Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-684899dbb8-7wlv9 Total loading time: 0.367 Render date: 2022-05-21T00:10:25.888Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "useNewApi": true }
  • English
International Organization International Organization

Article contents

Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2006

Michael J. Gilligan
Michael J. Gilligan
Affiliation:
New York University, mg5@nyu.edu
Get access

Abstract

Recently, scholars have questioned whether enforcement mechanisms are necessary to make regimes effective. This article provides a model of the international criminal regime in which the regime changes state behavior even though it possesses no enforcement mechanisms. The article also answers several prominent criticisms of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Critics claim that the ICC is at best futile because it lacks the power to apprehend the criminals it is meant to prosecute. Even worse, the ICC may be harmful because it will induce atrocious leaders to hold on to power longer than they would if they could step down with immunity for past crimes. The model in this article suggests those criticisms may be inaccurate. I model the interaction between a leader and a foreign state that has the option of offering that leader asylum. I examine the effect of the creation of an ICC-like institution on that interaction. The model produces three main findings. (1) Leaders' reigns will not be prolonged as a result of the regime. (2) Although the institution has no enforcement power, some leaders (those with such a high probability of being deposed that they would willingly surrender to the institution rather than try to stay in office) will be punished by it. In those circumstances, the foreign state has no incentive to offer the leader asylum. (3) The institution may deter some atrocities at the margin.I would like to thank Tanaz Moghadam, whose undergraduate honors thesis, which William Clark and I advised, provides an earlier game-theoretic analysis of the Court and introduced me to the topic of the ICC. Special thanks go to William Clark for the idea of treating the ICC game-theoretically and for valuable comments at various stages of this project. I am grateful to Lisa Martin and two anonymous reviewers who provided exceptionally helpful insights. I would also like to acknowledge Sandy Gordon, Dimitri Landa, James Morrow, Steve Ratner, Shanker Satyanath and Ken Scheve for their much-appreciated input. All errors remain my responsibility.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 60 , Issue 4 , October 2006 , pp. 935 - 967
Copyright
© 2006 The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Akhavam, Payam. 1996. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment. American Journal of International Law 90 (3):501–510.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Akhavam, Payam. 2001. Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities? American Journal of International Law 95 (1):7–31.Google Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Cameron, Iain. 2004. Jurisdiction and Admissibility Issues under the ICC Statute. In The Permanent International Criminal Court, edited by Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, and Eric Donnelly, 65–94. Oxford, England: Hart Publishing.
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. International Organization 47 (2):175–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Clark, Ann Marie. 2001. Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. International Organization 59 (2):363–398.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News about Cooperation Good News about Cooperation? International Organization 50 (3):379–406.Google Scholar
Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52 (4):887–917.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Florini, Ann. 1996. The Evolution of International Norms. International Studies Quarterly 40 (3):363–389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Franck, Thomas M. 1990. The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Goldsmith, Jack. 2003. The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court. University of Chicago Law Review 70 (1):89–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldsmith, Jack, and Stephen D. Krasner. 2003. The Limits of Idealism. Daedalus 132 (1):47–63.Google Scholar
Haas, Peter M. 1989. Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control. International Organization 43 (3):377–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haas, Peter M., ed. 1992. Special Issue: Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. International Organization 46 (1):1–390.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds. 1993. Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Henquet, Thomas. 1999. Mandatory Compliance Powers vis-à-vis States by the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Analysis. Leiden Journal of International Law 12 (4):969–999.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 2003. Tenth Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. Available at 〈http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2003/AR03-e.pdf〉. Accessed 20 June 2006.
Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Kelley, Judith. 2005. The Role of Material and Non-material Factors in State Behavior: Article 98 Agreements as a Quasi-Experiment. Paper prepared for the Vanderbilt Law School International Law Roundtable on International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law, Nashville, Tenn., January.
Keohane, Robert O., Peter M. Haas, and Mark A. Levy. 1993. The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements. In Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, edited by Peter M. Haas, Robert of Keohane, and Mark A. Levy, 3–26. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Klotz, Audie. 1995. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 2003. Interview: Conversations with History. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 31 March 2003. Transcript available at: 〈http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Krasner/krasner-con0.html〉. Accessed 20 June 2006.
Kratochwil, Friedrich V., and John G. Ruggie. 1986. International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State. International Organization 40 (4):753–775.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Legro, Jeffrey. 1997. Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism. International Organization 51 (1):21–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons. 1998. Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. International Organization 52 (4):729–757.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meernik, James. 2004. Reaching Inside the State: International Law and Superior Liability. International Studies Perspectives 5 (4):356–377.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meernik, James, and Jamie Shairick. 2005. Promoting International Humanitarian Law: Strong States and the Ratification of the ICC Treaty. Mimeo, University of North Texas, Denton.
Mitchell, Ronald. 1993. Compliance Theory: A Synthesis. Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 2 (4):327–334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, Ronald. 1994. Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. International Organization 48 (3):425–458.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moghadam, Tanaz. 2004. Deterring Atrocities Perpetration: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the International Criminal Court. Undergraduate Senior Honors Thesis in International Relations, New York University, New York.
Morrow, James D. 2001. The Institutional Features of Prisoner of War Treaties. International Organization 55 (4):971–991.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nadelman, Ethan. 1990. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. International Organization 44 (4):479–524.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, Richard. 1998. Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Target Land Mines. International Organization 52 (3):613–644.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raustiala, Kal, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2002. International Law, International Relations and Compliance. In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomes Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 538–558. London: Sage.
Roth, Kenneth. 2002. Part V: Introduction. Social Research 69 (4):1079–1084.Google Scholar
Rudolph, Christopher. 2001. Constituting an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. International Organization 53 (3):655–691.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. 1998. Compliance with International Agreements. Annual Review of Political Science 1:75–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A., and Lisa L. Martin. 2002. International Organizations and Institutions. In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomes Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 192–211. London: Sage.
Smidt, Michael L. 2001. The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence? Military Law Review 167:156–240.Google Scholar
Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. Paths to Compliance: Enforcement Management and the European Union. International Organization 56 (3):609–643.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Victor, David G., Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff. 1998. Introduction and Overview. In The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments, edited by David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, 1–46. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Wippman, David. 2000. Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice. Fordham International Law Journal 23 (3):473–488.Google Scholar
Young, Oran. 1994. International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
44
Cited by

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *