Chapter 4 of the new Israeli Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, introduces the concept of a contract in favour of a third party, while granting express recognition to the right of a third party beneficiary. Even those, (including the author) who maintain, that the right of a third party beneficiary could and should be derived, even before the commencement of the new Law, from the general principles and premises of the old Israeli law of contract, cannot fail to see in the above-mentioned chapter an important innovation in the Israeli legal system.

This paper is a comparative analysis of the institution of third party beneficiary. The analysis will consist of a presentation and critical examination of the central concepts and doctrines involved in the institution under discussion, and it will be combined with a comparative survey of the arrangements adopted in various legal systems. The choice of this approach stems from the particular circumstances of the new legislation.

While in most countries, comparative legal research is a luxury, in Israel it is a necessity. The new legislation in private law is inspired to a great extent by Continental codifications. As far as the law of contract is concerned, Israel is now in the process of becoming a “mixed jurisdiction”: departing from the common law tradition and technique, and heading towards an independent body of law, derived from various sources, mainly Continental in both substance and form.

On 19 January 1976, the Government of Israel announced its intention to impose censorship on two categories of information:

(1) Information about the existence or content of a document relating to Israel's foreign affairs which is classified “top secret” or similarly classified and which is addressed from Israel to a foreign country or from a foreign country to Israel.

(2) Information relating to a visit by an Israeli official to a foreign country or a visit by a foreign official to Israel, or a meeting between an Israeli and a foreign official—when no diplomatic relations obtain between Israel and that country and when the visit or meeting was not conducted in public nor officially announced in Israel.

This step was the Government's response to a series of leakages which appeared in the preceding weeks in the press in Israel. Two publicized items had particularly outraged the Government. One item discussed President Ford's secret message to Prime Minister Rabin. The other item disclosed a secret visit by Foreign Minister Allon to Europe.

The right of the citizen to express his views publicly is a basic feature of the democratic system. However, the freedom of expression, and the closely related freedom of public assembly, do at times conflict with other major social interests. As a result, no society has accepted the theory that these freedoms should be absolute. The democratic process requires a balancing of these freedoms with other important values and public interests. Consequently, each state has placed various limitations on the freedom of expression and public assembly. If a government limits these freedoms too much, it may do irreparable damage to the democratic process. Likewise, the fact that the freedom is enshrined in some constitutional document does not ensure that it will be given any meaningful protection. Whether or not fundamental freedoms are really preserved, is the true test of a democracy.

Demonstrations have traditionally been used as a vehicle for expressing dissent. A citizen who is generally satisfied with the social and political status quo will probably not feel a need to exhibit his satisfaction publicly.

While contemporary Jews debate “Who is a Jew?”, medievals found the question “Who is not a Jew?” much more relevant. Halakhic standards were clear enough on entrance to the community: birth or conversion decided the matter, and the latter provided no more problems than did the average halakhic norm. The institution of conversion was not quite as old as that of birth, but it too had a respectable history of Talmudic discussion and stable international precedent behind it by the start of medieval times, and no Jewry found itself in a quandary on that score. This was not the case regarding Jews who rejected Judaism and left the community. Talmudic discussion is both sparse and incomplete on this issue; and it may not necessarily suit the case of the medieval apostate who exchanges his native fold for an equally possessive faith community. The medievals faced the problem, then, with some Talmudic guidelines but with many open options; yet despite the different opinions that developed, we are able to speak of a medieval concensus. This concensus delivered a legal standard, to be sure; but, as we might expect from an issue of such scope and centrality, the legal concensus was based on a broad understanding of the relation of the Jew to his people and the nature of Jewish peoplehood.

The few privileges strictly necessary for observing the Jewish rites, privileges which the last Roman Emperors had allowed to be maintained, were naturally upheld by those Visigothic kings who did not propose to abolish Judaism altogether, that is to say, by all the Arian and some of the Catholic kings. But all Jewish ceremonies were proscribed under severe penalties by those kings who compelled the Jews to opt between either baptism or exile. Under the system established by the first converting kings, any Jew who refused to undergo baptism was liable to serious punishment. For him the question of observing Jewish rites simply did not arise. As for the baptized Jew who observed these rites, he incurred the rigours of the laws directed against Christians who practised Judaism.

Abandoning that system, Recesswinth refrained from imposing upon the the Jews the alternative of either accepting baptism or exile, but he prohibited the exercise of their religious rites. The penalties were the same for anyone transgressing that prohibition, be he a Jew or a baptized Jew—the death penalty by fire or stoning, or, if pardoned by the king, enslavement for life and forfeiture of all the offender's property.