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Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War

  • Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger

Why do states contribute to alliances? Is relative size the principal factor influencing the size of contributions, as many studies suggest, or are perceptions of threat, dependencies on other alliance members, and domestic institutions and policies equally important? These questions hold unusual interest in the wake of the cold war. The end of bipolarity promises more ad hoc coalitions, which will widen opportunities for research on alliance burden-sharing beyond the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the same time, because the political fault lines of the cold war have disappeared, there are few accepted political criteria for sharing those security burdens that are perceived collectively.

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We thank Isabelle Grunberg, John Odell, and the referees for International Organization for perceptive, valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. We also thank Maria Toyoda for preparing the tables and figures.

1. The term “most-likely” is from Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Greenstein, Fred and Polsby, Nelson, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79137. In a most-likely case, because the independent variable is at a level that strongly predicts a particular outcome, the outcome variable must occur or the theory is suspect. In a least-likely case, the independent variable is at a level that gives only a weak prediction; a finding that it nonetheless produces the outcome is strong supporting evidence. Eckstein introduces these as an alternative to what he calls “crucial” cases, that is, cases that “must closely fit” a theory if one is to have confidence in its validity or, conversely, “must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed.” Therefore, the strongest possible affirming evidence for a theory is a case where the theory makes only a weak prediction (a least-likely case), the alternative hypotheses make strong predictions in the opposite direction, and the evidence is consistent with the original theory. Conversely, the strongest possible infirming evidence is when a theory makes a strong prediction (a most-likely case), the alternatives also make the same prediction, and all the theories prove to be wrong. In these instances we can neither blame the alternative hypotheses for a theory's failure nor credit them for a theory's success. Such truly crucial cases are rare, and we found none in our study. The nearest instance was Japan's contribution, which fits the alliance-dependence hypothesis despite contrary predictions from the balance-of-threat and collective action hypotheses. But because this case is a most-likely one for the alliance-dependence hypothesis, it falls short of being the strongest possible affirming evidence. See pp. 118–20 for the quotations; emphasis original.

2. Ibid., p. 99.

3. On the method of process-tracing, see George, Alexander L. and McKeown, Timothy, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2 (Santa Barbara, Calif.: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 2158.

4. This follows the argument of Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971).

5. Olson, Mancur Jr., and Zeckhauser, Richard, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (08 1966), pp. 266–79.

6. Similarly, a good could be public for a region. In the episode at hand, teaching Iraq the “lesson” that states that attack neighbors will fail could have been more a public good for its neighbors, such as Egypt, than for distant or less vulnerable states.

7. Hegemonic stability theory suggests that a global hegemon will pay more to assure the stability of the world oil markets as well as the sanctity of international norms. See Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), chap. 10. Of course not all coalition leaders are global hegemons.

8. We have not assigned relative weights to economic and military capabilities, as rough orders of magnitude suffice.

9. Walt, Stephen M., The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

10. Leaders' beliefs about ends, means, and effective strategies in world affairs, and their images of other actors, also affect perceived threats and thus drive actors' preferences. For a good review of literature that explores these issues, see Tetlock, Philip and McGuire, Charles, “Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy,” in White, Ralph, ed., Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War (New York: New York University Press, 1986). Ideally we could probe leaders' beliefs about other actors and contexts—for instance, whether governments will align against threats or bandwagon toward their source and the roots of such beliefs, particularly the lessons learned about past efforts to meet threats and allocate burdens; see Jervis, Robert and Snyder, Jack, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). See also Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 6; and Breslauer, George and Tetlock, Philip, eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991). Yet we set beliefs aside because of the difficulty of getting “insider” process-tracing information about a contemporary, politicized episode.

11. For the United States, this was (and is) complicated by its strong implicit commitment to Israel's security.

12. See Snyder, Glenn, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36 (07 1984), pp. 461–96;Mandelbaum, Michael, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 151–52; and Kupchan, Charles A., “NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-alliance Behavior,” International Organization 42 (Spring 1988), pp. 317–46 and pp. 324–25 in particular.

13. Putnam, Robert D., “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 433–60.

14. Kupchan, , “NATO and the Persian Gulf,” footnote 27, p. 326. See also Barnett, Michael and Levy, Jack S., “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–1973,” International Organization 45 (Spring 1991), pp. 370–79; and David, Steven R., “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics 43 (01 1991), pp. 235–38.

15. Logically this process can take four paths. First, a dependent ally's leaders can respond to the external pressures by publicly expending political capital at home to push for major contributions. Second, leaders can be responsive but give only token domestic support to a contribution. Third, leaders could deal with the foreign pressure privately, that is, by attempting to insulate domestic politics from foreign demands. Fourth, the leaders could sharply feel the heat of external demands but resist them if public opposition is intense. If the ally is truly dependent, only exceptionally strong domestic pressures should lead to the fourth path.

16. See Barnett, and Levy, , “Domestic Sources of Alignments and Alliances.”

17. Katzenstein, Peter J. and Okawara, Nobuo, “Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” International Security 17 (Spring 1993), pp. 84118.

18. The phrase is Neustadt's, Richard. See Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), p. 26.

19. Wildavsky, Aaron, “The Two Presidencies,” in Wildavsky, Aaron, ed., The Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).

20. See Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Allison, Graham and Halperin, Morton, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” in Tanter, Raymond and Ullman, Richard, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

21. As stated, even this assertion's proponents acknowledge that seats do not entirely dictate stands. See Allison's qualifications to the hypothesis in Essence of Decision, p. 166. For criticism of the assertion that stands equal seats, see Art, Robert, “Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy Sciences (12 1973), pp. 467–90; and Jervis, , Perception and Misperception in international Politics, pp. 2428.

22. On this point, see Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy”; and Rosati, Jerel, “Developing a Systematic Decision-making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” World Politics 33 (01 1981), pp. 234–52.

23. For a study of U.S. military officials' attitudes on the use of force in various cold war crises, see Betts, Richard, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).

24. Pasztor, Andy and Murray, Alan, “U.S. May Reap Windfall if Allies Deliver on Pledges,” Wall Street Journal, 25 03 1991, p. A3.

25. Ibid.

26. Quoted in Woodward, Bob, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 237.

27. Baker, and Bush, are quoted on p. 393 of Cooper, Andrew Fenton, Higgott, Richard A., and Nassal, Kim Richard, “Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict,” Political Science Quarterly 106 (Fall 1991), pp. 391410.

28. Woodward, , The Commanders, p. 252.

29. Hoffman, David, “Messages as Mixed as Audiences,” Washington Post, 15 11 1990, p. A1.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Devroy, Ann, “Bush Sees Iraq as Nuclear Threat,” Washington Post, 23 11 1990, p. A1.

33. See Tyler, Patrick and Hoffmann, David, “U.S. Asking Allies to Share the Costs,” Washington Post, 30 08 1991, p. A1; and Riding, Alan, “U.S. Officials Begin Tour to Seek Financial Backing for Gulf Force,” The New York Times, 5 09 1990.

34. Apple, R. W., “Bonn and Tokyo are Criticized for Not Bearing More of Gulf Cost,” The New York Times, 13 09 1990, p. A1.

35. See Lewis, Neil A., “Sorting Out Legal War Concerning Real War,” The New York Times, 15 11 1990, p. A18; and Friedman, Thomas, “Senators Demand Bush Ask Congress Before Iraq Move: Want Say in Combat; but Baker Rebuffs Key Panel, Saying He'll ‘Consult,’ but Not Seek Permission,” The New York Times, 18 10, 1990, p. A1.

36. The New York Times and CBS News polls, reported in The New York Times, 4 03 1991.

37. Mueller, John, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973). For a review of the “rally” effect and the situations in which it has and has not occurred, see Brody, Richard, Assessing the President (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991).

38. Woodward, The Commanders.

39. Atkinson, Rick and Woodward, Bob, “Gulf Turning Points: Strategy, Diplomacy,” Washington Post, 2 12 1990, p. A1.

40. See ibid.; Woodward, The Commanders, pp. 300–321; and Friedman, Thomas and Tyler, Patrick, “Baker Seen as Balance to Bush on Crisis in Gulf,” The New York Times, 3 11 1990, p. A1.

41. Woodward, , The Commanders, p. 226. Also See Woodward, Bob and Atkinson, Rick, “Mideast Decision: Uncertainty over a Daunting Prospect,” The Washington Post, 26 08 1990, p. A1; and, for a similar reconstruction, Friedman, Thomas and Tyler, Patrick, “From the First, U.S. Resolve to Fight,” The New York Times, 3 03 1991, p. A1.

42. Making 'Em Pay,” The Economist, 26 01 1991, p. 18.

43. See Frankel, Glenn, “Britain Reclaiming Role as Top U.S. Ally,” Washington Post, 19 01 1991, p. A23;Schmitt, Eric, “Tensions Bedeviled Allies All the Way to Kuwait,” The New York Times, 24 03 1991; and Whitney, Craig R., “The Empire Strikes Back,” The New York Times Magazine, 18 03 1991, p. 32.

44. This may seem an excessively U.S.-centered view, but it is easier to operationalize than support for the goals found in the UN resolutions, since they could have been pursued in more than one way. Further, since the Bush administration built and maintained the anti-Iraq coalition, diplomatic support in practice meant support for U.S. policy.

45. Just Like Old Times,” The Economist, 1 09 1990, p. 51.

46. Frankel, Glenn, “Britain First to Join Multinational Force,” Washington Post, 9 08 1990, p. A37.

47. See Webster, Philip, “Thatcher Stance on Attack Threatens U.K. All-Party Consensus,” Times (London), 4 09 1990; and Lewis, John, “Labour Tempers Support for Policy with Warning,” Times (London), 8 09 1990, p. 7.

48. Wood, Nicholas and Bremner, Charles, “Thatcher Hits at Europeans' Gulf Efforts,” Times (London), 31 08 1990, p. 1.

49. McEwen, Andrew and Gumucio, Juan Carlos, “U.N. Agrees on Mandatory Iraq Sanctions,” Times (London), 7 08 1990, p. 1.

50. Webster, Philip, “Parties Agreed on Need to Destroy Iraqi War Machine,” Times (London), 29 01 1991, p. 2.

51. “Iraq Has Returned to Law of Jungle, Thatcher Tells M.P.s,” Times (London), 7 09 1990, p. 9.

52. British Foreign Secretary Hurd, Douglas, “Saddam Husayn: Standing Up to the Bully of Iraq,” Daily Telegraph, 24 08 1990, p. 16, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report: West Europe (hereafter, FBIS-WEU), 27 08 1990, p. 7.

53. Moncrieff, Chris, London Press Association broadcast, 30 08 1990, in FBIS-WEU 30 08 1990. Freedman and Karsh argue that Britain, as a former colonial power, continued to respond to challenges to world order. See Freedman, Lawrence and Karsh, Ephraim, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 110–11. This likely sensitized British leaders to others' apparent free-riding.

54. Just Like Old times,” The Economist.

55. Norton, Philip, The British Polity, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1991), pp. 197205.

56. Whitney, , “The Empire Strikes Back,” p. 58.

57. Back to the Bulldog Stuff,” The Economist, 19 08 1991, p. 51.

58. Interview with Hurd by Jones, George, “Time for the Military Screw to be Turned, Hurd Suggests,” Daily Telegraph, 1 11 1990, p. 10, in FBIS-WEU 2 11, 1990 pp. 67.

59. Freedman, and Karsh, , The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991, pp. 113–14.

60. Cairo Domestic Service broadcast, 8 08 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia (hereafter, FBIS-NES), 08 1990, pp. 67.

61. Beirut Domestic Service broadcast, 3 08 1990, in FBIS-NES 3 08 1990.

62. The Arabs: Liking Him Less,” The Economist, 25 08 1990, p. 34.

63. See Cairo MENA broadcast 27 08 1990, in FBIS-NES 28 08 1990, p. 7; and Paris Radio Monte Carlo broadcast 18 09 1990, in FBIS-NES 19 09 1990, p. 8. See also War, Peace, and Mr. Gorbachev's Arab Solution,” The Economist, 3 11 1990, p. 47.

64. Haberman, Clyde, “Officials Call for Iraqi's Ouster,” The New York Times, 24 02 1991, p. A19.

65. See Claiborne, William, “Mubarak Sets Summit, seeks All-Arab Force,” Washington Post, 9 08 1990, p. A33;“Mustafa Bakri report, Paris radio Monte Carlo, 14 August 1990, in FBIS-NES 16 August 1990, p. 7; and “Against Iraq,” The Economist, 5 01 1991, p. 32.

66. See Al-Shariqah, Al-Khalij, 18 11 1990, pp. 1 and 17, in FBIS-NES 27 November 1990, p. 1; and Hoffman, David, “Syria Reasserts ‘Defensive’ Role in Gulf Force,” Washington Post, 13 01 1991, p. A18.

67. Akhbar, Amman Al-Usbu broadcast 11 October 1990, in FBIS-NES 12 10 1990, p. 13.

68. See Hoffman, , “Syria Reasserts ‘Defensive’; Role in Gulf Force”; “Against Iraq,” The Economist; and Tyler, Patrick E., “Bush to Forgive $7.1 Billion Egypt Owes for Military Aid,” Washington Post, 1 09 1990, p. A1.

69. For example, see comments by Foreign Minister Ismat Abd-al-Majik, reported by Cairo Domestic Service broadcast 17 01 1991, in FBIS-NES 18 01 1991, p. 10.

70. Ottaway, David B., “New Arab Alignment Seen Joining Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,” Washington Post, 3 09 1990, p. A11.

71. Cody, Edward, “Anger at Saddam, Financial Need Seen Motivating Mubarak,” Washington Post, 6 11 1990, p. A15. See also Freedman, and Karsh, , The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991, pp. 72 and 9798.

72. Claiborne, William, “Limits Seen on Egypt's Caution,” Washington Post, 6 08 1990, p. A13.

73. Cairo MENA broadcast 27 September 1990, in FBIS-NES 27 09 1990.

74. See Claiborne, “Mubarak Sets Summit, seeks All-Arab Force”; and Tyler, “Bush to Forgive $7.1 Billion Egypt Owes for Military Aid.”

75. Badawi, Jamal, “Lessons from the United States,” Cairo Al-Wafd, 29 09 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-NES 4 10 1990, p. 9. It should be noted that this newspaper was not part of the semi-official Egyptian press.

76. Claiborne, “Mubarak Sets Summit, seeks All-Arab Force.”

77. See Cody, Edward, “Arabs Reaffirm Limited Role,” Washington Post, 9 10 1990, p. A12; and Against Iraq,” The Economist. As we note below, few Egyptians objected to aiding the Saudis; it was fighting fellow Arabs along with Westerners that aroused opposition. Thus, once Mubarak decided to oppose Saddam, he publicly demonized the Iraqi leader; See Freedman, and Karsh, , The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991, p. 98. Still, many Egyptian elites saw the conflict as an opportunity to reassert influence in the Arab world after being isolated after the Camp David Accords. See Frankel, Glenn, “Egypt's Alliance Role Meets Minimal Dissent,” Washington Post, 18 02 1991, p. A1.

78. McDermott, Anthony, Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution (London: Croon, Helm, 1988), p. 96.

79. As The Economist put it in mid-1993, “A long line of pharoahs, pashas, kings, and presidents has ignored public opinion in Egypt. See The Insurgency that Will Not Stop,” The Economist, 15 05 1993, p. 44.

80. McDermott, , Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak, p. 104.

81. Ibid., pp. 115–17. Nazih Ayubi has stated, “It is remarkable how stable the Egyptian political system has remained over the years, in spite of its numerous and escalating problems.” See Ayubi, Nazih, “Domestic Politics,” in Lillian Craig Harris, ed., Egypt: Internal Challenges and Regional Stability (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988), p. 49.

82. Belgrade, TANJUG broadcast 7 August 1990, in FBIS-NES 8 08 1990, p. 12.

83. See Frankel, “Egypt's Alliance Role Meets Minimal Dissent”; and Claiborne, William, “‘Allah Will Bring Vengeance,’ Iraqi President Told,” Washington Post, 26 08 1990, p. A29.

84. Mubarak dismissed the commander of his forces in Saudi Arabia for his soft public line against Iraq. See FBIS-NES 12 10 1990, p. 13.

85. Frankel, , “Egypt's Alliance Role Meets Minimal Dissent.”

86. Knipe, Michael, “Cairo Sounds Arab Opinion over Possible Ceasefire Plan,” Times (London), 22 01 1991, p. 4.

87. Drozdiak, William, “France Sends 4,000 More Troops to Seek an Air Blockade of Iraq,” Washington Post, 16 09 1990, p. A33.

88. Ibid.

89. Goshko, John M., “Mitterrand Proposes Peace Plan,” Washington Post, 25 09 1990, p. A1.

90. See Drozdiak, William, “France Denounces Iraq's Offer,” Washington Post, 24 08 1990, p. A29; and Freedman, and Karsh, , The Gulf Conflict 19901991, p. 115.

91. Ibrahim, Youssef M., “France Will Pursue Peace till 16th, Mitterrand Says,” The New York Times, 10 01 1991, p. A18.

92. Drozdiak, William, “E.C. Countries Expel Iraqi Attaches,” Washington Post, 18 09 1990, p. A1.

93. One official suggested that some in France worried that U.S. success would “leave no room for us to operate there.” See Hoagland, Jim, “Europeans Still Firm in Opposing Saddam,” Washington Post, 25 10 1990, p. A31. On offensive bandwagoning, see Walt, , The Origins of Alliances, p. 21.

94. Lewis, Paul, “France and Three Arab States Issue an Appeal to Hussein, The New York Times, 15 01 1991, p. A12. See also Riding, Alan, “French Maneuvering: Taking the Lead for Europe,” The New York Times, 6 01 1991, p. 4.

95. Riding, Alan, “Paris Stressing Independent Role,” The New York Times, 18 08 1990, p. 6.

96. Jean-Marie Le Pen said that France had “no vital interests at stake” and had more interest in Iraq than in ties to billionaire emires and advocates of Islamic fundamentalism. See Riding, Alan, “Le Pen, Isolated in France, Opposes Gulf Involvement,” The New York Times, 24 09 1990, p. A13. Other French elites also had misgivings; See Freedman, and Karsh, , The Gulf Conflict, 19901991, p. 115.

97. See Katzenstein, Peter J., “Conclusion: Domestic Structures of Foreign Economic Policies,” in Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 295336;Zysman, John, “The French State in the International Economy,” in Between Power and Plenty, pp. 255–93; and Zysman, John, Governments, Markets, and Growth (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983). For disagreement with this view, see Milner, Helen, “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation,” Inter-national Organization 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 639–65.

98. Macridis, Roy C., “French Foreign Policy: The Quest for Rank,” in Macridis, Roy C., ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp. 3839 and 4142.

99. The previous week, Chevenement had clarified his opposition to moving from an embargo to a blockade, “that's to say, from peace to war.” See Drozdiak, William, “Use of Force Authorized by France,” Washington Post, 20 08 1990, p. A15.

100. Lewis, Paul, “Arabs Say Iraq Plans Offer Linking Pullout to Israel; Congress Opens War Debate,” The New York Times, 11 01 1991, p. A1.

101. Drozdiak, “Use of Force Authorized by France.”

102. Inoguchi, Takashi, “Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview,” Journal of Japanese Studies 17 (Summer 1991) pp. 257–73.

103. See Purrington, Courtney and , A. K., “Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis,” Asian Survey 31 (03 1991), pp. 307–23; and Japan Fires Sanctions on Iraq,” Japan Times, 1319 08 1990, p. 1.

104. Ito, Kenichi, “The Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis,” Journal of Japanese Studies 17 (Summer 1991), pp. 275–90.

105. Kaifu Chooses to Avoid Risks of Mideastern Trip,” Japan Times, 2026 08 1990, p. 1.

106. U.S. Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter visited Kaifu on 12 August to encourage Kaifu to travel to the Middle East and show his support for the U.S. troop deployment. See ibid.

107. Weisman, Steven R., “Breaking Tradition, Japan Sends Flotilla to Gulf,” The New York Times, 25 04 1991, p. A11.

108. Weisman, Steven R., “Japan Counts the Costs of Gulf Action-or Inaction,” The New York Times, 27 01 1991, p. E2.

109. Tokyo KYODO broadcast 3 August 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, 3 08 1990, pp. 34.

110. Abe, Kazoyoshi, “The Japanese Business Community: Response to the Gulf War,” Japanese Review of International Affairs 5 (Fall/Winter 1991), pp. 177200.

111. Blustein, Paul, “In Japan, the Politics of Hesitation,” Washington Post, 17 02 1991, p. C2.

112. See Japan Fires Sanctions on Iraq,” Japan Times, 131908 1990; and Freedman, and Karsh, , The Gulf Conflict, 19901991, p. 81.

113. Bunshun, Shukan, 09 1990, as cited in Japan Times, 2430 09 1990, p. 21.

114. Reid, T. R. and Burgess, John, “U.S. Critics Not Satisfied with Japan's $4 Billion Gulf Contribution,” Washington Post, 6 10 1990, p. A24.

115. Niksch, Larry and Sutter, Robert, “Japan's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 23 05 1991.

116. Cutter, Henry, “Analysts Label Aid Package a ‘Policy Mess,'” Japan Times, 101609 1990, p. 1.

117. Niksch, and Sutter, , “Japan's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis.” See also Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 19901991, p. 122.

118. Money, Men: All Donations Welcome,” The Economist, 18 08 1990, p. 24.

119. Article IX of the Japanese constitution had been most often interpreted as prohibiting use of Japanese forces abroad. But in 06 1992, the Diet approved sending forces overseas as part of UN peacekeeping operations, though under very limited conditions.

120. See Angel, Robert C., “Prime Ministerial Leadership in Japan,” Pacific Affairs 61 (Winter 19881989), pp. 583602; and Katzenstein and Okawara, “Japan's National Security.”

121. Smith, Charles, “Stretching Things,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 11 1990, p. 16. As a result of World War II, most Japanese support constitutional constraints on the use of force, reflecting not only a fear of foreign entanglements but also mistrust of the consequences of a heightened military role within Japan itself.

122. Inoguchi, “Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis.”

123. Ibid.

124. Interview of Kohl by Muechler, Guenter, Cologne Deustchlandfunk broadcast, 18 11 1990, in FBIS-WEU 19 11 1990, pp. 1314.

125. Hamburg DPA broadcast, 5 01 1991, in FBIS-WEU 7 01 1991, p. 14.

126. Goshko, John M., “Germany to Complete Contribution Toward Gulf War Costs Thursday,” Washington Post, 27 03 1991, p. A26.

127. Hamburg DPA broadcast 24 09 1990, in FBIS-WEU 25 09 1990, p. 4.

128. Fisher, Marc, “Germany Reluctant to Defend Turkey if Iraq Retaliates,” Washington Post, 22 01 1991, p. A20.

129. Figures on German oil imports are from Mossberg, Walter S., Lehner, Urban C., and Kempe, Frederick, “Some in U.S. Ask Why Germany, Japan Bear so Little of Gulf Cost,” The Wall Street Journal, 11 01 1991, p. A1; and Making 'Em Pay,” The Economist. One of the few exceptions came in Kohl's first public reaction to the start of air strikes against Iraq, when he stated he was “paying particular attention to maintaining a reliable energy supply.” See FBIS-WEU 12 01 1991, p. 10.

130. Mainz ZDF broadcast 14 01 1991, in FBIS-WEU 15 01 1991, pp. 1113.

131. See, for example, Kohl's statement in a Hamburg DPA broadcast 29 01 1991, in FBIS-WEU 30 01 1991, p. 7.

132. Tyler, Patrick E. and Hoffman, David, “U.S. Asking Allies to Share the Costs,” Washington Post, 29 08 1990, p. A1.

133. Schreitter-Schwarzenfeld, Horst, “Baker to Request Money,” Frankfurter Rundschau 7 09 1990, p. 4, in FBIS-WEU 7 09, p. 9.

134. Hamburg DPA broadcast 15 09 1990, in FBIS-WEU 17 09 1990, pp. 89.

135. Cologne Deutschlandfunk broadcast 17 09 1990, in FBIS-WEU 18 09 1990, pp. 1011. See also Freedman, and Karsh, , The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991, p. 120; and A Strange and Motley Army,” The Economist 22 09 1990, p. 46.

136. See, for example, members of Congress quoted in Mossberg, Lehner, and Kempe, “Some in U.S. Ask Why Germany, Japan Bear so Little of Gulf Cost.”

137. Hamburg DPA broadcast 11 01 1991, in FBIS-WEU 11 01 1991, pp. 1011.

138. Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk broadcast 30 01 1991, in FBIS-WEU 31 01 1991, PP. 57.

139. On this issue, see Müller, Harald, “German Foreign Policy After Unification,” in Stares, Paul B., ed., The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 139–42.

140. Germany subsequently agreed, without amending its Basic Law, to provide troops for UN operations in Somalia and enforcement of the “no fly zone” in the Balkans. The Kohl government's decisions on these issues were very controversial in Germany but ultimately were upheld by Germany's highest court. See Fisher, Marc, “High Court Allows German Participation in U.N. Balkan Mission,” Washington Post, 9 04 1993, p. A19.

141. A Strange and Motley army,” The Economist.

142. Poll reported in Hamburg DPA broadcast 10 01 1991, in FBIS-WEU 11 01 1991, p. 11.

143. Polls reported in Hamburg DPA broadcast 15 01 1991, in FBIS-WEU 16 01 1991, p. 13, and in Berlin ADN broadcast 20 01 1991, in FBIS-WEU 22 01 1991, p. 22.

144. See Disagreement Within Bonn Coalition About Deploying Bundeswehr in Gulf,” Frankfurter Algemeine, 16 08 1990, p. 2, in FBIS-WEU 17 08 1990, pp. 1011; and Bundeswehr Under U.N. Command?,” Die Welt (Hamburg), 18–19 08 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-WEU 20 08 1990, p. 16.

145. Standing Up,” The Economist, 18 08 1990, p. 42.

146. Ibid. See also Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991, p. 119.

147. Hamburg DPA broadcast 15 09 1990, in FBIS-WEU 17 09 1990, pp. 89.

148. Putnam makes an analogous distinction between voluntary and involuntary defection from international bargains, based on whether central-state actors or domestic actors reject them. See Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.”

149. By late August when Bush said, “This [conquest of Kuwait] will not stand,” the United States had a rhetorical commitment to a rollback, even though the material capability to implement it took months to put in place.

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