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The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation

  • Frances Rosenbluth and Ross Schaap

Abstract

This article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics. Based on evidence from twenty-two industrialized countries, we argue that electoral rules—specifically, the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal—have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system. Moreover, despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration, the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels.

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The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation

  • Frances Rosenbluth and Ross Schaap

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