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Congressional oversight and the multilateral development banks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Jonathan Sanford  and
Margaret Goodman
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Extract

The existence of quasi-sovereign international institutions raises important questions regarding the level of national influence and the degree of democratic control over international political decisions which can be exercised within a multilateral political framework. Karl Kaiser suggests that “as the number and activities of international organizations expand, an area grows in which major decisions are made without much democratic control by the peoples and institutions which are affected or which support these activities financially. Because the national government is still the basic unit of political organization in contemporary world politics, it is necessary that national governments oversee the operations of the international institutions if the principle of public control over those who make the major political decisions is to be retained. For oversight to be effective, and for the principle of public control over the makers of political decisions to be retained, oversight must be reinforced by sufficient access to information so that governments can regulate these institutions and so that citizens can control governments.

Type
Comments and current views
Information
International Organization , Volume 29 , Issue 4 , Fall 1975 , pp. 1055 - 1064
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1975

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References

1 Kaiser, Karl, “Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process,” in Transnational Relations and World Politics, Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (eds.), (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972) p. 364Google Scholar.

2 Kaiser, in Keohane and Nye, pp. 364–5. It should be noted, however, that in 1948 and 1949 high officials of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) testified voluntarily before several congressional committees, including the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and the House and Senate Banking and Currency Committees. It would appear that a precedent thus exists for congressional committees to invite bank officials and staff personnel to testify before them.

3 See US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The United States and the Multilateral Development Banks, Committee Print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 03 1974, pp. 103–6Google Scholar, for a detailed description of the organization and function of the NAC.

4 The most important sources of this autonomy from US law are the charters of the banks, signed by US representatives, the US laws authorizing American participation in each bank and accepting the charters as binding upon the United States, and the International Organizations Immunities Act.

5 Bretton Woods Agreements Act, sec. 4. [59 Stat. 51, 22 U.S.C. et seq.], as modified by Sections 1 (a) and 3 (a) of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 and implemented by Executive Order 11209 [effective Feb. 14, 1966, 31 F.R. 2813].

6 US Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1974, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 05 11, 1973, p. 441Google Scholar.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Most contact between bank operating staff members and the US government takes place through the offices of US executive directors, but on occasion NAC personnel are in a position to discuss bank operations with bank staff members on particular issues.

10 This procedure is roughly comparable to that required for other US commitments to international organizations. The situation in the case of the multilateral development banks is more complex, however, because the banks cannot continue to make loans without assurance that countries will make good on their pledges, and the United States cannot make this assurance until Congress authorizes and appropriates funds.

11 US Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriations, 1972 (H.R. 14852), Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 04 14, 1972, p. 1002Google Scholar.

12 Gonzalez, Henry B., “IDA: The Fourth Replenishment,” Remarks in the House, Congressional Record vol. 119, 10 1973, p. H8542Google Scholar.