Hostname: page-component-7d684dbfc8-7nm9g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2023-09-24T02:54:34.242Z Has data issue: false Feature Flags: { "corePageComponentGetUserInfoFromSharedSession": true, "coreDisableEcommerce": false, "coreDisableSocialShare": false, "coreDisableEcommerceForArticlePurchase": false, "coreDisableEcommerceForBookPurchase": false, "coreDisableEcommerceForElementPurchase": false, "coreUseNewShare": true, "useRatesEcommerce": true } hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2009

Jason Lyall  and
Isaiah Wilson III
Jason Lyall
Affiliation:
Princeton University, E-mail: jlyall@princeton.edu
Isaiah Wilson III
Affiliation:
United States Military Academy at West Point, E-mail: isaiah.wilson@usma.edu.
Get access

Abstract

During the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes. Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands. What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency (COIN) wars? We argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is primarily responsible for this shift. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations. This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population. Modern militaries may therefore inadvertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies. We test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies (1800–2005) and a paired comparison of two U.S. Army divisions in Iraq (2003–2004). We find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent's status as an occupier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat. By contrast, we find only partial support for conventional power- and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 63 , Issue 1 , January 2009 , pp. 67 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Addington, Larry H. 1994. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. 2d ed.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
Anderson, Benedict R. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.Google Scholar
Arreguín-Toft, Ivan. 2001. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. International Security 26 (1):93–128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arreguín-Toft, Ivan. 2005. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Asprey, Robert. 1994. War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History. New York: Morrow.Google Scholar
Bailey, Jonathan B. A. 1996. The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare. Camberley, England: British Army Strategic and Combat Studies Institute.Google Scholar
Bailey, Jonathan B. A. 2001. The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare. In The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050, edited by Knox, MacGregor and Murray, Williamson, 132–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Banks, Arthur. 2003. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS), 1815–2003. [computer file] Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. ⟨http://www.icpsr.umich.edu⟩.Google Scholar
Bartels, Larry M. 1996. Pooling Disparate Observations. American Journal of Political Science 40 (3):905–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Biddle, Stephen. 2004. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Bob, Clifford. 2005. The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Callwell, C.E. 1996. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. 3d ed.Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.Google Scholar
Clodfelter, Michael. 2002. Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500–2000. New York: McFarland.Google Scholar
Cohen, Eliot A. 1984. Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars. International Security 9 (2):151–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collier, Paul, and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4):563–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Connor, Walker. 1994. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Correlates of War. 2000. Inter-State War Data, 1816–1997 Version 3.0. Available at ⟨http://www.correlatesofwar.org⟩. Accessed 14 October 2008.Google Scholar
Downes, Alexander B. 2006. Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War. International Security 30 (4):152–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eggenberger, David. 1985. An Encyclopedia of Battles: Accounts of Over 1,560 Battles from 1479 B.C. to the Present. London: Dover Publications.Google Scholar
Eyre, Dana P., and Suchman, Mark C.. 1996. Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach. In The Culture of National Security, edited by Katzenstein, Peter, 79–113. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Fazal, Tanisha M. 2007. State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D., and Laitin, David D.. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review 97 (1):75–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feaver, Peter, and Gelpi, Christopher. 2004. Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Fortna, Page. 2004. Where Have All the Victories Gone? War Outcomes in Historical Perspective. Paper presented at the 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, Chicago.Google Scholar
Galula, David. 2006. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger.Google Scholar
Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Eriksson, Mikael, Sollenberg, Margareta, and Strand, Håvard. 2002. Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 39 (5):615–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grenier, John. 2005. The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hegre, Håvard, and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (4):509–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hollis, Patrecia Slayden. 2004. Division Operations Across the Spectrum—Combat to SOSO in Iraq. Field Artillery Journal (2):9–12.Google Scholar
Horne, Alistair. 1977. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962. New York: Viking.Google Scholar
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Humphreys, Macartan, and Weinstein, Jeremy M.. 2006. Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War: Determinants of the Strategies of Warring Factions. American Political Science Review 100 (3):429–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2007. The Military Balance 2007. London: Taylor & Francis.Google Scholar
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2007. IMF Direction of Trade: Global Insight. Washington, D.C.: IMF.Google Scholar
Jaggers, Keith, and Gurr, Ted Robert. 1995. Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data. Journal of Peace Research 32 (4):469–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jane's Armour and Artillery. 2007. New York: Jane's.Google Scholar
Jentleson, Bruce W. 1992. The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force. International Studies Quarterly 36 (1):49–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnson, Dominic, and Madin, J.. 2008. Population Models and Counter-Insurgency Strategies. In Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World, edited by Sargarin, Raphael D. and Taylor, Terrence, 159–85. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahaner, Larry. 2006. AK-47: The Weapon That Changed the Face of War. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Kocher, Matthew. 2007. How ‘Free’ Is Free-Riding in Civil War? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem. World Politics 59 (2):177–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kier, Elizabeth. 1997. Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Kilcullen, David. 2006. Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency. Military Review (May-June):103–8.Google Scholar
King, Gary, Tomz, Michael, and Wittenberg, Jason. 2000. Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation. American Journal of Political Science 44 (2):347–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krepinevich, Andrew F. 1988. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Kress, Moshe. 2002. Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations. New York: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leites, Nathan, and Wolf, Charles Jr. 1970. Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts. Chicago: Markham.Google Scholar
Licklider, Roy. 1995. The Consequences of Negotiated Settlement in Civil Wars, 1945–93. American Political Science Review 89 (3):681–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lieven, Anatol. 1998. Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Luard, Evan. 1986. War in International Society. London: Tauris.Google Scholar
Lynn, John. 1993. The History of Logistics and Supplying War. In Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, edited by Lynn, John A., 9–30. Boulder, Colo: Westview.Google Scholar
Mack, Andrew. 1975. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict. World Politics 27 (2):175–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mao, Tse-tung. 1978. On Guerrilla Warfare. Translated Griffith, by Samuel B. II. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press.Google Scholar
March, James G., and Olsen, Johan P.. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International Organization 52 (4):943–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McNeill, William H. 1982. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Merom, Gil. 2003. How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitchell, Allan. 2000. The Great Train Race: Railways and the Franco-German Rivalry, 1815–1914. New York: Berghahn.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mueller, John E. 1973. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Nagl, John A. 2002. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.Google Scholar
Ness, Leland S. 2002. Jane's World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles: The Complete Guide. New York: HarperCollins.Google Scholar
Record, Jeffrey. 2007. Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books.Google Scholar
Regan, Patrick M. 2002. Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1):55–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ricks, Thomas E. 2006. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: Penguin.Google Scholar
Salehyan, Idean. 2007. Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuaries for Rebel Groups. World Politics 59 (2):217–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salehyan, Idean, and Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2006. Refugees and the Spread of Civil Wars. International Organization 60 (2):335–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1). Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (3):259–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War. Perspectives on Politics 2 (2):259–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shafer, D. Michael. 1988. Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Sheffield, Gary D. 2001. Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities. London: Headline.Google Scholar
Smithers, A. J. 1992. Cambrai: The First Great Tank Battle, 1917. London: L. Cooper.Google Scholar
Solyakin, A. G. 2005. Otechestvennye bronirovannye mashiny, XX vek. Moscow, Russia: Eksprint.Google Scholar
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2007. Arms Transfer Database. Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI Press.Google Scholar
Strachan, Hew. 1988. European Armies and the Conduct of War. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Thompson, Robert. 1966. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. New York: Praeger.Google Scholar
Tomz, Michael, Wittenberg, Jason, and King, Gary. 2003. Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.1. Available at: ⟨http://gking.harvard.edu⟩. Accessed 12 August 2008.Google Scholar
U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual No. 3–24. 2007. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Valentino, Benjamin, Huth, Paul, and Balch-Lindsay, Dylan. 2004. “Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare. International Organization 58 (2):375–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Creveld, Martin L. 1977. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. London: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Vandervort, Bruce. 1998. Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914. London: UCL Press.Google Scholar
Walter, Barbara F. 2001. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Westad, Odd Arne. 2007. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Wilson, Isaiah III 2007. Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Relations and Why America Fails to Win the Peace. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wood, Elizabeth Jean. 2003. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar