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Do Finite Duration Provisions Reduce International Bargaining Delay?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 October 2014

David H. Bearce ,
Cody D. Eldredge  and
Brandy J. Jolliff
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Abstract

This research note hypothesizes that international agreements including a finite duration provision or with a shorter expected duration should take less time to negotiate. Using a random sample of agreements across different issue areas, it finds statistical support for this hypothesis. Agreements without a finite duration provision experienced a bargaining phase that was twice as long as agreements including a finite duration provision and otherwise short-term agreements. This result not only offers empirical support for the theoretical proposition that a longer shadow of the future leads to increased bargaining delay—it also has important policy implications. International negotiators can include a finite duration provision when they prefer a shorter bargaining phase to a potentially more durable agreement, and they can avoid this feature when they prefer a more durable agreement, although this decision comes with the cost of additional bargaining delay. By treating finite duration provisions as an independent variable, this result also addresses a critique of the research program on the rational design of international institutions that it moves backward by considering only design features as dependent variables.

Type
Research Notes
Information
International Organization , Volume 69 , Issue 1 , Winter 2015 , pp. 219 - 239
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2015 

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Footnotes

For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank Scott Adler, Aysegul Aydin, Steve Chan, Daniela Donno, Julia Gray, Joe Jupille, Moonhawk Kim, Yonatan Lupu, Barbara Koremenos, Ed Mansfield, Sarah Sokhey, Nicole Simonelli, Jessica Stanton, Jaroslav Tir, Kim-Lee Tuxhorn, Alex Weisinger, two anonymous reviewers, and the IO editor.

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