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What's in a Name? Metaphors and Cybersecurity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 September 2020

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Abstract

For more than a decade, the United States military has conceptualized and discussed the Internet and related systems as “cyberspace,” understood as a “domain” of conflict like land, sea, air, and outer space. How and why did this concept become entrenched in US doctrine? What are its effects? Focusing on the emergence and consolidation of this terminology, I make three arguments about the role of language in cybersecurity policy. First, I propose a new, politically consequential category of metaphor: foundational metaphors, implied by using particular labels rather than stated outright. These metaphors support specific ways to understand complex issues, provide discursive resources to some arguments over others, and shape policy contestation and outcomes. Second, I present a detailed empirical study of US military strategy and doctrine that traces the emergence and consolidation of terminology built on the “cyberspace domain.” This concept supported implicit metaphorical correspondences between the Internet and physical space, yielding specific analogies and arguments for understanding the Internet and its effects. Third, I focus on the rhetorical effects of this terminology to reveal two important institutional consequences: this language has been essential to expanding the military's role in cybersecurity, and specific interests within the Department of Defense have used this framework to support the creation of US Cyber Command. These linguistic effects in the United States also have implications for how other states approach cybersecurity, for how international law is applied to cyber operations, and for how International Relations understands language and technological change.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2020

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Cyberspace: A new universe, a parallel universe created and sustained by the world's computers and communication lines.

Cyberspace: First Steps [1991]Footnote 1

Strategic Initiative 1: DoD [the US Department of Defense] will treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace's potential.

—DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace [2011]Footnote 2

The Internet has generated, even for powerful states, fundamentally new security vulnerabilities, including commercial espionage, data breaches, intrusions into government networks, threats to physical infrastructure, and online election interference. Yet the Internet is also seen as a source of opportunities, including for militaries—a virtual space for carrying out actions remotely that previously required crossing boundaries physically, enabling “force projection without the need to establish a physical presence in foreign territory.”Footnote 3 This potential was demonstrated on the day of the 2018 US midterm elections, when a US military operation reportedly shut down Internet access at an organization in Russia believed to be behind election interference and disinformation. According to one US official, “We showed what's in the realm of the possible”—that is, the ability and willingness to use cybersecurity tools within another state's borders.Footnote 4

How did we get here, where the US government is carrying out self-described “offensive military operations” inside Russian territory? What explains the policies and institutional changes that US officials—and those in other states, reacting to US actions—have pursued in response to cybersecurity concerns? In other words, how do policymakers understand these rapidly evolving threats and opportunities, and how are states adapting to face them? Answering these questions requires looking beyond the material features of technologies or the structure of geopolitical competition. Although threats or attacks on hardware create pressure for a policy response—and the US operation was itself a reaction to Russian interference—the form of that response is underdetermined by material or strategic circumstances and thus is also shaped by ideational factors, including the effects of language itself. Focusing specifically on changes in cybersecurity terminology used by state officials, in this article I make three arguments: theoretical, empirical, and explanatory.

First, I propose a novel addition to theories of language and policy. I distinguish between, on the one hand, explicitly stated analogies and metaphors and, on the other, foundational metaphors, constituted by using particular terms as labels. Foundational metaphors implicitly connect otherwise distinct conceptual fields, reframing policy problems and solutions and shaping the rhetorical resources available for political contestation. This approach builds on existing International Relations (IR) literature—including constructivist scholarship on language,Footnote 5 theories emphasizing argument and rhetoric,Footnote 6 and research joining IR with Science and Technology StudiesFootnote 7—and suggests new, generalizable mechanisms by which language shapes outcomes.

Second, through an extensive study of primary documents, I provide the first comprehensive empirical account of the cybersecurity language used by the US military. After several decades of evolving terminology, by the late 2000s US doctrine defined cybersecurity in terms of threats and opportunities “in cyberspace.” Simultaneously, cyberspace was defined as a “warfighting domain,” suggesting that it is as militarily important as land, sea, air, and outer space. The combination of “cyberspace” with “domain” has constituted a foundational metaphor implying that the Internet and related systems have created a virtual space within which actions take place.

Third, I explain how this foundational metaphor, implicit in “cyberspace domain,” has reshaped US policy and institutions in two ways. First, as state agencies have competed for cybersecurity resources and responsibilities, this language has reinforced the military's arguments for a dominant role. Second, in contestation within the military, the metaphor has supported a specific institutional solution: US Cyber Command. These changes have altered policy outcomes, including the nature and frequency of US military cybersecurity operations. Moreover, creating a command for “cyberspace” has effects beyond the United States, as Cyber Command operates across borders and as other states emulate—or challenge—US concepts, strategies, and institutions. These linguistic and ideational factors are largely overlooked by the prevailing approach to cybersecurity in IR, which has productively emphasized technical and strategic aspects.Footnote 8 Focusing on the rhetorical consequences of foundational metaphors implicit in terminological labels reveals new connections between language and policy outcomes, including identifying why language is so consequential in a complex field like cybersecurity.Footnote 9

Metaphor Theory and Cyberspace

Metaphors involve “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another,”Footnote 10 a transfer of meaning that is especially important for thinking through new or complex phenomena.Footnote 11 Metaphors, however, are not simply evocative comparisons. Instead they have complex effects through their entailments: follow-on concepts or ideas that reshape thinking, decision making, and practical outcomes.Footnote 12 IR studies have explored the effects of metaphorical language, demonstrating that even instrumentally deployed analogies have pervasive, often unintended policy consequences.Footnote 13

In addition to analogies and metaphors that are used consciously, other metaphors operate on a deeper level. These conceptual metaphors are “systematic sets of correspondences … across conceptual domains” that “reflect conventional patterns of thought.”Footnote 14 In this article I introduce a new category, foundational metaphors: conceptual metaphors constituted by using particular terms as labels. Like other conceptual metaphors, they provide “mental models [that] guide our thoughts without us really being aware of them”Footnote 15—reinforcing specific assumptions, suggesting particular analogies and discouraging others, and limiting which arguments can be made convincing. Foundational metaphors, however, specifically emerge when something is labeled with a term with connotations that imply answers to foundational questions: What defines this as a “thing”? What are its fundamental characteristics? To what other things is it similar? Whether chosen deliberately or intuitively, the label itself is often presented by speakers as commonsensical, or not needing to be explained.Footnote 16 Nonetheless, whether anyone is aware of it or not, metaphorical correspondences can emerge.Footnote 17

Unlike explicitly stated metaphors (or analogies), foundational metaphors’ correspondences are implied by the connotations of terminology—yet either type of metaphor could draw the same correspondences. Because foundational metaphors are implicit, identifying them requires multiple steps: noting that a particular label is consistently used,Footnote 18 examining the range of metaphorical correspondences potentially implied, and then analyzing surrounding texts to see which of those correspondences—if any—are guiding the entailed descriptions, arguments, and explicit analogies and metaphors. The content of a foundational metaphor is shaped, as well as revealed, by surrounding language. For example, explicitly stated metaphors and implicit foundational metaphors often work in conjunction, each structuring the meaning of the other.

I focus on rhetoric and argument, where foundational metaphors play a powerful and distinct role.Footnote 19 Rhetorical contestation takes place at all levels of international politics,Footnote 20 and even “rational” actors need to use acceptable “normative reasoning” to convince others.Footnote 21 In such arguments, language can be deployed to remove opponents’ discursive resources—not changing their minds, but denying them the “rhetorical commonplaces” needed to convince audiences.Footnote 22 Metaphorical language in contestation ranges from intentional deployments to unconscious choices. Historical analogies, for example, are often selected instrumentally by decision makers (albeit from those resonant within a community).Footnote 23 By contrast, invoking foundational metaphors by using particular terminology is rarely so instrumental. Speakers may reach for a term because they believe it “works” as a label rather than because they think it will directly support their arguments. In fact, opposing arguments often use the same terminology and draw on the same foundational metaphors, the entailments of which then frame debate. Yet not all arguments are as readily supported by the metaphors implied by shared terms—foundational metaphors can make certain arguments more convincing.

As with other linguistic processes, foundational metaphors are simultaneously a resource, constraint, and context for political interaction.Footnote 24 Like “dominant narratives” in foreign policy, these metaphors “do not fully smother contestation but channel it,”Footnote 25 setting boundaries for which arguments count as legitimate. The point at which terminology comes to be at least provisionally settled—that is, presented as unproblematic and commonsensical—constitutes an important critical juncture.Footnote 26 Contestation and argument continue, but within different bounds.

Metaphorical language is everywhere in cybersecurity, as designers, users, and policymakers rely extensively on analogies and metaphors—including terminology no longer even considered metaphorical (desktop, virus, firewall). Existing studies have focused on the effects, often unintended, of instrumental analogies and metaphors.Footnote 27 For example, the analogy to Pearl Harbor explicitly emphasized the possibility of a catastrophic attack on infrastructure to promote specific preventive measures, but it also unintentionally minimized the threat of continuous low-level intrusions and espionage.Footnote 28 Likewise, the “threat representations” that decision makers instrumentally deploy to support their arguments also shape perceptions in unintended ways.Footnote 29 Foundational metaphors, implicit in terminology, have received far less attention.

The word cyberspace implies a metaphor between the Internet (and related systems) and some kind of space.Footnote 30 This implicit correspondence follows a common pattern: something “relatively abstract, complex, unfamiliar, subjective, or poorly delineated” (global computer networking) is understood by reference to something “concrete, simple, familiar, physical and well-delineated” (physical space).Footnote 31 Yet space can be understood and defined in various ways, and identifying the specific spatial metaphor implied by a community's use of cyberspace requires examining the associated arguments and analogies, especially when they form a coherent whole.Footnote 32 Although the implication that cyberspace is a “place” is almost never meant literally, implicit metaphors nonetheless shape discussion.

Where, then, did cyberspace originate? Author William Gibson coined the word in the early 1980s, noting later that “it seemed evocative and essentially meaningless.”Footnote 33 Yet there was a meaning embedded in the term itself, in its designation as a type of space—reinforced by the spatial language used to describe this “consensual hallucination.”Footnote 34 Within a few years cyberspace had been adopted in the media and by technology companies, and by the mid-1990s it was widely used to describe where Internet users were, metaphorically.Footnote 35 It was deployed in explicitly political arguments, such as the 1996 “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,”Footnote 36 as well as in late-1990s legal debates about regulating online activity—in which opposing arguments shared the metaphorical framework that online activity occurred “in cyberspace.”Footnote 37

The popularity of a spatial term like cyberspace was in part predictable. Spatial metaphors are often used to understand abstract concepts,Footnote 38 and they have been widely applied to online activities.Footnote 39 Yet the embrace of this specific term was also, in part, coincidental.Footnote 40 Many technologists had been interested in cybernetics and thus were likely to find the cyber prefix appealing.Footnote 41 In the early 2000s, however, the term largely disappeared from popular and academic discourses.Footnote 42 Yet it was exactly in this period that cyberspace increasingly appeared in US military language, where the term has since become ubiquitous.Footnote 43

In short, cyberspace is more than just a catchy word. In the specific context of US security policy and military doctrine it has been an essential component of terminology—and implicit metaphors—used to conceptualize the political and security implications of information technology. These metaphors have provided the foundation for specific arguments and policies deployed by the US government to manage cybersecurity threats. As other states have emulated, challenged, or resisted US actions, the language and policy of the United States have played a significant role in shaping the global response to cybersecurity issues.Footnote 44

US Doctrine and the “Cyberspace Domain”

Since computer security first arose as a policy issue, US decision makers have used an evolving set of terms. By the late 2000s, however, US military doctrine had come to rely almost exclusively on cyberspace-based terminology, further specifying that computers and networks constitute a “domain” of warfare. This dual conceptual framework has changed little in the past decade and is now deeply rooted in how the US military talks about, and organizes for, cybersecurity. To uncover this pattern, I draw on a comprehensive reading of public and declassified cybersecurity documents. They were not read for an exact count of terms, or to identify the first or last use of a particular word or phrase. Instead, I survey trends in dominant terminology and implied foundational metaphors (identified in surrounding texts). Focusing on this level of language reveals broad patterns that cut across variation in documents’ arguments, author intent, or drafting processes.Footnote 45

In the 1980s, cybersecurity was rarely addressed in major national security statements; when it was, documents discussed the security of “telecommunications” and “information systems.”Footnote 46 The terminology changed by the mid-1990s, especially at the Department of Defense (DoD), where “information warfare” dominated.Footnote 47 This was a broad concept: the definition in an influential 1995 Air Force document includes not only computer-network attack and defense but also all operations targeting information, from propaganda to the physical destruction of informational hardware.Footnote 48 “Joint Vision 2010,” released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1996, reflects a similar emphasis on information warfare and operations.Footnote 49 Neither document uses “cyberspace” or cyber-prefixed terms.

At the same time, “cyberspace” began to appear in other government documents as something within which things happen. For example, a 1995 National Security Agency (NSA) document is titled “SIGINT and INFOSEC in Cyberspace,”Footnote 50 and in 1997 an outgoing NSA official argued that cyberspace is a distinct site of espionage and conflict akin to territorial spaces: “Almost every type of action that occurs in the physical world will have a corollary in cyberspace,” and “The Future of Warfare is Warfare in Cyberspace.”Footnote 51 Yet these documents continued to use “information warfare” language as well.

Published in 2000, the Joint Chiefs’ “Joint Vision 2020” reveals an evolution of information-warfare terminology, while setting the stage for the important later shift to “cyberspace domain.” Like its 1996 predecessor, this document continues to use information-based terms rather than “cyberspace.” Yet it now defines information as a “domain of operations,” noting that “operations within the information domain will become as important as those conducted in the domains of land, sea, air, and space.”Footnote 52 In contrast, earlier documents had sometimes proposed an area or realm of conflict in which information plays a special role,Footnote 53 but the terminology was inconsistent and had not included the word domain. (While it is impossible to prove the complete absence of a term or usage, it is suggestive that the DoD Dictionary—which collates terms from military documents—starts defining “domains” in 1999).Footnote 54

In the mid-2000s, US military language took a decisive shift, joining domain with cyberspace—a combination that would prove crucial. For example, the Joint Chiefs’ 2004 “National Military Strategy” uses cyberspace as a framework to understand the new domain (“The Armed Forces must have the ability to operate across the air, land, sea, space and cyberspace domains”).Footnote 55 Soon thereafter, other documents consistently deploy cyberspace language in place of information terms. The Joint Chiefs’ classified “National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations” from 2006 explicitly defines cyberspace—not information—as a domain and argues that “treating cyberspace as a domain establishes a foundation to understand and define its place in military operations.”Footnote 56 Finally, a 2008 memo from the Deputy Secretary of Defense officially defines cyberspace as a “global domain” in doctrine,Footnote 57 a definition subsequently adopted across DoD documents.

The metaphorical correspondences implied by cyberspace terminology provided a consistent conceptual framework for discussing this new nonphysical domain—in other words, cyberspace gave domain a particular meaning. The earlier information-based terminology was ambiguous, with diverse connotations, and the relationship between information and physical spaces was never clarified. For example, the “Joint Vision” document from 2000 argues that information has a “multidimensional definition”: “domain of operations” and “target, weapon, resource.”Footnote 58 Given that information was essential to military operations long before the Internet,Footnote 59 is the “information domain” actually new? Which aspects are new and require new strategies or tactics? These questions were difficult to address with information-based terminology.

By labeling this new domain “cyberspace,” however, it could be designated as a domain and nothing else. Cyber warfare involves “operating within or through [cyberspace],” while information operations aim broadly to “influence adversary decisions.”Footnote 60 Essential to this discursive effort was the particular spatial metaphor implied by the combination of cyberspace with domain. While each term has diverse possible meanings, when used together their definitions are narrowed. Without this further specification, cyberspace could imply various types of space: political territory, postmodern “space of flows,” notional space of ideas, or others. Likewise, domain's multiple etymologies—ranging from mathematics to medieval political authority over land—imply diverse metaphorical correspondences. Because the two terms are deployed together in US military documents, however, the metaphorical implications of each are narrowed down to a correspondence between the cyberspace domain and the four physical spaces within which the military already operates.Footnote 61 This is evident in the geographic or territorial analogies deployed in surrounding texts: “terrain,” “high ground,” “borders,” “failed state,” “ungoverned frontier,” and so on.Footnote 62 These explicit comparisons reveal the characteristics of the implicit spatial metaphor and they are simultaneously made more convincing by it.Footnote 63

The foundational metaphor implied by cyberspace domain allowed convincing parallels to be drawn to physical spaces. Broad objectives “in cyberspace” can be framed with available concepts: for example, the 2006 Joint Chiefs document states that a key “strategic goal” is “to ensure US military strategic superiority in cyberspace” just as in air, sea, land, and space.Footnote 64 The rhetorical power of that statement follows from the metaphor implied by the terms: here is a new space, created by computers and networks, into which existing goals can be translated.

DoD documents subsequently argue repeatedly that cyberspace is a domain, distinct from the four physical domains but similar in that the US military needs to operate within it. For example, a 2009 “Cyber Warfare Lexicon” defines a host of cyber-prefixed terms as the versions of “real world” phenomena taking place “in cyberspace.”Footnote 65 Especially after 2010, the dual shift in terminology—deploying the “cyberspace” label and then calling it a “domain”—becomes pervasive in high-profile documents. The Pentagon's 2011 “Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,” for instance, frames cyberspace as a domain within and through which the US and its adversaries act.Footnote 66 Although this document actively argues that cyberspace should be treated as an operational domain, it simply asserts that there is something called “cyberspace” within which things happen.Footnote 67 This terminology was taken up throughout the US military, as service branches used cyberspace-domain language to analogize to their existing practices and concepts.Footnote 68

By the mid-2010s, the idea of cyberspace as a domain of warfare was fully entrenched in US military language.Footnote 69 For example, while the DoD's 2011 cybersecurity strategy explicitly argues that cyberspace should be treated as an operational domain, the 2015 and 2018 revisions simply assume that cyberspace is a domain and discuss how to operate in it.Footnote 70 This terminology was not only directed at external audiences; it also informed internal DoD discussions. Classified memos use the same foundational metaphor, including, for example, a 2010 secret instruction on “counterintelligence activities in cyberspace”Footnote 71 and a 2013 document on “Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Activities in Cyberspace.”Footnote 72 A 2012 Presidential Decision Directive authorizing offensive cyber operations also addresses threats and actions “in cyberspace.”Footnote 73 Finally, internal Pentagon communications about disrupting the Islamic State's online presence discuss the need to “counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Cyber Space.”Footnote 74

This terminology has become both stable and ubiquitous, demonstrating its rhetorical power and its ability to fit logically with existing military concepts and ideas. In other words, at this point there is little contestation among military authors about the language to be used; the arguments are entirely about how to apply the cyberspace-domain concept to improve strategies and tactics. This framework's persistence for more than a decade is striking, given the incentives to propose new terms. Military documents often note the importance of language,Footnote 75 and promoting new or different terminology can be one way to contribute to strategy or doctrine.Footnote 76 Since at least 2010, however, efforts to innovate have continued to discuss the “cyberspace domain.”Footnote 77

While scholarly attention usually focuses on contested aspects of language and policy, the consolidation of terminology—and implicit foundational metaphors—can be equally important. Contestation continues, but the available rhetoric has been transformed. Tracing these linguistic processes reveals new aspects of cybersecurity policymaking.

Metaphors and Institutional Change

In the mid-2000s, significant intrusions into US government and corporate networks intensified pressure on policymakers to respond.Footnote 78 Yet the nature of that response was far from preordained and was shaped by the foundational metaphor implicit in cyberspace-domain terminology. This metaphor gave particular arguments more weight and made it possible to present certain institutional solutions as commonsensical. In other words, language has not driven policy directly, nor has it entirely constrained how speakers or audiences think. Instead, explicit and implicit linguistic framings have made some propositions more resonant with existing ideas, arguments, and interests, strengthening those positions in political contestation.

A critical juncture occurred in the late 2000s, with concurrent changes in US doctrine, institutions, and outcomes. The shift to an exclusive reliance on cyberspace-domain terminology allowed an implied foundational metaphor to be deployed—both instrumentally and unintentionally—to support particular institutional and policy changes, at two levels of contestation. First, as state agencies have competed for cybersecurity responsibilities and resources, this language has been successfully used to argue for increasing the role of military over civilian institutions.Footnote 79 Second, within the military, it supported the creation of US Cyber Command, a single organization for military operations “in cyberspace.” The resulting institutional changes have had significant downstream effects, including enabling an increase in offensive cybersecurity actions by the US military. Given the ambiguity of many cybersecurity tasks—which could be framed in terms of commerce, law enforcement, homeland security, or national defense—these outcomes were not simply the most effective or “rational” responses.

Policy outcomes in cybersecurity emerge out of numerous processes, of course, many of which interact with the rhetorical effects of language. For example, DoD funding procedures can make it difficult to “mainstream” solutions to new problems, that is, to add a new task across existing organizations.Footnote 80 Overcoming that challenge by creating a new organization, however, depends on the availability of rhetorical resources to support such an institutional change. Similarly, while the militarization of cybersecurity may reflect general post-9/11 trends,Footnote 81 the metaphors implied by cyberspace-domain language have made it possible to present this as a commonsense solution. Finally, although institutional and policy shifts have coincided with broader contextual changes—technical innovation, more skilled adversaries, turnover and learning among policymakers—the effects of those factors are, on their own, indeterminate. For example, given that there is rarely a single optimal policy, learning alone cannot explain which specific solution is chosen.Footnote 82 Instead, how officials revise strategies, respond to adversaries, and understand novel threats have all been framed by the terms, rhetoric, and ideas that predominate within the military cybersecurity community—including the metaphors implicit in cyberspace domain. At key moments, bureaucratic competition over cybersecurity has been shaped by this language—probabilistically, not deterministically—as cyberspace-domain terminology favored certain arguments over others.

DoD officials have actively used this framework to denote cybersecurity as a military rather than civilian concern, attempting to close the controversy around the nature of the problem and its solution. The early-2000s shift from information warfare to cyberspace domain—with its implied spatial metaphor—made it rhetorically easier to present cybersecurity activities taking place in something analogous to air, land, sea, and outer space, all of which involve nonmilitary issues and concerns but, simultaneously, are spaces in which the military legitimately operates.Footnote 83 For example, in 2010 the Deputy Secretary of Defense wrote in Foreign Affairs that “the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare … just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space.”Footnote 84 Officials at other agencies “were as much surprised by the article as some foreign audiences,”Footnote 85 and they immediately protested this designation.Footnote 86 Information-warfare concepts had not inspired such a direct reaction, but the cyberspace-domain framework suggested a more expansive—and bureaucratically threatening—claim.

This language supports military arguments, while also having an intrinsic appeal to military actors. As Michael Hayden (retired Air Force general and former NSA and CIA director) put it in 2011: “Like everyone else who is or has been in a US military uniform, I think of cyber as a domain. It is now enshrined in doctrine: land, sea, air, space, cyber. It trips off the tongue, and frankly I have found the concept liberating.”Footnote 87

That Hayden finds this language “liberating” reflects how the implied spatial metaphors are simultaneously useful in policy arguments and appealing as a metaphorical framework for understanding a complex and challenging area.Footnote 88 As noted earlier, they allow policymakers to apply existing ideas to new problems. The relevant questions are then straightforward (How do known strategies apply “in cyberspace”?) and less likely to require entirely new concepts or models. The ability to draw from other domains has been essential to military staffing, since many senior cybersecurity positions were initially filled by individuals who began in traditional “kinetic” operations.Footnote 89 In short, this terminology was adopted because it intuitively fit as much as because it was instrumentally useful.

While few argue that the military should play no role in cybersecurity, the DoD's gradual expansion of its remit is potentially reshaping US civil-military relations, which are defined by such “haggling over prerogatives.”Footnote 90 Beyond the core problem of civilian control—formally settled in the United States—factors like the balance of funding affect how power within the state is distributed and whom the public perceives to be “in charge” in a particular policy area.Footnote 91 Contestation thus affects the relative primacy of civilian goals, the choice of solutions to new problems, and how problems are defined to begin with—especially with novel or ambiguous issues. If the military's definition of cybersecurity problems comes to be accepted as commonsensical and beyond debate, that definition will frame which solutions are in or out of bounds.Footnote 92 The recent expansion of the military's role thus represents an important shift in how the US government approaches cybersecurity.Footnote 93

Within the Defense Department as well, there has been competition over cybersecurity roles and resources.Footnote 94 Diverse elements within the DoD have attempted to claim cybersecurity as “their” issue area, with the Air Force most prominent among the service branches. In the 1990s, for example, Air Force documents argued that the “information realm” was most similar to air,Footnote 95 and in 1995 it created one of the first “true combat” units for information attack.Footnote 96 A decade later, Air Force officials drew on emerging cyberspace language to propose an Air Force Cyber Command, describing its core mission as “to fly and fight in the Air, Space, and Cyberspace.”Footnote 97

Yet it was officials advocating for a joint approach, particularly within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who successfully deployed the cyberspace-domain framework. Had the discussion simply been about cyberspace—that is, had cyberspace not been designated as a domain—Air Force arguments could have been more convincing: cyberspace is complex, and operating there shares features with maneuvering in air and space more than with acting on land or sea. Framing cyberspace as one of five domains, however, implies that each domain, while distinct, shares certain characteristics (i.e., those making it a domain), supporting the need for parallel organizations. This fits better with building a joint force for cybersecurity than with subsuming cyberspace under the Air Force, a service already dedicated to a “traditional” domain.Footnote 98 In 2008, Air Force Cyber Command's permanent activation was denied.

Instead, in 2009 the relevant tasks were newly combined in US Cyber Command, one of the most significant organizational changes in US cybersecurity policy in the last two decades.Footnote 99 Creating an independent command for both defensive and offensive cyberspace operations represents a combat-focused “military paradigm” that favors specific “legal and policy choices,”Footnote 100 supported rhetorically by the foundational metaphor implied by cyberspace-domain terminology. Unfortunately, the explicit analogies that have followed (e.g., maneuver or deterrence in cyberspace), while succinct and evocative, may compromise key cybersecurity goals.Footnote 101 Military institutions are always guided by more than official mandates or rational decision-making processes, and foundational metaphors shape outcomes in ways similar to organizational procedures or service “personalities.”Footnote 102

While distinct from the service branches, Cyber Command has been tightly linked to another military organization: the National Security Agency (NSA). Its commander is “dual hatted” as NSA director, and both headquarters are at Fort Meade. These connections reflect the Command's need to coordinate with NSA signals-intelligence activities—and, even more, to draw on NSA resources and expertise.Footnote 103 Nonetheless, the Command is organizationally separate, with authority to conduct combat operations rather than espionage. This distinction has enabled actions that would have been extremely unlikely to emerge from an intelligence organization, including Cyber Command's recent uptick in “offensive operations.”Footnote 104 Revealing capabilities by engaging in attack or disruption runs contrary to the goal in intelligence collection to keep capabilities secret—and thus usable—for as long as possible. Overall, both organizations have likely seen advantages as well as disadvantages to this arrangement.Footnote 105 Thus, while the dual hat can certainly be read as NSA “winning” a bureaucratic battle, the expansion of Cyber Command's combat-oriented activities—supported by the DoD's dominant cyberspace-domain language—suggests a limited NSA victory at best.Footnote 106

Cyberspace-domain language provided essential rhetorical tools for those advocating for the new command. For example, the 2009 memo establishing Cyber Command emphasizes various threats “in cyberspace” and the need “to secure freedom of action in cyberspace.”Footnote 107 In 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense argued that, because “the military must be able to defend and operate within [cyberspace] … the Defense Department needs an appropriate organizational structure.”Footnote 108 Which institutional solution is deemed “appropriate,” of course, is conditioned by how problems are framed—here, entirely in terms of operating “in cyberspace,” making Cyber Command the correct solution. The Command's mission statement also draws on implicit spatial metaphors: the Command will “ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries.”Footnote 109 In later documents and testimony related to Cyber Command, cyberspace-domain language continues to be essential to further argument—and goes largely unremarked.Footnote 110

Even when recent statements explicitly emphasize new threats—requiring new responses—discussion continues to rely on the same terminology and spatial analogies. For example, the 2018 “Command Vision” outlines a significant shift in strategy toward a more offensive posture through “defending forward” and “persistent engagement,” repudiating the more reactive 2011 strategy.Footnote 111 Cyberspace-domain language helps to legitimize the new posture—including potentially controversial elements like “operating outside our borders, being outside our networks.”Footnote 112 Operating in another state's territory could be interpreted as a form of aggression, or raise concerns about possible escalation.Footnote 113 Those concerns, however, are undercut by arguments drawing on spatial metaphors. For example, in 2019 Paul Nakasone, the head of Cyber Command, wrote:

We must “defend forward” in cyberspace, as we do in the physical domains. Our naval forces do not defend by staying in port, and our airpower does not remain at airfields. They patrol the seas and skies to ensure they are positioned to defend our country before our borders are crossed. The same logic applies in cyberspace.Footnote 114

The Command's new posture thus involves activity “in cyberspace” analogous to uncontroversial actions in the physical domains. Of course, the idea that these all follow the “same logic” depends on the underlying foundational metaphor that connects cyberspace to physical spaces, especially to global commons like the high seas.Footnote 115

Nakasone's statement, moreover, operates at multiple levels of contestation simultaneously. It explicitly defends Cyber Command's new proactive posture. It justifies the Command as the military's centralized cybersecurity organization—if the high seas have the Navy and airspace has the Air Force, cyberspace requires Cyber Command. Finally, it implicitly promotes the broader role of the military: civilian agencies do not contest the DoD securing physical domains, so why should they protest the “same logic” applied to cyberspace? All three arguments rely on the metaphor implied by cyberspace domain.

Within the US military, this language appears to be firmly consolidated. It was first explained and advocated, then officially declared as doctrine, and finally taken as given. Cyberspace-domain terminology continues to justify the existence of Cyber Command and, at the same time, the institutionalization of this language in the Command's mission—and even its name—makes it increasingly difficult for an alternative framework to replace it. In fact, while discursive communities outside the government have long resisted this terminological framework—domain, cyberspace, even the cyber prefixFootnote 116—the military's terms and implied foundational metaphors have spread into broader discussions across the federal government.Footnote 117 This terminology continues to shape policy outcomes, not just rhetoric: the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act expanded Cyber Command authorities to respond to a wide array of threats “in cyberspace,” resulting in a significant increase in offensive actions.Footnote 118

Counterfactuals and Comparisons

How might different language have led to different outcomes? Without the foundational metaphor implied by the combination of cyberspace with domain, cybersecurity debates would have played out differently. Essential here is the conjunction of the two terms and how that specified and strengthened the particular metaphorical implications that emerged: namely, that the Internet has created a virtual space with territorial features, within which military ideas, strategies, goals, and actions apply. Without the specification as a domain, cyberspace could have continued to be associated with a wide range of spatial ideas and implications—in fact, before the military adopted this term, its most prominent political uses were explicitly nonterritorial.Footnote 119

Without the combined term, arguments for increasing the military's cybersecurity role would have lacked a powerful rhetorical resource, and counterarguments by other agencies might have been more successful. Consider, for example, a published back-and-forth between officials from the DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).Footnote 120 In response to the DoD's assertion that cyberspace constituted a “domain of warfare,” the DHS officials first deployed a nonspatial concept: “cyber-ecosystem—not just technology, but also policy, procedure, practice, and law.”Footnote 121 Yet the cyberspace term could not be ignored, so the DHS response also tried to redefine it: “cyberspace is fundamentally a civilian space.” But land, sea, air, and space are “civilian spaces” and “warfighting domains” at the same time. Thus “domain” specifies exactly what the DoD means by “cyberspace” and makes it possible to undermine counterarguments that use cyberspace language. Without this ability to set the terms of the debate (literally), the DoD position would have lacked a key rhetorical advantage it has enjoyed against civilian agencies’ arguments.

We can also ask what might have happened if Gibson had not coined the specific term cyberspace to begin with. It is certainly possible that a different term implying a spatial metaphor could have emerged and become widely adopted.Footnote 122 If combined with domain (or the like), another spatial term could in theory have constituted similar rhetorical resources.Footnote 123 Yet not every candidate term with spatial connotations would have worked as effectively. For one, “cyberspace” does not just connote a space, it literally contains the word space. And the term is syntactically efficient: speaking about events or actors “in cyberspace” is more succinct than many alternatives.Footnote 124 Without the specific word cyberspace, it is unlikely that arguments supporting the role of military actors and interests in this domain would have been so convincing.

Without cyberspace-domain language, nonspatial terms and implicit foundational metaphors might have become more prominent in these cybersecurity debates. For example, when “the Internet” is used as an overall label for networking and computing,Footnote 125 it can imply a set of metaphorical correspondences to networks rather than spaces.Footnote 126 The resulting emphasis on network features (e.g., nodes and connections) rather than operating in a virtual space yields different interpretations of cybersecurity problems and solutions.Footnote 127 Biological terms and metaphors like ecosystem, similarly, might be more prevalent in the absence of cyberspace-domain language, yielding different rhetorical resources.Footnote 128 While these and other terminologies have come in and out of use,Footnote 129 few have become as firmly consolidated within a community—and thus as consequential—as the US military's use of cyberspace domain.

The effects of the DoD's cybersecurity language are further illustrated by comparing how different terminology has worked within other agencies—and by considering how those terms could have altered outcomes at DoD. For example, since its creation in 2002, DHS has not characterized cyberspace as a spatial domain but has instead discussed cybersecurity in terms of protecting critical infrastructure. More than a description of Internet hardware, “critical infrastructure” implies a metaphorical correspondence between the Internet and other communication and transportation systems. The terminology first became prominent in a 1997 presidential commission report that focused on “cyber” threats to civilian infrastructure, without framing them as threats within digital spaces and without using “cyberspace” at all.Footnote 130 Although later DHS documents occasionally use the term, it is not discussed as a domain and the metaphor of actions in a virtual space is absent.Footnote 131

The contrast between DHS and DoD language has had observable consequences. The two have reacted differently to major cybersecurity incidents, with each organization's response guided not only by its mission but also by its foundational metaphors. In 2016, as evidence of Russian interference in US elections surfaced, the DHS largely stayed within the frame of monitoring, preventing, and mitigating direct attacks on election infrastructure.Footnote 132 The department's institutional response was then to reorganize its relevant components as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The DHS Secretary argued that this change “allows us to confront the threats of today.”Footnote 133

The Pentagon's response to 2016 election interference, on the other hand, has involved a command whose mission is entirely framed in terms of operating “in cyberspace,” defined as a military domain. Russian actions are thus labeled as “cyberattacks,” and threats to the territory and sovereignty of the United States.Footnote 134 In March 2018 comments on Russian interference, for example, the head of Strategic Command argued that “Cyberspace needs to be looked at as a warfighting domain … and if somebody threatens us in cyberspace, we need to have the authorities to respond.”Footnote 135 The response by US Cyber Command has then focused on operating proactively “in cyberspace” to prevent or disrupt future interference, including the 2018 election-day operation discussed earlier.

How would the two organizations respond differently if their terminologies and metaphors were reversed? If the DoD were to use critical infrastructure as a cybersecurity framework,Footnote 136 its response to foreign interference would likely be framed by its existing definition of “critical infrastructure protection” in general: “Actions taken to prevent, remediate, or mitigate the risks resulting from vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure assets. Depending on the risk, these actions could include changes in tactics, techniques, or procedures; adding redundancy; selection of another asset; isolation or hardening; guarding, etc.”Footnote 137 None of this is about defending those “assets” by operating in adversaries’ territory and interfering with their corresponding systems. Actions like the 2018 cyberattack on Russian sources of election interference would not easily fit in this frame, making them more difficult to present as commonsensical and proportionate responses.

Likewise, DHS would pursue different policies if it relied on spatial terminology and metaphors. While using “domain” would be unlikely—since that term emerged from a specific context at DoD—a spatial model that DHS could conceivably draw on is an analogy to border protection (one of “six overarching homeland security missions”).Footnote 138 This would place less emphasis on vulnerability and resilience in core infrastructure and more on preventing intrusions at network locations analogous to territorial boundaries (i.e., away from election hardware itself).Footnote 139 Yet DHS's long reliance on critical infrastructure language, which predates the department itself, appears to undermine other frameworks—just as DoD's cyberspace-domain terminology has, thus far at least, remained impervious to alternatives.

“Cyberspace” Beyond the United States

In this article I have analyzed how cybersecurity has been constructed by language, going beyond the focus in existing literature on technical and strategic aspects. In particular, foundational metaphors, implied by widely used terminology, have shaped arguments, policy responses, and institutional changes. In US military doctrine and strategy, the cyberspace domain label has constituted a set of underlying spatial metaphors since the mid-2000s—providing instrumental rhetorical tools and, simultaneously, structuring the arguments, analogies, and policies brought to bear. This has shaped contestation within the US government, supporting militarization and the creation of a unified Cyber Command. In circumstances of rapid technological change, uncertain consequences, and novel vulnerabilities—conditions clearly present in cybersecurity—how issues are framed in terminology and then institutionalized can have significant effects. While I have focused on the United States, cybersecurity language and metaphors also shape contestation in other contexts.Footnote 140

For one, US terms—and implicit metaphors—have appeared in documents from other states, particularly among US allies.Footnote 141 NATO documents have also drawn directly on US concepts,Footnote 142 and even US adversaries have, on occasion, used US language.Footnote 143 While the military, economic, and diplomatic power of the United States explains why US language has sometimes been emulated,Footnote 144 the consequences of that emulation result from the content of US terminology, including its implicit foundational metaphors.

Those consequences are evident in debates around how international law applies to cybersecurity—especially debates that have drawn directly on US language.Footnote 145 For example, the two Tallinn Manuals were written by a group of experts (largely from NATO states) seeking to codify how state practices reveal customary and treaty-based international law of “cyber warfare” and “cyber operations.”Footnote 146 The Manuals build on the spatial concepts in US cybersecurity language, even quoting from a US document that “international norms guiding State behavior … also apply in cyberspace,” and defining terms like “cyber operations” and “cyberspace” very similarly to US terminology.Footnote 147 Yet the spatial metaphors implied by this terminology can complicate—maybe unnecessarily—the application of international law.Footnote 148

Because the Tallinn Manuals discuss cybersecurity actions as occurring in or through cyberspace, nearly all issues are framed in terms of territorial sovereignty, defined as control over or independence of “a portion of the globe.”Footnote 149 This is unproblematic for analyzing states’ rights and responsibilities with regard to physical Internet infrastructure (states have a clear claim over hardware within their boundaries) or actions that involve physically crossing a border. Yet there is more to cybersecurity than direct control over hardware—one “point of leverage” over Internet activityFootnote 150 but a crude tool of Internet governance and rarely successful on its own.Footnote 151

The Tallinn Manuals, therefore, also attempt to classify actions that rely exclusively on informational or nonphysical means, especially actions that intentionally cross state boundaries. This ranges from using “remote cyber operations” to effect damage inside another stateFootnote 152 to sending “cyber weapons” through the infrastructure of a neutral party.Footnote 153 The spatial metaphor implied by cyberspace terminology has complicated this analysis, preventing consensus within the Tallinn group of experts: some treated cyberspace as a spatial extension of state territory (and thus subject to the same rules, metaphorically translated “into cyberspace”), while others treated cyber operations as informational actions that should not be understood through spatial analogies. With progress unlikely on any treaty-based international law for cybersecurity,Footnote 154 even nonbinding discussions like the Tallinn process will guide further developments in international law and norms, including by framing questions with largely unquestioned terms and implicit metaphors.Footnote 155

In other international settings, less dominated by US interests, the interactions across diverse languages, terminologies, and metaphors have been more complex. For example, in two UN cybersecurity bodies—the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the more recent Open Ended Working Group (OEWG)—US language has not predominated. In consensus reports in 2013 and 2015 (hailed for demonstrating a surprising degree of international agreement), the GGE framed its work as developing norms regarding the use of “information and communication technologies” (ICTs) and the “conduct of ICT-related activities”Footnote 156—not actions “in cyberspace.” It is possible that agreement was enabled, albeit temporarily,Footnote 157 by the broad language being used: “ICT activities” favors neither the US cyberspace-domain concept nor the very different language of “information security” used by some other participating states, including Russia and China.Footnote 158

Outside of international forums, there are other pathways by which US language may have global effects. For example, important aspects of Internet governance could be reshaped by an unintended correspondence between US terminology and authoritarian governments’ Internet policies. The metaphors implied by cyberspace-domain language in US doctrine may inadvertently legitimize controls like China's “great firewall”—the US's spatial metaphors naturalize the idea of boundaries and state authority “in cyberspace.” The Chinese government's claim of sovereignty over the Internet within its borders has even been justified with reference to the Tallinn Manuals.Footnote 159 In other words, the cyberspace-domain concept and the resulting spatial metaphors could implicitly support “Internet fragmentation,” especially the “alignment” of Internet controls with state boundaries.Footnote 160

Given that cybersecurity metaphors are likely to persist (it would be nearly impossible to avoid them entirely),Footnote 161 we should at a minimum be aware of how the metaphors implied by terminology shape arguments in policymaking—and in scholarship. Research in IR and Security Studies often uses cyberspace terminology, asking whether and how conflict, power, norms, deterrence, or other “traditional” security issues and concepts apply “in cyberspace.”Footnote 162 Using other language may add new analogies, comparisons, and policy recommendations.Footnote 163 Or it could be helpful to avoid conceptualizing the Internet and its effects as one “thing,” by any name, and instead discuss it for what it is: a collection of actors, technologies, systems, institutions, problems, policies, effects, and so on.Footnote 164 Finally, one could use multiple terminologies simultaneously, and thus draw on diverse underlying metaphors.Footnote 165 While the “imperfections” of any particular metaphor are a possible constraint, they can also be “a source of creativity and innovation,”Footnote 166 especially when disparate metaphors are put in conversation with one another.

For IR in general, this study of terminology, metaphors, and their effects suggests two additions to how we analyze language and its consequences. First, it shows that examining implicit meanings and metaphors, not just explicitly made arguments, can be useful for understanding rhetorical processes and effects. Second, in addition to the customary focus on open contestation—arguments and analogies deployed instrumentally—we can look at what elements of language are not contested and what underlying ideas are then supported or precluded. To identify how language becomes consolidated, it is useful to trace it back to the point at which it was still unsettled—when terminology remained an open rather than closed controversy.Footnote 167 Both points apply outside of cybersecurity, especially to the politics of other new technologies.Footnote 168

Quite a lot, it turns out, can be in a name. The labels and implicit metaphors that militaries, analysts, and even scholars use can reshape the technological environment, redefine the “terrains” of conflict, and determine what is and is not a “domain of warfare.”

Acknowledgments

I thank the editors of IO, the anonymous reviewers, Jonathan Caverley, Peter Dombrowski, Helen Kinsella, Ron Krebs, Sean Lawson, Helen Lee, Jon Lindsay, Bryan Nakayama, Abe Newman, John Savage, Jacquelyn Schneider, Amit Sheniak, Max Smeets, Tim Stevens, the staff at the National Security Archive, and the participants and audiences where earlier versions of this article were presented: the University of Wisconsin, the University of Minnesota, Cambridge University, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, the Naval War College, Yale University, King's College London, Marquette University, the University of Connecticut, Georgetown University, Santa Clara University, Claremont McKenna College, and the 2018 International Studies Association meeting.

Footnotes

1. Benedikt Reference Benedikt1991, 1.

2. DoD 2011, 5.

3. Joint Chiefs 2018, xii.

4. Ellen Nakashima, “US Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian Troll Factory on Day of 2018 Midterms,” Washington Post, 27 February 2019; David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “US Escalates Online Attacks on Russia's Power Grid,” New York Times, 15 June 2019.

8. E.g., Buchanan Reference Buchanan2016; Choucri Reference Choucri2012; Demchak and Dombrowski Reference Demchak and Dombrowksi2011; Gartzke Reference Gartzke2013; Kello Reference Lucas2017; Lindsay Reference Lindsay2013; Rid Reference Rid2013; Valeriano and Maness Reference Valeriano and Maness2015. A wider array of approaches has also emerged, relating cybersecurity to Internet governance (DeNardis Reference DeNardis2014; Raymond and DeNardis Reference Raymond and DeNardis2015), securitization (Hansen and Nissenbaum Reference Hansen and Nissenbaum2009), Science and Technology Studies (Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty2018), norm development (Finnemore and Hollis Reference Finnemore and Hollis2016), history (Healey Reference Healey2013; Warner Reference Warner2012), territoriality (Herrera Reference Herrera, Cavelty, Mauer and Krishna-Hensel2007; Lambach Reference Lambach2020; Sheniak Reference Sheniak2014), and language (Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty2013; Lawson Reference Lawson2020; Lupovici Reference Lupovici2016).

9. Following Raymond (Reference Raymond2019, 36), I combine constitutive and causal claims, addressing first how it has been possible to construct cybersecurity threats in specific ways and then why certain institutional and policy responses have followed.

10. Lakoff and Johnson Reference Lakoff and Johnson1980, 5.

14. Semino Reference Semino2008, 5. On conceptual metaphor theory, see Lakoff and Johnson Reference Lakoff and Johnson1980.

15. Larsson Reference Larsson2017, 7–8.

16. This takes no position on whether speakers or audiences believe the implicit metaphorical correspondences are true or commonsensical. Instead, following Semino's discursive metaphor theory, we can analyze texts’ metaphorical content, including how prevalent metaphors “come to represent the ‘commonsense’ or ‘natural’ view.” Semino Reference Semino2008, 33.

17. Many metaphors are “not noticed as being metaphorical.” Lakoff and Johnson Reference Lakoff and Johnson1980, 27.

18. Determining how “consistently” and by whom is difficult. A foundational metaphor exists when a speaker uses a term with metaphorical implications, observable in surrounding text. That metaphor is consequential when it is used widely in a community. See footnote 26.

19. Focusing on rhetoric sidesteps the contested argument that metaphors directly shape thought. Semino, for example, argues that while we are not “completely blinkered and straitjacketed by the metaphors we conventionally use … in some cases we may be,” supporting a “weak version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.” Semino Reference Semino2008, 33.

20. Crawford Reference Crawford2002, 13.

21. Sandholtz Reference Sandholtz2008, 103.

22. Krebs and Jackson Reference Krebs and Jackson2007, 42, 45.

24. The effects of foundational metaphors can be distinguished from other linguistic processes by two elements. First, here metaphors implicitly connect otherwise distinct concepts, defining a narrower scope of meaning making than narratives, norms, or rules. Second, the importance of implicit meanings differentiates this from securitization (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde Reference Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde1998) or instrumentally using a label—for example, combatant—with explicit legal or normative consequences (Kinsella Reference Kinsella2005). Yet foundational metaphors often work alongside other processes: narratives or stories, for example, help define policy problems, but “the framing of problems often depends upon metaphors underlying the stories.” Schön Reference Schön and Ortony1993, 138. Among the diverse ways in which social facts shape contestation, foundational metaphors are distinguished by being metaphors implicit in shared terminology.

25. Krebs Reference Krebs2015, 5.

26. It is difficult to set a threshold on how widely a term must be accepted. Nonetheless, when multiple sides to an ongoing debate use the same terminology—implying the same metaphorical correspondences—that community's language has at least provisionally been settled. While never permanent, language often remains stable for identifiable periods.

27. E.g., studies suggesting “cyber analogies”: Goldman and Arquilla Reference Goldman and Arquilla2014; Greathouse Reference Greathouse, Kremer and Müller2014; Karas, Moore, and Parrott Reference Karas, Moore and Parrott2008; Manjikian Reference Manjikian2015, Reference Manjikian2016; Nye Reference Nye2011; Perkovich and Levite Reference Perkovich and Levite2017. For analysis: Betz and Stevens Reference Betz and Stevens2013; Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty2013; Graham Reference Graham2013; Lapointe Reference Lapointe2011; Lawson Reference Lawson2012; Libicki Reference Libicki2012; Stevens Reference Stevens2016.

28. Critical discussions: Gartzke Reference Gartzke2013; Goldman and Arquilla Reference Goldman and Arquilla2014; Lawson Reference Lawson2020; Stevens Reference Stevens2016.

29. Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty2013 is closest to my approach, examining language both “setting the linguistic rules of the game and … used instrumentally” (118). I focus on metaphors implied by terminology used by decision makers, rather than the creation of available “threat representations.”

30. Karas, Moore, and Parrott Reference Karas, Moore and Parrott2008; Lapointe Reference Lapointe2011. Betz and Stevens note that “cyberspace” may represent cybersecurity's “ur-metaphor.” Betz and Stevens Reference Betz and Stevens2013, 149.

31. Semino Reference Semino2008, 6.

32. Larsson Reference Larsson2017, 28. The next section demonstrates this in the US case with cyberspace and domain.

33. Mueller Reference Mueller2017a, 418.

34. Gibson Reference Gibson1984, 69; Edwards Reference Edwards1996, 308.

35. Edwards Reference Edwards1996, 19–20; Rid Reference Rid2016, 219–20.

36. Barlow uses cyberspace terminology but draws on nonterritorial images (“a standing wave in the web of our communications”). Barlow Reference Barlow1996. The elasticity of possible metaphorical correspondences reinforces the point: identifying the foundational metaphor constituted by a term requires looking to the surrounding text(s).

38. Lakoff and Johnson Reference Lakoff and Johnson1980, 17.

39. E.g., Internet users describe their actions spatially. Maglio and Matlock Reference Maglio and Matlock1998; Matlock et al. Reference Matlock, Castro, Fleming, Gann and Maglio2014. See also Cohen Reference Cohen2007, 212; Hunter Reference Hunter2003; 444; Larsson Reference Larsson2017, 29.

40. Contingent origins do not preclude path-dependent effects: for example, the QWERTY keyboard. David Reference David1985.

41. Rid Reference Rid2016. This helps explain why “cyberspace” was adopted over other authors’ terms (e.g., “the other plane,” in Vinge Reference Vinge1981, a novella influential among technologists; Rid Reference Rid2016, 206) or Gibson's “the matrix,” which appears more often than “cyberspace” in his novels. Hunter Reference Hunter2003, 473.

42. The Google Books Ngram Viewer shows a post-2000 decline. Wagner Reference Wagner, Singh, Carr and Marlin-Bennett2019, 61. See also Betz and Stevens Reference Betz and Stevens2013, 150; Graham Reference Graham2013, 178.

43. Even cyber has come to refer to computers and networks in this community. Healey Reference Healey2013, 280; but see Futter Reference Futter2018 and Lupovici Reference Lupovici2016. This has eclipsed Arquilla and Ronfeldt's Reference Arquilla and Ronfeldt1993 influential discussion of “cyberwar,” in which cyber referred to “information-related principles.” With roots in cybernetics, cyber could also suggest control or governance. Arquilla and Ronfeldt Reference Arquilla and Ronfeldt1993, 57; Lindsay Reference Lindsay2017, 494; Rid Reference Rid2016, 3. Yet “historical” or “etymological” origins of metaphors often matter less than current uses. Semino Reference Semino2008, 18.

44. Dunn Cavelty and Egloff Reference Dunn Cavelty and Egloff2019, 44.

45. Diverse approaches study ideas through documents. E.g., Builder Reference Builder1989; Raymond Reference Raymond2019; Semino Reference Semino2008. Contemporary documents are more useful than later interviews, given the tendency to project vocabulary backwards. Although accessing all relevant documents is impossible (especially with classification), I reviewed an extensive sample covering all types of US military documents, classified and unclassified: memos, vision documents, strategies, doctrines, etc. The quoted documents are representative of overall trends.

46. White House 1984.

48. US Air Force 1995.

49. Joint Vision 2010, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996. On file with author.

50. National Security Agency 1995.

52. Joint Chiefs 2000, 72.

53. E.g., US Air Force 1995, 8.

54. Joint Chiefs of Staff, n.d.

55. Joint Chiefs 2004, 18.

56. Joint Chiefs Reference Johnson and Post2006, ix.

57. Specifically, cyberspace is “a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.” US Strategic Command 2009, 8.

58. Joint Chiefs 2000, 72.

59. Joint Chiefs 2000, 61.

60. Alexander Reference Alexander2007, 60.

61. Separating out land, sea, and air was a long-standing organizational principle of the US military, institutionalized in the National Security Act of 1947. But it was only when this “new” space appeared that a label (i.e., “domain”) was needed—the 1947 act simply distinguishes among “operations on land,” “operations at sea,” and “air operations.” See Heftye Reference Heftye2017 and Nakayama Reference Nakayama2019. Thus “domain” does not appear until the late 1990s. The eventual designation of one label for land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace may have been more important than the term “domain” itself—which has not been officially defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff, n.d. See also Allen and Gilbert Reference Allen, Gilbert, Czosseck and Geers2009, 2.

63. Implied characteristics can contradict explicit definitions. For example, US military publications define cyberspace in terms of hardware. See footnote 57; Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty2013, 108. Yet those texts’ spatial analogies present cyberspace instead as a “space between the hardware components … where interaction happens.” Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty2013, 107. The implicit metaphor, not the formal definition, often frames further arguments and proposed solutions.

64. Joint Chiefs 2006, 13. Note that these statements often discuss actions or goals “in cyberspace” without using “domain.” In this community, “cyberspace” alone has come to embody the combined meaning of “cyberspace domain.”

65. US Strategic Command 2009; Cartwright Reference Cartwright2010.

66. DoD 2011.

67. See epigraph.

68. US Army 2010; US Air Force 2011; US Navy 2012; US Coast Guard 2015.

69. The pattern is clear in document series: for example, the 1997–2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) shift from using no cyberspace terminology to consistently discussing cyberspace as a domain.

70. DoD 2011, 2015, 2018.

71. DoD 2010a, 1.

72. DoD 2013.

73. White House 2012.

74. US Cyber Command 2016.

75. Cartwright Reference Cartwright2010, 1; US Army 2010, i.

76. In author interviews, officials repeatedly mentioned new terminology being motivated by the desire to “make one's mark” in a new position.

77. E.g., DoD 2018; Joint Chiefs 2018.

78. David E. Sanger, “Pentagon Puts Cyberwarriors on the Offensive, Increasing the Risk of Conflict,” New York Times, 18 June 2018.

79. I do not address broader, state-versus-society contestation regarding the respective cybersecurity roles of the state vis-à-vis corporations, civil-society groups, individuals, etc. See Coles-Kemp, Ashenden, and O'Hara Reference Coles-Kemp, Ashenden and O'Hara2018; Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty2013; Dunn Cavelty and Egloff Reference Dunn Cavelty and Egloff2019; Hansen and Nissenbaum Reference Hansen and Nissenbaum2009; McCarthy Reference McCarthy2018. On language see Kamis and Thiel Reference Kamis and Thiel2015; Stevens Reference Stevens2016, 184.

80. As noted regarding cybersecurity by former Defense Secretary Carter Reference Carter2019, 340.

82. Although cyberspace terminology and metaphors have been rhetorically effective—making certain policies easier to promote—the resulting policies are not necessarily objectively effective.

83. Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty2013, 113; Manjikian Reference Manjikian2015, 3.

84. Lynn Reference Lynn2010, 101–102. See also Alexander Reference Alexander2007.

85. Hayden Reference Hayden2016, 130.

86. E.g., Lute and McConnell Reference Lute and McConnell2011.

87. Hayden Reference Hayden2011, 4; see also Libicki Reference Libicki2012. Hayden's Reference Hayden2016 memoir makes similar points.

88. Lambach Reference Lambach2020; Stevens Reference Stevens2016, 74. This suggests studying positive affect in cybersecurity, adding to research on negative emotions like fear. Betz and Stevens Reference Betz and Stevens2013, 149; Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty and Möckli2012, 116; Lawson Reference Lawson2020.

89. Healey Reference Healey2013, 55; Libicki Reference Libicki2012, 332.

90. Brooks Reference Brooks2019, 387.

91. Footnote Ibid., 386.

92. Using cyberspace-domain language to present a significant military role in cybersecurity as commonsensical has been essential. For example, former CYBERCOM commander Keith Alexander argued, on the appropriate role of the military: “[the US Constitution] says that the purpose of the Union is to provide for the common defense. There is no parenthetical that says ‘except in cyberspace.’” Clarke and Knake Reference Clarke and Knake2019, 94.

93. Healey Reference Healey2013; Warner Reference Warner2012. While DoD certainly had a hand in the creation of the Internet, the importance of that is contested and for decades other interests dominated Internet structure and governance. Townes Reference Townes2012.

94. I focus here on institutional interests and arguments; on the role of specific individuals see Kaplan Reference Kaplan2016 and Nakayama Reference Nakayama2019.

95. US Air Force 1995, 8; Hayden Reference Hayden2016, 127.

97. Lani Kass, “A Warfighting Domain,” Presentation, AF Cyberspace Task Force, 26 September 2006. On file with author.

98. In 2019 space operations were upgraded from an Air Force command to a stand-alone Space Force, a move similarly promoted with “domain” language. For example, in 2017 the future head of Space Force argued that “space is … a war-fighting domain and we need to treat it as such.” Anthony Capaccio, “US Air Force Space Chief Sees Final Frontier as Battleground,” Bloomberg, 17 October 2017. Available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-17/u-s-air-force-space-chief-sees-final-frontier-as-battleground>. “Domain” favors the separation, not merging, of roles.

99. Healey Reference Healey2013, 73–75. Cyber Command was operational in 2010 and elevated to a unified combatant command in 2018.

100. Hollis and Ohlin Reference Hollis and Ohlin2018, 441.

101. A point made by, among others, Betz and Stevens Reference Betz and Stevens2013; Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty and Möckli2012, 119; Heftye Reference Heftye2017; Lapointe Reference Lapointe2011, 16; Lawson and Middleton Reference Lawson and Middleton2019, 14–15; Libicki Reference Libicki2012; Stevens Reference Stevens2016.

102. E.g., Builder Reference Builder1989.

103. Linking the two could be presented to the Joint Chiefs as “offering NSA's resources to enhance DOD cyber-combat power at little cost to the services.” Hayden Reference Hayden2016, 143. While this practical explanation is convincing, the rhetorical effects of language may have played some role. Kaplan (Reference Kaplan2016, 219–20) notes that NSA declassified a host of cybersecurity documents in 2012, once Cyber Command was operational and PPD-20 (White House 2012) had authorized offensive cyber operations. Included were the mid-1990s NSA documents discussed earlier, which do not use “domain” but do discuss “cyberspace” (NSA 1995; Black Reference Black1997)—suggesting at least the possibility that NSA sought to demonstrate its own lineage “in cyberspace.” Yet such a rhetorical move was unlikely to succeed: by 2012 cyberspace-domain language was well established as a rhetorical resource to support Cyber Command's assertion of a combat role in this “warfighting domain.”

104. Kaplan argues that, once Cyber Command was operational, offensive operations “emerged as a consuming, even dominant, activity at Fort Meade.” Kaplan Reference Kaplan2016, 211.

105. Sulmeyer Reference Sulmeyer2017.

106. Some connection between Cyber Command and NSA will almost certainly persist. While discarding the dual hat has long been discussed (Kaplan Reference Kaplan2016, 257; Sulmeyer Reference Sulmeyer2017), the arrangement represents a “sticky” institutional design—who wants to be the first non-dual-hatted NSA director or CYBERCOM commander?

107. Secretary of Defense 2009.

108. Lynn Reference Lynn2010, 101–102.

109. DoD 2010b.

111. Schneider Reference Schneider2019; Smeets and Lin Reference Smeets, Lin, Lin and Zegart2018; US Cyber Command 2018.

112. Nakasone Reference Nakasone2019a, 7.

113. Though Kreps and Schneider Reference Kreps and Schneider2019 suggest that escalation fears may be misplaced.

114. Nakasone Reference Nakasone2019b, 12.

115. Rhetoric also used by Hayden Reference Hayden2016, 132.

116. Rid and Buchanan Reference Rid and Buchanan2018, 7.

117. E.g., the report from the “Cyberspace Solarium Commission,” led by elected officials and including multiple federal agencies, closely tracks DoD language. King and Gallagher Reference King and Gallagher2020.

118. NDAA 2019, section 1642. Chesney Reference Chesney2019; Clarke and Knake Reference Clarke and Knake2019; Sanger and Perlroth, “US Escalates Online Attacks.”

119. E.g., Barlow Reference Barlow1996.

120. The DoD case was prominently argued in Foreign Affairs by Lynn Reference Lynn2010, with a response in Wired by Lute and McConnell Reference Lute and McConnell2011.

121. Lute and McConnell Reference Lute and McConnell2011.

122. Lakoff and Johnson (Reference Lakoff and Johnson1980, 17) note the prevalence of spatial metaphors.

123. I remain agnostic about how essential the specific term domain has been (rather than early alternatives like realm). The crucial step was consistently applying a single label to land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace (see footnote 61).

124. Compare, for example, “operating in the information domain/realm” with “operating in cyberspace.”

125. Recalling that the word internet originally referred only to “internetworking” projects like ARPANET.

126. E.g., “Internet governance” literature largely avoids spatial language and metaphors, focusing instead on network-type characteristics like “control points.” DeNardis Reference DeNardis2014; Raymond and DeNardis Reference Raymond and DeNardis2015.

127. Lambach Reference Lambach2020, 7–8. For example, this suggests historical analogies to communication networks like the telegraph, with distinct security (Gartzke and Lindsay Reference Gartzke and Lindsay2015) or legal implications. Goldsmith Reference Goldsmith1998.

128. On biological metaphors in general, see Betz and Stevens Reference Betz and Stevens2013; Dunn Cavelty Reference Dunn Cavelty2013, 110; Lapointe Reference Lapointe2011. Ecosystem has been suggested by analysts (Osenga Reference Osenga2013, 49–51) and policymakers (Lute and McConnell Reference Lute and McConnell2011).

129. E.g., “information superhighway” was used to argue for federal investment in the early Internet. Blavin and Cohen Reference Blavin and Cohen2002, 269–70.

131. E.g., DHS 2003; DHS 2011, D-2. See Futter Reference Futter2018. The core difference between DHS and DoD definitions of cyberspace is the DoD's use of domain—the two definitions are otherwise nearly identical. US Strategic Command 2009, 8; DHS 2011, D-2.

132. E.g., DHS 2016, 2018.

133. DHS 2018. Clarke and Knake argue that it was “just a reorganization of things that were already in DHS.” Clarke and Knake Reference Clarke and Knake2019, 171.

134. E.g., Carter Reference Carter2019, 341.

135. Sanger, “Pentagon Puts Cyberwarriors on the Offensive.”

136. As to why it does not, see the discussion on the close “fit” that spatial terminology provided with military concepts and staffing.

137. DoD 2020.

138. “Mission.” Homeland Security. Available at <https://www.dhs.gov/mission>.

139. Manjikian Reference Manjikian2016.

140. The following explores, briefly, linguistic processes and cybersecurity elsewhere, particularly international reactions to US terminology. Comparing terms and metaphors across languages has inherent challenges, including the mistranslation of words or divergent connotations. Giles and Hagestad Reference Giles, Hagestad, Podins, Stinissen and Maybaum2013; Kamis and Thiel Reference Kamis and Thiel2015; Zeng, Stevens, and Chen Reference Zeng, Stevens and Chen2017.

141. E.g., UK Cabinet Office 2009. Emulation of US policy includes the very idea of releasing a “cybersecurity strategy.” Kerttunen and Tikk Reference Kerttunen and Tikk2019, 10.

142. NATO 2014, par. 72–73.

143. E.g., a 2015 Chinese strategy mentions “threats from such new security domains as outer space and cyber space.” PRC 2015; see also Zeng, Stevens, and Chen Reference Zeng, Stevens and Chen2017. This suggests the possibility that a single terminology could eventually serve as a “focal point” for international cybersecurity contestation. Farrell and Glaser Reference Farrell and Glaser2017, 13.

144. Some other communities have thus been instrumentally motivated to adopt the cyberspace-domain framework, regardless of whether it provided the same institutional and intuitive “fit” that explains its uptake in the US military.

145. On cybersecurity language and international law see Boer Reference Boer, Kuijer and Werner2017; Sauter Reference Sauter2015.

146. Schmitt Reference Schmitt2013, Reference Schmitt2017. Although states do not see these manuals as binding and some analysts consider them irrelevant (e.g., Lucas Reference Lucas2016, 17), they serve as the first point of discussion and frame subsequent debate. Corn Reference Corn2017; Raymond Reference Raymond2019, 206. Legal discourses are often shaped by “conceptual path dependence.” Larsson Reference Larsson2017, 50.

147. Schmitt Reference Schmitt2013, 3, 258. They have also drawn, implicitly, on language used by US officials (e.g., State Department lawyer Harold Koh Reference Koh2012 on international law “in cyberspace”), itself reflecting earlier legal scholarship (footnote 37).

148. Although “domain” appears only rarely, the Tallinn discussions nonetheless draw on the US framing of cyberspace as a domain.

149. Schmitt Reference Schmitt2013, 16; Schmitt Reference Schmitt2017, 11. For example, the second edition begins by affirming: “The principle of State sovereignty applies in cyberspace.” Schmitt Reference Schmitt2017, 11. International legal debates often define “cyberspace with reference to territory.” Manjikian Reference Manjikian2015, 4. See also Mueller Reference Mueller2019.

150. Finnemore and Hollis Reference Finnemore and Hollis2016, 460.

151. DeNardis Reference DeNardis2014; Lambach Reference Lambach2020, 13–14.

152. Schmitt Reference Schmitt2017, 17–27.

153. That is, are “cyber weapons” munitions or information? Schmitt Reference Schmitt2017, 553–62.

154. Hollis and Ohlin Reference Hollis and Ohlin2018.

155. Post-Tallinn discussions have continued to debate how law applies “in cyberspace” (e.g., AJIL Unbound 2017).

156. UNGA 2013, 2015.

157. In 2017 the GGE failed to yield a consensus report. See Henriksen Reference Henriksen2019; Maurer Reference Maurer2020; Raymond Reference Raymond2020; Tikk and Kerttunen Reference Tikk and Kerttunen2018.

158. Giles and Hagestad Reference Giles, Hagestad, Podins, Stinissen and Maybaum2013; Tikk and Kerttunen Reference Tikk and Kerttunen2018. Information security includes controlling Internet content alongside blocking malware or preventing network intrusions. While authoritarian governments’ deployment of this concept is explained well by instrumental motivations, this article's framework suggests additional questions: What metaphors are implied by these terms? How do those metaphors fit with different interests? How might contestation around cybersecurity then be reshaped in countries where these terms predominate?

159. Zeng, Stevens, and Chen Reference Zeng, Stevens and Chen2017, 449.

160. Mueller Reference Mueller2017b, 35. See also Mueller Reference Mueller2019.

161. Sauter Reference Sauter2015, 66.

162. E.g., Borghard and Lonergan Reference Borghard and Lonergan2017; Finnemore and Hollis Reference Finnemore and Hollis2016; Gartzke Reference Gartzke2013; Kello Reference Kello2017.

163. E.g., Gartzke and Lindsay Reference Gartzke and Lindsay2015 on deception in communication networks, or Demchak and Dombrowski (Reference Demchak and Dombrowksi2011, 35) on the Internet as a “substrate.”

164. Or a “bundle of mechanisms.” Farrell Reference Farrell2012, 36.

165. For related suggestions, see Lawson and Middleton Reference Lawson and Middleton2019, 16; Manjikian Reference Manjikian2016.

166. Lawson Reference Lawson2020, 197.

168. For example, in legal and ethical debates about remote military operations, activists have instrumentally deployed terms like “killer robots,” while militaries discuss “remotely piloted aircraft.” Both labels are intended to frame the debate by suggesting specific metaphors—to dystopian scenarios or to the accepted use of aircraft in warfare. Yet even the widely used word drone may imply a set of unexamined metaphorical correspondences.

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