Kydd, Andrew H. and McManus, Roseanne W. 2017. Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, Issue. 2, p. 325.
Berejikian, Jeffrey D. 2016. David versus Goliath: Risk and Weaker State Confrontation. Foreign Policy Analysis, p. orw037.
Frühling, Stephan and O’Neil, Andrew 2016. Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective. Contemporary Security Policy, p. 1.
LeVeck, Brad L. and Narang, Neil 2016. How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Violations in Context. International Interactions, p. 1.
Nzau, Mumo 2016. Kenya After 50.
Trager, Robert F. 2016. The Diplomacy of War and Peace. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 19, Issue. 1, p. 205.
Xenakis, Sappho and Ivanov, Kalin 2016. Does Hypocrisy Matter? National Reputational Damage and British Anti-Corruption Mentoring in the Balkans. Critical Criminology,
Carter, David B. 2015. The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 59, Issue. 3, p. 461.
Tyson Chatagnier, John 2015. Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 27, Issue. 2, p. 237.
Fuhrmann, Matthew and Sechser, Todd S. 2014. Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, Issue. 4, p. 919.
Kim, T. 2014. Asymmetric strategic problems in nuclear nonproliferation. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 14, Issue. 2, p. 191.
Knuppe, Austin J 2014. Handcuffing the hegemon: The paradox of state power under unipolarity. International Politics Reviews, Vol. 2, Issue. 2, p. 61.
Steff, Reuben and Khoo, Nicholas 2014. Hard Balancing in the Age of American Unipolarity: The Russian Response to US Ballistic Missile Defense during the Bush Administration (2001–2008). Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, Issue. 2, p. 222.
Wolford, Scott 2014. Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, Issue. 1, p. 144.
Kang, David C. 2013. International Relations Theory and East Asian History: An Overview. Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 13, Issue. 02, p. 181.
Sechser, Todd S. and Fuhrmann, Matthew 2013. Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail. International Organization, Vol. 67, Issue. 01, p. 173.
Downes, Alexander B. and Sechser, Todd S. 2012. The Illusion of Democratic Credibility. International Organization, Vol. 66, Issue. 03, p. 457.
Knopf, Jeffrey W. 2012. Varieties of Assurance. Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, Issue. 3, p. 375.
Monteiro, Nuno P. 2012. WE CAN NEVER STUDY MERELY ONE THING: REFLECTIONS ON SYSTEMS THINKING AND IR. Critical Review, Vol. 24, Issue. 3, p. 343.
Monteiro, Nuno P. 2012. Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful. International Security, Vol. 36, Issue. 3, p. 9.
States typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries, yet their threats often fail. Why? Expanding on a standard model of international crisis bargaining, I argue that a theory of reputation-building can help shed light on this puzzle. The model casts reputation as a strategic problem, showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors. If challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands, then even reputation-conscious targets will acquiesce. I argue, however, that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underestimate their targets' reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them. In this way, military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats. The logic is illustrated by the 1939 Russo-Finnish crisis, and the argument's implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored.
This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.
Full text views reflects the number of PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views.
Abstract views reflect the number of visits to the article landing page.
* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 21st August 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.