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Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Abstract

A traditional association of judgment with “reason” has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by Hypatia, Inc.

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