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Learning to Predict Proliferation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 July 2021

Nicholas L. Miller
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Abstract

How effective are states at assessing and predicting the nuclear intentions of foreign countries? Drawing on close to 200 US assessments of foreign countries’ proliferation intentions between 1957 and 1966, this research note finds that close to 80 percent of testable US assessments were correct and that they shifted from highly inaccurate in the late 1950s to highly accurate in the 1960s. Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis, I conclude that learning from early failures led the intelligence community to achieve higher accuracy.

Keywords

Nuclear weaponsnuclear proliferationintelligenceintentionslearning

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Type
Research Note
Information
International Organization , Volume 76 , Issue 2 , Spring 2022 , pp. 487 - 507
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Copyright © The IO Foundation 2021

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