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Reply to Louise Antony

  • Naomi Scheman
  • In response to commentaries on:

Abstract

In her discussion of Naomi Scheman's “Individualism and the Objects of Psychology” Louise Antony misses the import of an unpublished paper of Scheman's that she cites. That paper argues against token identity theories on the grounds that only the sort of psycho-physical parallelisms that token identity theorists, such as Davidson and Fodor, reject could license the claim that each mental state or event is some particular physical state or event.

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Antony, Louise. 1985. Is psychological individualism a piece of ideology? Hypatia 10 (3): 157–73.
Fodor, Jerry. 1975. The language of though. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
Scheman, Naomi. 1983. Individualism and the objects of psychology. In Discovering reality, ed. Harding, Sandra and Hintikka, Merrill B.Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Scheman, Naomi. 1983. Types, tokens, and conjuring tricks. unpub. ms.
Scheman, Naomi. 1993. Engendering: Constructions of knowledge, authority, and privilege. New York: Routledge.
Scheman, Naomi. 1995. Feeling our way toward moral objectivity. In Mind and morals, ed. Clark, AndyFriedman, Marilyn, and May, Larry. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wilson, Robert A. 1995. Cartesian psychology and physical minds: Individualism and the sciences of the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reply to Louise Antony

  • Naomi Scheman
  • In response to commentaries on:

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