Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-mmrw7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-12T00:26:56.676Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Spatial Effects in Dyadic Data

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2010

Eric Neumayer  and
Thomas Plümper
Eric Neumayer
Affiliation:
Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics, and the Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). E-mail: e.neumayer@lse.ac.uk
Thomas Plümper
Affiliation:
Government Department, University of Essex, UK, and the Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). E-mail: tpluem@essex.ac.uk
Get access

Abstract

Political units often spatially depend in their policy choices on other units. This also holds in dyadic settings where, as in much of international relations research, analysis focuses on the interaction or relation between a pair or dyad of two political units. Yet, with few exceptions, social scientists have analyzed contagion in monadic datasets only, consisting of individual political units. This article categorizes all possible forms of spatial effect modeling in both undirected and directed dyadic data, where it is possible to distinguish the source and the target of interaction (for example, exporter/importer, aggressor/victim, and so on). This approach enables scholars to formulate and test novel mechanisms of contagion, thus ideally paving the way for studies analyzing spatial dependence between dyads of political units. To illustrate the modeling flexibility gained from an understanding of the full set of specification options for spatial effects in dyadic data, we examine the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties between developed and developing countries, building and extending on Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons's 2006 study. However, we come to different conclusions about the channels through which bilateral investment treaties diffuse. Rather than a capital-importing country being influenced by the total number of BITs signed by other capital importers, as modeled in their original article, we find that a capital-importing country is more likely to sign a BIT with a capital exporter only if other competing capital importers have signed BITs with this very same capital exporter. Similarly, other capital exporters' BITs with a specific capital importer influence an exporter's incentive to agree on a BIT with the very same capital importer.

Information

Type
Research Notes
Information
International Organization , Volume 64 , Issue 1 , January 2010 , pp. 145 - 166
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

REFERENCES

Anselin, Luc. 1988. Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.Google Scholar
Anselin, Luc. 2003. Spatial Externalities, Spatial Multipliers, and Spatial Econometrics. International Regional Science Review 26 (2):153–66.Google Scholar
Basinger, Scott, and Hallerberg, Mark. 2004. Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom. American Political Science Review 98 (2):261–76.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Beardsley, Kyle. 2006. Space Is More than Geography: Using Spatial Econometrics in the Study of Political Economy. International Studies Quarterly 50 (1):27–44.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, and Katz, Jonathan N.. 1996. Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models. Political Analysis 6 (1):1–36.Google Scholar
Brooks, Sarah M. 2007. When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural Pension Reforms Across Nations. Journal of Politics 69 (3):701–15.Google Scholar
Cho, Wendy K. Tam. 2003. Contagion Effects and Ethnic Contribution Networks. American Journal of Political Science 47 (2):368–87.Google Scholar
Elkins, Zachary, Guzman, Andrew T., and Simmons, Beth A.. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000. International Organization 60 (4):811–46.Google Scholar
Elkins, Zachary, and Simmons, Beth A.. 2005. On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598 (1):33–51.Google Scholar
Franzese, Robert J. Jr., and Hays, Jude C.. 2006. Strategic Interaction Among EU Governments in Active Labor Market Policy-Making: Subsidiarity and Policy Coordination under the European Employment Strategy. European Union Politics 7 (2):167–89.Google Scholar
Franzese, Robert J. Jr., and Hays, Jude C.. 2007. Spatial Econometric Models of Cross-Sectional Interdependence in Political Science Panel and Time-Series-Cross-Section Data. Political Analysis 15 (2):140–64.Google Scholar
Franzese, Robert, and Hays, Jude C.. 2008. Spatial Econometric Models of Interdependence. Book prospectus.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, and Gleditsch, Kristian S.. 2006. Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide. European Journal of International Relations 12 (1):53–87.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, Li, Quan, and Boehmer, Charles. 2001. Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict. International Organization 55 (2):391–438.Google Scholar
Genschel, Philipp, and Plümper, Thomas. 1997. Regulatory Competition and International Cooperation. Journal of European Public Policy 4 (4):626–42.Google Scholar
Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Ward, Michael D.. 2006. The Diffusion of Democracy and the International Context of Democratization. International Organization 60 (4):911–33.Google Scholar
Guzman, Andrew T. 1998. Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties. Virginia Journal of International Law 38:639–88.Google Scholar
Hallerberg, Mark, and Basinger, Scott. 1998. Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players. Comparative Political Studies 31 (3):321–53.Google Scholar
Jahn, Detlev. 2006. Globalization as “Galton's Problem”: The Missing Link in the Analysis of Diffusion Patterns in Welfare State Development. International Organization 60 (2):401–31.Google Scholar
King, Gary. 2001. Proper Nouns and Methodological Propriety: Pooling Dyads in International Relations Data. International Organization 55 (2):497–507.Google Scholar
Levi-Faur, David. 2005. The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598 (1):12–32.Google Scholar
Manger, Mark S. 2006. The Political Economy of Discrimination: Modelling the Spread of Preferential Trade Agreements. Working Paper. Montréal, Canada: Department of Political Science, McGill University.Google Scholar
Meseguer, Covadonga. 2005. Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598 (1):67–82.Google Scholar
Mooney, Christopher Z. 2001. Modelling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion. Political Research Quarterly 54 (1):103–24.Google Scholar
Murdoch, James C., and Sandler, Todd. 2004. Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion. American Journal of Political Science 48 (1):138–51.Google Scholar
Neumayer, Eric. 2006. Self-Interest, Foreign Need and Good Governance: Are Bilateral Investment Treaty Programs Similar to Aid Allocation? Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (3):245–67.Google Scholar
Neumayer, Eric, and Spess, Laura. 2005. Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries? World Development 33 (10):1567–85.Google Scholar
Plümper, Thomas, and Neumayer, Eric. Forthcoming.Model Specification in the Analysis of Spatial Dependence. European Journal of Political Research.Google Scholar
Plümper, Thomas, Troeger, Vera E., and Manow, Philip. 2005. Panel Data Analysis in Comparative Politics. Linking Method to Theory. European Journal of Political Research 44 (2):327–54.Google Scholar
Porojan, A. 2001. Trade Flows and Spatial Effects: The Gravity Model Revisited. Open Economies Review 12 (3):265–80.Google Scholar
Russett, Bruce, Oneal, John R., and Davis, David R.. 1998. The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–1985. International Organization 52 (3):441–67.Google Scholar
Salehyan, Idean, and Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2006. Refugees and the Spread of Civil War. International Organization 60 (2):335–66.Google Scholar
Simmons, Beth A., Dobbin, Frank, and Garrett, Geoffrey. 2006. Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism. International Organization 60 (4):781–810.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A., and Elkins, Zachary. 2004. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. American Political Science Review 98 (1):171–89.Google Scholar
Swank, Duane. 2006. Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism. International Organization 60 (4):847–82.Google Scholar
Ward, Michael D., and Gleditsch, Kristian. 2002. Location, Location, Location: An MCMC Approach to Modeling the Spatial Context of War and Peace. Political Analysis 10 (3):244–60.Google Scholar
Ward, Michael D., and Gleditsch, Kristian. 2008. Spatial Regression Models. London: Sage.Google Scholar
Weyland, Kurt. 2005. Theories of Political Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform. World Politics 57 (2):262–95.Google Scholar