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Exploring the “myth” of hegemonic stability

  • Isabelle Grunberg (a1)
Abstract

There is a growing discrepancy between the popularity of the hegemonic stability theory and the amount of material pointing to the theory's shortcomings, both analytic and empirical. This article begins with a discussion of the theory's major weaknesses and then offers an analysis of the theory's discourse. Using methods of structural analogy and the study of imagery, the investigation proceeds from the most superficial to the most deep-seated and universal imagery found in the theory's discourse. It argues that the idea of hegemonic stability and the notion of the benevolent hegemon have their roots in powerful and interrelated myths, including myths of the golden age, the Savior, and the death of the sun. It also argues that the ability of these myths to sway human emotions has interfered with the process of theory-building and scientific investigation, of which intuition is a vital component. It concludes that the continuing popularity of the hegemonic stability theory is based on the timeless appeal of the myths that it incorporates.

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1. See Gilpin Robert. U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Gilpin Robert, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Gilpin Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); Keohane Robert O., “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977,” in Holsti Ole R., Siverson Randolph M., and George Alexander L., eds.. Change in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 131–62; Keohane Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Kindleberger Charles P., The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Pelican Books, 1987); Kindleberger Charles P., “Systems of Economic Organizations,” in Calleo David P., ed., Money and the Coming World Order (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 1540; Kindleberger Charles P., “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods and Free Riders,” International Studies Quarterly 25 (06 1981), pp. 242–54; Kindleberger Charles P., “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 841–48; Krasner Stephen D., “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (04 1976), pp. 317–47; and Krasner Stephen D., ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

2. Gowa Joanne, “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?World Politics 41 (04 1989), p. 310.

3. See Lake David A., “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934,” World Politics 35 (07 1983), p. 518; Keohane , “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes,” p. 156; and Snidal Duncan, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), p. 579.

4. Haas Ernst B., “Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom About Regimes,” in Krasner , International Regimes, p. 26.

5. See Calleo David P., Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 218 and 220; and Calleo David P. and Rowland Benjamin, America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 17.

6. Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” pp. 289 and 304.

7. Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 364.

8. Keohane , After Hegemony, p. 38.

9. See Gowa Joanne, “Hegemons, International Organizations, and Markets: The Case of the Substitution Account,” International Organization 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 661–84; and Evans Peter B., “Declining Hegemony and Assertive Industrialization,” International Organization 43 (Spring 1989), pp. 207–38. Regarding the ambiguities in After Hegemony, Snidal makes a similar remark in “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” p. 581.

10. Strange Susan, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 551–74.

11. See, for example, Rees-Mogg William and Davidson James Dale, “How the World Can Profit by the Crash of '87,” The Times, 9 02 1988.

12. Strange, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony.”

13. Russett Bruce, “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or. Is Mark Twain Really Dead?International Organization 39 (Spring 1985), pp. 209 and 211.

14. See Calleo David P., The Atlantic Fantasy: The US, NATO and Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 14; Gilpin , U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 151; Lake , “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy,” pp. 540–42; Keohane , After Hegemony, p. 37; Russett , “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony,” p. 211; and Kennedy Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 689–90 and 694–95.

15. Strange , “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” pp. 563–64.

16. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, p. 156.

17. Ibid., p. 29.

18. Ibid., p. 109.

19. Ibid., p. 110.

20. Ibid., p. 111.

21. Ibid., p. 116.

22. Ibid., p. 144.

23. Ibid., p. 147.

24. Gilpin , “The Richness of the Tradition of Realism,” International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), p. 295.

25. Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 72.

26. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, p. 133.

27. Krasner , “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” p. 337.

28. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, p. 233.

29. Calleo , Beyond American Hegemony, p. 137.

30. See, for example, Kaplan Morton, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 2236.

31. Krasner , “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” pp. 338–43.

32. Van der Wee Herman, Prosperity and Upheaval: The World Economy, 1945–1980 (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1986), pp. 380–82.

33. See Strange , “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” pp. 559–62. See also Cowhey Peter F. and Long Edward, “Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline or Surplus Capacity?International Organization 37 (Spring 1983), pp. 157–88.

34. Lawson Fred H., “Hegemony and the Structure of International Trade Reassessed: A View from Arabia,” International Organization 37 (Spring 1983), p. 330.

35. See, for example, Calleo and Rowland , America and the World Political Economy, p. 13; Krasner , “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” p. 321; and Snidal , “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” pp. 597612.

36. Gallagher John and Robinson Ronald, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review, 2d series, vol. 6, 1953, p. 9.

37. See Calleo and Rowland , America and the World Political Economy, pp. 713; and Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, pp. 137–40.

38. See, for example, Krugman Paul R., ed.. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).

39. Evans , “Declining Hegemony and Assertive Industrialization,” pp. 211–12.

40. Snidal , “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” p. 586.

41. See James Scott C. and Lake David A.. “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1946,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1989). pp. 130.

42. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, pp. 156–57.

43. See ibid., pp. 75–105; and Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, pp. 9397.

44. See Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, pp. 173–80: Gilpin . U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, pp. 151, 197, and 260; and Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 89.

45. See Krasner , “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” p. 322.

46. See. for example, Gilpin . U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 48.

47. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, pp. 138 and 145.

48. Gilpin , U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 84.

49. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, pp. 156–85.

50. Gilpin , U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, pp. 165201.

51. Ibid., p. 33. Kindleberger makes the same remarks in “Systems of Economic Organizations,” p. 16.

52. See Eichengreen Barry, “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System,” Brookings Papers on International Economics, vol. 54 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988).

53. Ibid., p. 33.

54. This does not amount to a dismissal of normative judgments in international politics or economics. Perhaps states should be benevolent rather than rational (predatory) in situations in which the two seem incompatible, but the difficulty lies in keeping the description separate from the prescription.

55. See Kindleberger , “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,” pp. 243–44; and Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, pp. 7475.

56. See Conybeare John A. C., “Public Goods, Prisoner's Dilemma and the International Political Economy,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (03 1984), pp. 613; and Snidal , ”The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” pp. 590–93.

57. See Kindleberger , “Systems of Economic Organizations,” p. 32.

58. Conybeare , “Public Goods, Prisoner's Dilemma and the International Political Economy,” p. 14.

59. For a discussion regarding the British case, see McKeown Tim, “Hegemonic Stability Theory and the Nineteenth-Century Tariff Levels in Europe,” International Organization 37 (Winter 1983), pp. 7392. For a discussion regarding the U.S. case, see Mastanduno Michael, “Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 121–50; and Strange , “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” especially pp. 209–14.

60. Russett , “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony,” pp. 217–22 and 226–31.

61. See Strange , “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” pp. 572–73; and Arrighi Giovanni, quoted in Russett , “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony,” p. 221.

62. See Calleo and Rowland , America and the World Political Economy, pp. 8586; Calleo , Money and the Coming World Order, p. xvi; and Calleo , Beyond American Hegemony, pp. 82108 and 138.

63. See Gilpin , U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 217: “The relative power of the U.S. has dramatically declined.… The U.S. has suffered a major decline in power. This undermining of American hegemony and its implications are fundamental facts of international relations in the 1970s.”

64. See Huntington Samuel P., “The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?Foreign Affairs 67 (Winter 1988), pp. 7696; Nye Joseph S. Jr, “America's Decline: A Myth,” The New York Times, 10 04 1988; Bator Francis, “Must We Retrench?Foreign Affairs 68 (Spring 1989), pp. 93116; and Strange, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony.” Susan Strange's error in reproducing a chart in her article does not detract from the overall validity of her argument, which in this case rested heavily on the unqualified notion of structural power. See Helen Milner and Jack Snyder, “Lost Hegemony?” and Strange Susan, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony: Reply to Milner and Snyder,” International Organization 41 (Autumn 1988), pp. 749–51.

65. See, for example, Huntington , “The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?” pp. 8687; and Friedberg Aaron, “The Political Economy of American Strategy,” World Politics 41 (04 1989), pp. 388–92.

66. Snidal , “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” pp. 509 and 612.

67. See Strange , “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” pp. 551–52; and Russett , “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony,” p. 207.

68. See Kindleberger , “Systems of Economic Organizations,” p. 19; and Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 845.

69. See Kindleberger , “Systems of Economic Organizations,” p. 19; and Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” pp. 841 and 845.

70. See Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 841; and Kindleberger , “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,” pp. 246 and 251.

71. Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 846.

72. See Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 845; Kindleberger , “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,” p. 248; and Kindleberger , “Systems of Economic Organizations,” p. 34.

73. Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 845.

74. Kindleberger , “Systems of Economic Organizations,” p. 19.

75. See Lake , “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy,” pp. 517–43; and Lake David A., “Beneath the Commerce of Nations: ATheory of International Economic Structures,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (03 1984), pp. 143–70.

76. Lake , “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy,” p. 522.

77. Ibid.

78. Gowa , “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods and Small Groups,” p. 312.

79. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, p. 30.

80. Ibid., p. 129.

81. Ibid., p. 187.

82. Ibid., p. 198.

83. Kaiser Karl, “A View from Europe: The U.S. Role in the Next Decade,” International Affairs 65 (Spring 1989), p. 209. See also Moïsi Dominique: “Force et faiblesse des Etats-Unis” (Strength and weakness of the United States), Politique Etrangère 1 (Spring 1989). pp. 4555.

84. François-Poncet Jean, “Les Etats-Unis et I'Europe: Pour une nouvelle donne” (The United States and the world: For a new deal), Commentaire 46 (Summer 1989). pp. 280–81.

85. For a discussion of Europe's decline, see Stoffaes Christian, Fins de monde: Declin et renouvean dans i'économie mondiale (Ends of worlds: Decline and renewal in the world economy) (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1987): and de Montbrial Thierry. ed., RAMSES, 1986–87 (Annual report on world systems and strategies, 1986–87) (Paris: Atlas Economica. 1986), pp. 291366.

86. Mentré Paul. L'Amériqne et nous: L'insontenable légèreté dufort (America and us: The unbearable lightness of the strong) (Paris: Dunod, 1989).

87. See Krasner, International Regimes; and Keohane, After Hegemony.

88. See Gilpin , U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, pp. 6472; and Kindleberger , “Systems of Economic Organizations,” p. 38.

89. Keohane Robert O., “U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Toward Other Advanced Capitalist States: The Struggle to Make Others Adjust,” in Oye Kenneth, Rothschild Donald, and Lieber Robert, eds., Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World (London: Longman, 1979), p. 96.

90. Calleo , Beyond American Hegemony, p. 217.

91. Gould Stephen Jay, Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle: Myths and Metaphors in the Discovery of Geological Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).

92. Holton Gerald, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).

93. Weart Spencer R., Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. iv.

94. Reich Robert B., Tales of a New America: The Anxious Liberal's Guide to the Future (New York: Vintage Books, 1988).

95. Bachelard Gaston, La psychanalyse du feu (A psychoanalysis of fire) (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p. 127. Translations of quotes by Bachelard (as well as quotes by other French authors) are my own. Some of the major works by Bachelard have been made available to the American public by Beacon Press in Boston. In addition, a short introduction to Bachelard's work in English can be found in Smith's Charles RockGaston Bachelard (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982). La psychanalyse dufeu was translated in 1964 by Alan C. M. Ross, with a preface by Northrop Frye, and was published in London by Routledge & Kegan Paul.

96. Bachelard Gaston, L'eau et les rěves: Essais sur I'imagination de la matière (Water and dreams: An essay on musing about matter) (Paris: José Corti, 1942), p. 127.

97. Bachelard , La psychanalyse du feu, pp. 117, 16, and 8, respectively.

98. Bachelard , L'eau et les rěves, p. 25.

99. Girardet Raoul, Mythes et mythologies politiques (Political myths and mythologies) (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 15.

100. Lévi-Strauss Claude, Anthropologie structurale (Structural anthropology) (Paris: Plon, 1974), pp. 232–33.

101. Polanyi Karl, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 218.

102. Manning Charles A. W., The Nature of International Society (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1962), p. 5.

103. Vladimir Propp and the Russian formalists initiated the structuralist study of narratives, as discussed in Propp's Morphology of the Folktale, 2d ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968). Greimas A. J. coined the term “actant” and laid the groundwork for the use of structuralism in literary criticism in La semantique structurale (Structural semantics) (Paris: Larousse, 1966). Northrop Frye elaborated on the link between mythology and structure in Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). And Roland Barthes studied the ideological function of social codes in Mythologies (Paris: Seuil, 1957). For a good methodological introduction to the study of comparative narratives, see Coster Michel de, L'analogie en sciences humaines (Analogy in social science) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979).

104. See Richards I. A., Principles of Literary Criticism, 3d ed. (London: Regan Paul, Trench, Trubner&Co., 1944).

105. Kissinger , quoted in Business Week, 13 01 1975.

106. Kindleberger , The World in Depression, p. 304. Note the persuasive power achieved by the language itself in this sentence. The impression of logical consistency comes from the use of “stabilized” instead of “stable.” “Stabilization” (a process) presupposes an agent, whereas “stability” (a desired state) does not. The logic of the argument stems from pure semantics.

107. Snidal , “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” p. 593.

108. Keohane , “U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Toward Other Advanced Capitalist States,” p. 94.

109. This idea is borrowed from Robert Triffin's more general reflections on the paradoxes of the gold exchange standard, as set forth in Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960). The so-called Triffin dilemma as used in the theory of hegemonic stability emphasizes the hegemon's point of view, rather than that of the system as a whole.

110. See Stein Arthur A., “The Hegemon's Dilemma: Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), pp. 355–86; and Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 89.

111. See Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, pp. 7475 and 86–87.

112. The vision of the hegemon as a supplier is evident in the following passage by Gilpin: “The core is principally defined by its performance of certain functions in the international economy. In the first place, it performs the role of a central banker. The core supplies the international currency and liquidity; in effect it establishes and manages the international monetary system. Second, it plays a critical role in creating and organizing the international trading system.… Finally, through private investment or foreign aid or both, the core supplies investment capital and generates development throughout the system.” See U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 48.

113. Russett , “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony,” pp. 226 and 223, respectively.

114. Lake , “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy,” p. 523.

115. See Goldfinger Charles, La géofinance: Pour comprendre la mutation financière (Geofinance: Understanding the financial transformation) (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 325; and Bourguinat Henri, Les vertiges de la finance Internationale (A dizzy international finance) (Paris: Economica, 1987).

116. See Brender Anton, Un choc de nations (Clashing nations) (Paris: Hatier, 1988); and Bachelard , L'eau et les reves, p. 18. The equivalence between money and water in the imagination is also established via the notion of language. “Fluency” characterizes a way of speaking. Bachelard, noting that “language wants to flow” and does “flow naturally,” argues that “liquidity is the very desire of language” (p. 250). Kindelberger , in “The Politics of International Money and World Language,” Princeton Essays in International Finance, no. 51, 08 1967, closes the associative chain by drawing a parallel between language and the dollar as a world currency, with both seen as crucial media provided by the United States. One resulting equation is money = language = water, and perhaps another is language = knowledge/information = technology. In the future, the “information standard” may replace other standards, as Walt Wriston suggests in The World's Replacement for the Gold Standard,” Wall Street Journal, 31 12 1985.

117. Keohane , “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes,” p. 136; emphasis added.

118. Gallagher and Robinson , “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” p. 6; emphasis added.

119. Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 350.

120. Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 847.

121. Stein , “The Hegemon's Dilemma,” p. 383.

122. Manning , The Nature of International Society, p. 8.

123. Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” pp. 842–43; emphasis added.

124. Kindleberger , “Systems of Economic Organizations,” pp. 33 and 34.

125. See Huntington , “The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?” p. 88; and Kennedy , The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 540.

126. See Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 78; and Kindleberger , “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,” p. 251.

127. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, p. 169.

128. Freud Sigmund, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18 (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), p. 97.

129. Ibid., pp. 93–99.

130. Girardet , Mythes et mythologies politiques, p. 96.

131. Gilpin , “The Richness of the Tradition of Realism,” pp. 296–97.

132. Kindleberger , The World in Depression, p. 294.

133. Kindleberger , Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (New York: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 220–21.

134. Kindleberger , The World in Depression, p. 299.

135. See Rosenau James N., “Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 849–94. See also Kindleberger , “Systems of Economic Organizations,” p. 38; and Kindleberger Charles P., International Economics, 4th ed. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, 1968), p. 215: “It is well known that benevolent despotism is the optimum form of government.” The influence of Plato's philosopher-king, occasionally mentioned by Kindleberger, may be felt in this statement.

136. Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 844.

137. In his radio address of 17 June 1940, for example, Pétain stated, “I present France with the gift of my person, in order to alleviate her distress.”

138. Le Monde, 19 March 1988.

139. See Merle Marcel, Les acteurs dans les relations Internationales (Actors in international relations) (Paris: Economica, 1986), p. 6; and Windsor Philip, “An Introduction to the Special Issue,” Millennium 16 (Summer 1987), p. 186.

140. For a discussion of the “socio-cosmological image,” see Manning , The Nature of International Society, p. 4. Regarding the particular metaphors listed here, see Strange , “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” p. 570; Mackintosh Ian, Sunrise Europe: The Dynamics of Information Technology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); and Rosenau , “Before Cooperation,” p. 10.

141. Bachelard , L'eau et les reves, p. 134.

142. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, pp. 12.

143. Ibid., p. 229.

144. Ibid., p. 232.

145. Bergsten C. Fred, Keohane Robert O., and Nye Joseph S. Jr, “International Economics and International Politics: A Framework for Analysis,” in Bergsten C. Fred and Krause Lawrence B., eds., World Politics and International Economics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 17.

146. Ibid., p. 23.

147. Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 2, scene 2, lines 90–91 and 93–94.

148. Jobes Gertrude, Dictionary of Mythology, Folklore and Symbols (New York: Scarecrow Press, 1962).

149. Ibid.

150. For a study of the notion of cyclical time, see Eliade Mircea, Le mythe de I'éternel retour: Archetypes el répétition (The myth of eternal return: Archetypes and repetition) (Paris: Gallimard, 1949).

151. de Romilly Jacqueline, “La notion de nécessité dans l'histoire de Thucydides” (The notion of necessity in Thucydides' history), in Casanova Jean-Claude, ed., Science et conscience de la société: Mélanges en ihonneur de Raymond Aron (Science and conscience of society: Selected papers in honor of Raymond Aron) (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1971), p. 118.

152. Gilpin quotes Thucydides in War and Change in World Politics, notably on pp. 93 and 228. Calleo discusses Gilpin's work in Beyond American Hegemony, p. 149.

153. Ginestier Paul, La pensee de Bachelard (Bachelard's thinking) (Paris: Bordas, 1987), p. 178.

154. Chevalier Jean and Gheerbrant Alain, Dictionnaire des symboles (A dictionary of symbols) (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1982).

155. Gilpin , “The Richness of the Tradition of Realism,” pp. 296–97.

156. See Gallagher and Robinson , “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” p. 5; and Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, p. 176.

157. Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, pp. 49 and 198.

158. See Cohn Norman, The Pursuit of the Millennium (London: Paladin, 1970); and Freud , Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, p. 96. “The mutual ties have ceased to exist,” writes Freud, “and a gigantic and senseless fear is set free.”

159. See Calleo , Money and the Coming of World Order, p. xiv.

160. See Tudor Henry, Political Myth (London: Pall Mall, 1972); and Eliade . Le mythe de I'éternel retour, pp. 188–89.

161. Eliade , Le mythe de I'éternel retour, p. 162.

162. In “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony,” Russett uses these expressions ironically when reassuring those of his contemporaries who may be alarmed by such dire predictions. The entire quotes are as follows: “The sky has not fallen” (p. 220). “It is not quite a case where ‘all instruments agree’ it is a dark, cold day” (p. 210). According to the theory of hegemonic stability, the interregnum between two successive hegemonies (as in the 1930s and at the present time) is particularly fraught with danger and uncertainty. Within the daily sun cycle, this corresponds with nighttime; and within the yearly cycle, it has traditionally corresponded with the end of the year's fertility cycle, a time when demons and spirits rise from the dark (Halloween or All Saints' Day). Similarly, ghosts’ alleged favorite hour is midnight, the exact breaking point between two cycles.

163. Gardner Richard N., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956).

164. Eichengreen , “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System,” p. 57.

165. See Keohane , “U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Toward Other Advanced Capitalist States.” p. 93; and Gilpin , U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 97.

166. See Tudor , Political Myth, pp. 95 and 109; and Girardet , Mvthes et mythologies politiques, pp. 105, 119, 125, and 132.

167. Tudor, Political Myth.

168. Quoted in Cohn , The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 28.

169. Ibid.

170. Frye Northrop, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).

171. Acheson Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

172. Eichengreen , “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System,” pp. 1618 and 23–24.

173. Rogowski Ronald, “Structure, Growth, and Power: Three Rationalist Accounts,” International Organization 37 (Autumn 1983), p. 735; emphasis added.

174. Bergsten , Keohane , and Nye , “International Economics and International Politics,” p. 17.

175. Ibid., pp. 23–24. Note that in some textbooks, the world of pure economics is explicitly referred to as a “Garden of Eden,” and barriers to trade imposed by political authorities are considered the “original sin.” See the discussion on the second best argument in Lindert Peter H., International Economics, 8th ed. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, 1986), p. 148.

176. Kolakowski Leszek, Metaphysical Horror (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 42.

177. See Enriquez Eugène, De la horde à I'état: Psychanalyse du lien social (From horde to state: A psychoanalysis of the societal link) (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), pp. 141 and 145. One example of the “slain savior” motif can be found in C. S. Lewis's fairy tale, The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, one of the most widely read stories in the English-speaking world. In this tale, a wicked witch casts a spell on the kingdom of Narnia. The king, the mighty and generous Asian, must undergo a ritual sacrifice in order to lift the spell and bring spring again to the country. He is eventually resurrected—in a splendid sunrise. In addition to its Christian symbolism, the tale, written in Britain in 1944, reflects the “beware of the spies” atmosphere and excitement surrounding the expectation of the landing of American troops in Europe. The historical parallel is striking at the beginning of the tale, and the religious parallel becomes most evident toward the end. Both point to the following equation, which is active in the Western mind: Asian = Christ = America. I am indebted to David Long for drawing this tale to my attention.

178. Frye , The Great Code, pp. 147 and 148.

179. John 19:34.

180. Huntington , “The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?” p. 81.

181. Eichengreen , “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System,” p. 38.

182. Shakespeare, King Lear, act 3, scene 4, line 42.

183. See Portier Lucienne, Le pelican: Histoire d'un symbole (The pelican: History of a symbol) (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1984), p. 11.

184. Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 845.

185. See Keohane , After Hegemony, p. 45; and Gilpin , War and Change in World Politics, p. 174.

186. Freud Sigmund, Totem and Taboo (1913), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 13, p. 151.

187. Freud also, of course, recognized the impact of early childhood experiences. Everyone has heard of the Oedipus complex, which may be relevant here, especially since the name “Oedipus,” meaning “swollen feet,” is said to stand for the dilated, reddened, setting sun (see Ginestier , La pensee de Bachelard, p. 178). However, the works by Freud used here concentrate on phylogenesis rather than ontogenesis.

188. Keohane , After Hegemony, p. 3.

189. Snidal , “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” p. 80.

190. Bachelard , La psychanalyse du feu, pp. 6768.

191. Ibid., p. 87.

192. See Bergsten , Keohane , and Nye , “International Economics and International Politics,” p. 17; and Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 843.

193. Claudel , quoted in Bachelard, L'eau et les rives, p. 181.

194. Bachelard , L'eau et les rěves, pp. 157–58.

195. See the following works of Klein Melanie: The Psychoanalysis of Children (London: Hogarth Press, 1932); and “Love, Guilt and Reparation,” in Klein Melanie and Riviere Joan, eds., Love, Hate and Reparation (London: Hogarth Press, 1937), pp. 57119.

196. Ròheim Géza, La panique des dieux (Paris: Payot, 1972), p. 285; published in English as The Panic of the Gods (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

197. Bachelard , L'eau et les rěves. p. 174.

198. Sometimes the free riders are divided into two types, the hungry weakeners and the ambitious challengers, as in this passage by Gilpin: “The Russians and OPEC have raised the price to the U.S. of maintaining its global commitments [weakeners] at the same time that European and Japanese economic competition [challengers] has decreased America's capacity to pay.” See U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 218.

199. Kindleberger , “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,” p. 249.

200. Kindleberger , “Systems of Economic Organizations,” p. 21.

201. Barthes , Mythologies, pp. 4546.

202. See Girardet, Mythes et mythologies poliiiques.

203. Bachelard Gaston, La formation de I'esprit scientifique: Contribution a une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective (The development of the scientific mind: Contribution to a psychoanalysis of objective knowledge) (Paris: Vrin, 1938), p. 16.

204. Freud Sigmund, Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays (1939), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 23, p. 134.

205. Millenarianism, the idea of America's moral superiority, and the notion of America's succession of England in the religious order are all enduring features of U.S. religious-political mythology. See Fitzgerald Frances, “The American Millennium,” in Ungar Sanford J., ed.. Estrangement: America and the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1985), pp. 253 and 276; and Eliade Mircea, “La nostalgie du paradis et la naissance de l'Amérique” (The nostalgia for paradise and America's birth), in Pauwels Louis, ed.. La fin du monde? (The end of the world?) (Paris: Retz, 1977), pp. 6776. Similarly, according to Greenstein, American political culture makes for a widespread sensitivity to the benevolent leader figure, typically seen in children's political attitudes. See Greenstein Fred I., “The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority,” in Dahl Robert A., ed.. Readings in Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968). pp. 341–55.

206. Lévi-Strauss , Anthropologie structural, p. 231.

207. Bachelard , La psychanalyse du feu, p. 80.

208. See, for example, Kelley Harold, Causal Schemata and the Attribution Process (Morriston, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1972), p. 21.

209. Jervis Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 128–45.

210. See, for example, Frank Andre Gunder, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review 17 (09 1966), pp. 17 and 20: “A whole chain of constellations of metropoles and satellites relates all parts of the system from its metropolitan centre in Europe or the U.S. to the farthest outposts in the Latin American countryside.… [This structure] serves to suck capital or economic surplus to the world metropolis.”

211. Snidal , “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” pp. 580–81.

212. Kindleberger , “Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation,” p. 841.

213. Frohlich Norman and Oppenheimer Joe A., “I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends,” World Politics 23 (10 1970), p. 191.

214. Ibid., p. 120.

215. Ibid.

216. Lake , “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy,” p. 522.

217. Gilpin , The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 351.

218. Bachelard , La formation de l' ésprit scientifique, p. 16.

219. Rosenau , “Before Cooperation,” p. 5.

220. Stein , “The Hegemon's Dilemma,” p. 602.

221. Eichengreen , “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System,” p. 5.

222. See Lawson , “Hegemony and the Structure of International Trade Reassessed,” p. 137; Keohane , After Hegemony, p. 35; and Frieden Jeff, “Sectoral Conflict and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 5990.

223. See, for example, Haggard Stephan, “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 91120.

224. See Ikenberry G. John, Lake David A., and Mastanduno Michael, “Introduction: Approaches to Explaining Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 114.

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International Organization
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