When the promisee ceases to be interested in performance of the contract by the promisor—and the case is not caught by the rules relating to frustration of purpose—he will prefer the promisor not to perform it. If breach by the promisor occurs, the promisee will be entitled to damages and where an abstract valuation applies (the difference between the consideration for the property or service under the contract and its value at the date of rescission: sec. 11 of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 1971) that will be very convenient for the promisee. In every case, he will be spared performance on his part. Less convenient, but still sufficiently convenient, is the assumption that it is impossible for the promisor to perform: that the same event which caused the promisee's benefit in performance by the promisor to cease—or some other event—precludes performance by the promisor or renders it too onerous. Here as well the promisee will be spared his own performance and in addition may possibly receive indemnity, under sec. 18 of the Law, “for expenses reasonably incurred and liabilities reasonably contracted by him for the performance of the contract.”

It is my contention that the concepts which hide behind the terms constituting the title of this essay, have many traits in common and to a large extent deal with the same problem.

This, however, is not sufficiently admitted. Further theoretical and philosophical clarification is overdue.

In the first place the theorist in each field finds it difficult to confess to what extent the prevailing terminology is misleading; the more so because in spite of defective terminology he is—in a general way—in agreement with his fellow-specialists as to the object of their study.

In the second place the theorist in each field, finding it hard enough to follow the torrent of literature in his chosen specialty, tends to neglect developments in fields which however closely interrelated are considered to be distinct.

This series of articles is intended to deal with one aspect of the sources of Israel law, namely the influence of foreign legal systems and principles derived therefrom on Israel law and on the attempt in recent years to independent creation of local law.

Foreign law constitutes on occasion an actual legal source for the law of Israel. This occurs when a local enactment refers to foreign law and makes it applicable in certain situations. In such case the foreign law which we are to apply constitutes an obligatory legal norm in Israel and is, in fact, part of the Israel legal system. In other cases foreign law influences the process of creation of local law but does not constitute a formal source of law in the Israel system. This happens, for example, when Israel case law relies for authority upon some rule established in an American decision (which is, of course, not binding in Israel) or when the Israel legislator is influenced by a principle of law derived from another legal system. We might say there that the foreign law is an historical source for the Israel rule.

The hijacking of a Lufthansa aircraft from Rome to Kuwait, via Athens, consequent upon the massacre at Rome airport, focused attention upon the problem of the prevention and punishment of aerial hijacking.

This issue has many facets, but perhaps one of those which is of most interest to the lawyer is the institution of judicial proceedings against those involved. Insofar as international hijackings are concerned, the offender is always outside the territory of the country from or to which the aircraft is flying, either because of the diversion or because the hijacker has made his safe exit, a condition for the freeing of the aircraft or its passengers and crew. Invariably, too, he is outside the territory of the aircraft's state of registration. This means that extradition becomes a major issue, with the possibility of the hijacker seeking asylum in order to avoid his return to any of the various countries that may be seeking to place him on trial.

Any attempt to review twenty-five years of legislation and judicial criminal procedure in twenty-five minutes is frustrating, since we have at our disposal one minute for each year of activity. This impossible task was imposed upon my colleagues and myself by the organizers of this important convention, apparently in the belief that Israelis are never deterred by difficult and even hopeless missions.

We shall divide our discussion on criminal procedure into two parts: firstly, a brief history of legislation, and secondly, an examination of the accused's fundamental rights as they are protected in Israel after twenty-five years of statehood, and a partial survey of the Supreme Court's contribution to finding a reasonable balance between the defence of human rights and a guarantee of effectiveness in combating delinquency and bringing delinquents to punishment. The entire discussion will be in general terms, and many of the details mentioned will be no more than selected drops from the ocean of criminal procedure.