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Theory, Data, and Hypothesis Testing: World Bank Environmental Reform Redux

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2005

Daniel L. Nielson  and
Michael J. Tierney
Daniel L. Nielson
Affiliation:
Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, daniel_nielson@byu.edu
Michael J. Tierney
Affiliation:
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, mjtier@wm.edu
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Extract

We thank Tamar Gutner for her thoughtful comments on our article, “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform” (International Organization, Spring 2003). While championing principal-agent (P-A) theory as the most promising approach to the study of international organizations (IOs) in general, she questions the novelty of our P-A model and criticizes both our methods and data. We are grateful for the opportunity to clarify our contributions and offer concrete solutions to the research questions that she raises.We thank Brad Parks and Sue Peterson for comments on an early version of this article. For research assistance, we are grateful to Daniel Magleby, Dan Maliniak, and Jess Sloan.

Information

Type
COMMENT AND RESPONSE
Information
International Organization , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , July 2005 , pp. 785 - 800
Copyright
© 2005 The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press

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References

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