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Jung, Sung Chul 2017. Nuclear aggressors, nuclearizing targets: nuclear weapon development and preventive conflict. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 17, Issue. 1, p. 137.
Krainin, Colin 2017. Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power. Political Science Research and Methods, Vol. 5, Issue. 01, p. 103.
Kydd, Andrew H. and McManus, Roseanne W. 2017. Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, Issue. 2, p. 325.
Baerg, Nicole Rae and Hallerberg, Mark 2017. Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 49, Issue. 7, p. 968.
Bas, Muhammet A. and Coe, Andrew J. 2017. A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War. International Organization, Vol. 70, Issue. 04, p. 655.
Debs, Alexandre 2017. Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword? Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, Issue. 1, p. 73.
Fuhrmann, Matthew and Tkach, Benjamin 2017. Almost nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 32, Issue. 4, p. 443.
Lockwood, Erin 2017. Predicting the unpredictable: Value-at-risk, performativity, and the politics of financial uncertainty. Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 22, Issue. 4, p. 719.
Spaniel, William 2017. Arms Negotiation, War Exhaustion, and the Credibility of Preventive War. International Interactions, Vol. 41, Issue. 5, p. 832.
Fuhrmann, Matthew and Sechser, Todd S. 2017. Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, Issue. 4, p. 919.
Monteiro, Nuno P. and Debs, Alexandre 2017. The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation. International Security, Vol. 39, Issue. 2, p. 7.
Large and rapid power shifts resulting from exogenous economic growth are considered sufficient to cause preventive wars. Yet most large and rapid shifts result from endogenous military investments. We show that when the investment decision is perfectly transparent, peace prevails. Large and rapid power shifts are deterred through the threat of a preventive war. When investments remain undetected, however, states may be tempted to introduce power shifts as a fait accompli. Knowing this, their adversaries may strike preventively even without conclusive evidence of militarization. In fact, the more effective preventive wars are, the more likely they will be launched against states that are not militarizing. Our argument emphasizes the role of imperfect information as a cause of war. It also explains why powerful states may attack weaker targets even with ambiguous evidence of their militarization. We illustrate our theory through an account of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.
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