Yehuda Blum's article, ostensibly devoted to an examination of the lawfulness of a military order under the law of occupation, actually explored a preliminary question – whether Jordan had valid title to the West Bank (referred to as ‘Judea and Samaria’). Concluding that Jordan had no title, Blum concluded that the law of occupation did not apply. This reflection revisits Blum's thesis. It suggests that Blum's argument failed to elucidate the relevant legal questions and therefore his conclusion was hasty. It would be distressing to think that it was Blum's article that convinced Israeli decision-makers to deny the formal applicability of the law of occupation to the West Bank and Gaza.

Over the years, the Security Council has on several occasions dealt with humanitarian assistance issues. However, it is Security Council Resolution 2165(2014), related to the situation in Syria, that has brought the role of the Security Council to the forefront of the debate. It is against this background that the article discusses the legal issues arising from Security Council action facilitating humanitarian assistance to be delivered in situations of non-international armed conflict.

Following a brief survey of relevant practice of the Security Council related to humanitarian assistance, the article considers the relevance, if any, of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) to humanitarian assistance to be delivered in such situations. It then moves on to analyse whether a rejection by the territorial state of humanitarian aid to be delivered by third parties may amount to a situation under Article 39 of the UN Charter. It then considers in detail whether (at least implicitly) Resolution 2165 has been adopted under Chapter VII and, if this is not the case, whether it can be still considered to be legally binding.

The article finally considers what impact the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2165 might have on the interpretation of otherwise applicable rules of international humanitarian law and, in particular, the right of third parties to provide humanitarian assistance in a situation of a non-international armed conflict in spite of the absence of consent by the territorial state, and the obligations that members of the Security Council, permanent and non-permanent, have under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions when faced with a draft resolution providing for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, notwithstanding the absence of consent by the territorial state.

In recent years, the increasingly frequent and, in certain contexts, extremely severe impediments to the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need have focused attention on how to enhance compliance with the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that regulate humanitarian relief operations. Efforts to hold accountable parties to armed conflict and persons responsible for unlawfully impeding humanitarian relief operations face the challenge that the underlying rules give parties latitude in how to implement the central obligation to allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian supplies, equipment and personnel. This article outlines the rules of IHL regulating humanitarian relief operations and highlights the difficulties, in the majority of situations, of determining whether they have been violated. It then presents current endeavours to promote accountability. It concludes with some reflections on whether the threat of accountability is the most effective way of enhancing compliance with this area of IHL, at least while efforts are under way to negotiate access.

Humanitarian assistance is essential for the survival of the civilian population and people hors de combat in the theatre of war. Its regulation under the laws of armed conflict tries to achieve a balance between humanitarian goals and state sovereignty. This balance, reflected in the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, is not as relevant to contemporary armed conflicts, most of which involve non-state armed groups. Even those provisions relating to humanitarian assistance in conflicts involving non-state armed groups fail to address properly the key features of these groups, and especially their territorial aspect. This article proposes a different approach, which takes into consideration and gives weight to the control exercised by non-state armed groups over a given territory. Accordingly, it is suggested that provisions regulating humanitarian relief operations in occupied territories should apply to territories controlled by armed groups. This approach views international humanitarian law first and foremost as an effective, realistic and practical branch of law. Moreover, it has tremendous humanitarian advantages and reflects the aims and purposes of the law, while considering the factual framework of these conflicts.

Offering a current reflection on Raphael Walden's 1977 article, ‘The Subjective Element in the Formation of Customary International Law’, this contribution seeks to illustrate that considerable clarity has been achieved over the decades with regard to several long-standing questions associated with customary international law, not least those surrounding opinio juris. Accumulated practice and constructive scholarship have supplied insights into, and indeed answers to several of the controversies that have bedevilled the theory of this central source of international law. While it may inherently defy exact formulations, and some theoretical questions remain, customary international law is thus today not only as present in the international legal system as it has always been but is also better understood.

Applying human rights beyond state borders is thorny. Which law governs the property rights of a Palestinian whose orchard lies across the Israeli border, or the cross-border shooting of a Mexican citizen by a United States border control agent? This article explores the relationship between constitutional law and international law in the extraterritorial enforcement of human rights by offering a typology of models: the American, European and Israeli models. These models are analysed comparatively, highlighting their chosen legal source of rights: the American model applies constitutional law, the European model uses international law, and Israel combines the two.

The article argues that the choice between constitutional and international law is important as it affects the nature and scope of rights, and reflects the relationship between the state and the territory it controls or within which it acts. The dynamic formation process of the Israeli model demonstrates the multiple possible ways to combine these two sources of law and formulate the relationship between them.

All three models share a ‘constitutional mindset’: the use of basic legal concepts and reasoning in legally grey zones. However, these transnational processes are not deterministic and could result in original concepts, contradictions and discrepancies, as well as serve different political visions.

Canada is often cited as one of the principal sources of proportionality analysis – an approach to the determination of limits on constitutional rights that has been adopted in many jurisdictions. The two-step structure of constitutional rights adjudication is built on the idea that these rights are the basic conditions of individual autonomy or liberty that must be protected from the demands of collective welfare. At the first stage of the adjudication the court determines whether the restricted activity falls within the scope of the right. At the second stage the court balances the right against the competing interest advanced by the restrictive law to determine whether the restriction is justified. Yet few of these rights fit this individual liberty model and are better understood as social or relational in character, protecting different aspects of the individual's interaction or connection with others in the community. If we recognise that most constitutional rights do not simply protect individual autonomy but instead protect different aspects of human flourishing or dignity within community then two conclusions may follow. First, there can be no single generic test for limits on rights. The form or character of ‘limitations’ on these rights may differ in significant ways. Second, the two steps of adjudication may often be difficult to separate, or the separation may seem quite artificial. Many of the issues addressed by the courts will not fit easily into the two-step structure of analysis because the ‘competing’ interests are really different dimensions of a social relationship.

The use of proportionality and balancing by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is inconsistent and does not provide clear guidelines from which policies can be drafted that could strike a fair balance between individual rights and public interests while not impairing the essence of the rights at stake. While ad hoc and unprincipled balancing may be justified on the theoretical level, on the practical level a policymaker seeking to understand which infringements constitute clear violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is left confused. This article adds clarity to this state of bewilderment by breaking down several aspects of the ECHR rights to a fair trial into clear-cut ‘red lines’, or minimum thresholds of protection. Overstepping those could result in a violation of the right concerned. Identifying these red lines is intended to assist legislators and policymakers in drafting laws and policies that conform with the obligations of their states under the ECHR, and to instruct policymakers outside the member states of the Council of Europe. Because of its unique characteristics, as well as the volume and breadth of its case law, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR can be a lodestone for the consolidation of an international human rights community based on shared values. The unique contribution of this article is the assessment of ECtHR jurisprudence not only on its own merits, but also in comparison with the jurisprudence of other international courts.

The quarter-century anniversary of Israel's ratification of the major United Nations (UN) human rights treaties is an opportunity to revisit the formal and informal interaction between domestic and international Bills of Rights in Israel. This study reveals that the human rights conventions lack almost entirely a formal domestic legal status. The study identifies a minor shift in the scope of the Israeli Supreme Court's reference to international law, as the Court now cites international human rights law to justify decisions that a state action is unlawful, and not only to support findings that an action is valid. This shift may be the result of other reasons, for instance, a ‘radiation’ of the Court's relatively extensive use of international humanitarian law in reviewing state actions taken in the Occupied Territories. However, it may also reflect a perception of enhanced legitimacy of referring to international human rights law as a point of reference in human rights adjudication following ratification of the treaties.

At the same time, the Court continues to avoid acknowledging incompatibility between domestic law and international law. It refers to the latter only to support its interpretation of Israeli constitutional law, as it did before the ratification. This article critically evaluates this practice. While international human rights law should not be binding at the domestic level, because of its lack of sufficient democratic legitimacy in Israel, it should serve as an essential benchmark. The Court may legitimise a human rights infringement that is unjustified according to international law, but such incompatibility requires an explicit justification. The Court, together with the legislature and the government, are required to engage critically with the non-binding norms set by the ratified UN human rights treaties.

The role of courts as lawmakers has been scrutinised, partly because of the questions it raises regarding legitimacy. This scrutiny has sometimes assumed that courts are safe from legitimacy-based criticism in their role as appliers of law. However, recent events in the United Kingdom show that, regrettably, this is not so: the media reaction to the judgments in the Brexit case of Miller went far beyond criticism of the courts’ reasoning or conclusions. It was an attack on legitimacy. Insofar as such attacks arise out of misunderstandings about the nature of adjudication (including, for example, the existence and scope of judicial discretion), one way of countering them is for the legal community (scholars, judges, practitioners) to continue to increase public awareness about these issues. However, it is incumbent upon other parts of the state – the executive and the legislature – to respond promptly to such attacks in order to uphold the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law.

Ever since the Wednesbury decision in 1947 (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223) courts and public law scholars in the United Kingdom (UK) have been struggling to comprehend the meaning of ‘reasonableness’ and its relation to ‘proportionality’. The main purpose of this article is to promote conceptual clarity in UK public law by describing the nature of reasonableness and proportionality as grounds of judicial review and by highlighting the overlooked similarities and differences between them.

The main arguments of this article are that: (i) reasonableness is, in essence, an exercise in balancing and weighing; (ii) proportionality adds very little to the existing grounds of judicial review in UK public law; (iii) this addition is not necessarily focused on the administrative weighing and balancing process; and (iv) since proportionality adds very little to the existing grounds of judicial review, there is no conceptual or normative reason to prevent having proportionality as a general ground of judicial review in UK public law.

Thomas D Grant's Aggression Against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility and International Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) is the first book which offers a careful, meticulous examination of all aspects of Russia's involvement in Crimea in 2014 in terms of international law, as well as of both Russian and Ukrainian municipal legal orders. It covers probably the widest possible spectrum of legal issues connected with Russia's involvement in Crimea and provides a comprehensive, analytical overview of relevant modern rules of international law in the field of territorial integrity, self-determination and use of force.

This article, departing from Gila Stopler's ‘Rights in Immigration: The Veil as a Test Case’, published in the Israeli Law Review in 2010, reviews how the time spent by a long-term migrant, irrespective of legal status, normatively figures in liberal theories of migration and in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The article detects that in contemporary liberal theories, assigning an independent normative value to time spent by the migrant in the receiving country is a key move in balancing the competing interests of migrants and of the migrant-receiving country, where the right of the country to regulate migration is taken as given: the longer a migrant is present in a country, the stronger her interests become in receiving citizenship status or treatment akin to citizens. The article then surveys the case law of the ECtHR relating to long-term migrants. It finds that time is often one of multiple normative considerations in the balancing exercise, in conjunction with whether a migrant has achieved social integration in the migrant-receiving country and whether the right of the receiving community to regulate migration for reasons of affording citizenship, national security or distributive justice is paramount. The article argues that the lack of an independent normative weight afforded to time in the case law of the ECtHR is not merely a tension between the translation of liberal normative theory to legal policy. It also shows a deeper tension in liberal theories of migration between national liberalism and cosmopolitan liberalism.

This review of Non-State Actors in International Law, edited by Math Noortmann, August Reinisch and Cedric Ryngaert (Hart Publishing, 2015), focuses on the constraints of state-centric approaches in accurately depicting the role and status of non-state actors in the international arena. As the book presents a comprehensive examination of the influence of diverse entities in a variety of fields, such limitations are evidenced and inevitably lead to the reassessment of novel theoretical standpoints, as well as to the recognition that a multidisciplinary approach is much needed in order to advance further studies on the issue.

International investment law is usually oriented to protect investors while cultural heritage law focuses on the protection of unique items and activities of cultural value. These two subsystems coexist and increasingly intersect within the international legal system, mainly in the context of investment arbitration proceedings, where domestic cultural policies are balanced against the interests and rights of foreign investors. The interplay between these subsystems entails legal complexities and challenges and, as a result of the increasing number of cultural heritage disputes, demands new approaches in the fields of cultural governance, international relations and dispute settlement. These issues are thoroughly addressed by Valentina Vadi in her book Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2014).