Contemporary trends toward protectionism seem not merely to represent a passing phase in the world political economy but reflect widespread resistance to deep-seated structural change. In three major sectors of the world economy characterized by surplus capacity—textiles, steel, and shipbuilding—state policies increasingly challenge liberal, market-oriented economic arrangements. The emergence of restrictive arrangements in these areas is still primarily organized nationally: multinational enterprises do not dominate economic activity. Conflict among firms over market shares is reflected, therefore, in conflict among governments. Such conflict may be temporarily resolved through market-sharing agreements, but these are inherently unstable. Increasing state involvement is likely in the long run to exacerbate the problems of capitalism and to increase conflict over international economic issues. These adverse developments will call further into question theories of international political economy that assume compatibility between a liberal, market-oriented international economic system and a state-oriented international political system.

During the 1970s the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), acclaimed only a decade earlier as prominent evidence of successful integration of member states, manifest major defects. Farm prices to the consumers increased continually, large surpluses of certain farm commodities accumulated, the cost of operating the CAP rose tremendously, and recurring changes of member state currencies made a shambles of the common price and market concept. Several general and specific causes of those problems can be identified. Strongly influenced by powerful national farm lobbies, the member governments have imposed their own interests, often at variance with the “common” interest, upon the Community decision-making framework. The large number of national officials participating in the CAP implementation process has tended to strengthen trends toward policy outcomes undesirable from the Community perspective. More specifically, the main cause for disrupting agricultural price and market unity has been the system of “green” currency rates and the monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) which have provided the member governments with opportunities to reconstitute national control over farm prices. Fear of domestic political repercussions has restricted the creation of vigorous policies to counter surpluses, and structural improvement of farms, badly needed in some regions of the Community, has been slow.

Cross-sectional evidence from interviews at the United Nations found some delegate socialization. Third World delegates with longer tenure showed frustration with the organization, expansionist interests toward its economic activities, and satisfaction with their governments' missions to the United Nations, suggesting increased identification with governmental supranationalist goals. Western delegates with longer tenure showed cynicism about world politics, frustration with the United Nations, expansionist interest toward the Secretariat, and dissatisfaction with their UN missions, suggesting tension between governmental policies and socialized delegate supranationalism which delegates may reduce by leaving the United Nations. Such socialization implies little more than a reinforcement of national policies.

The finding of even this disheartening socialization in the United Nations calls for more careful research in organizations where delegate socialization is theoretically more likely. Such research should use scales more complex than those commonly used and should consider bodies “intermediate” between national governments and international organizations, such as permanent missions.

An analysis of 344 selected votes in the four major issue areas in the UN General Assembly from 1971 to 1977 examines the question whether China has fulfilled its promise to support the Third World and oppose the superpowers. The findings are: 1) China was much more favorable to the Third World than to the West in this period and more supportive of the developing nations than of the Communist bloc on all except colonial issues; 2) China voted with the Third World more often than with the Communist nations, even when colonial issues were included; 3) China was least friendly to the United States on the majority of issues and in all years; and 4) the Soviet Union was the most anti-China nation in the Communist world, and of the four permanent members of the Security Council, Soviet voting agreement with China was the third lowest on political and security issues in the overall period and was often the lowest on arms control and disarmament. Thus at least within the context of UN voting, China has succeeded in developing its pro-Third World and anti-superpower position, particularly on economic and security issues.