It does not need to be said that to be asked to give the Lionel Cohen lecture is a great honor. One of the first books on private international law which I acquired when I became interested in the subject was a volume of the Lionel Cohen lectures delivered by Sir Otto Kahn-Freund. I have chosen a topic which involves the subjects in which I have my primary academic interests, public and private international law, but also a subject in which I had some professional involvement before I became a judge.

My immediate family was safely in England at the time of the Holocaust, but I am particularly glad that some of my cousins are here at this lecture. Their families in Poland were tragically involved in the Holocaust and my cousin Rony Lerner made a film in 2006, which was shown on Israeli TV, about the murder in Poland of his grandmother and his search for her murderers. His grandmother was my grandmother's sister.

The vocabulary of “reasonableness” invokes a wide margin of discretion that is often needed to temper the excessive rigour of legal rules and to deal with the inevitable problems of over- and under-inclusion associated with application of formal law to individual cases. The acceptability of the use of discretion by a law-applying institution such as the Israeli High Court of Justice is based on the assumption that its preferences and moral sensibilities are broadly reflective of the preferences and sensibilities of the community in which it exercises its jurisdiction. When jurisdiction is exercised in conditions of occupation, however, such consensus cannot be easily presumed. On the contrary, recourse to moral pathos by an institution of the occupying power will appear to normalize its jurisdiction and add an element of hypocrisy to the felt illegitimacy of its possessing jurisdiction in the first place. Moreover, it will undermine the moral and political significance of the fact of the occupation, even diminishing the urgency of bringing it to an end.

Many scholars have written about the changes in international law in recent years. Many have seen this change in the environment of international humanitarian law as a result of greater application of human rights in this area of law (IHL). This Article approaches the changes in international humanitarian law from a different perspective, that of law and economics.

The main claim in this Article is that recent changes in international humanitarian law can be seen as a change from a rule based normative system, to a standard based one. The difference between a rule system and a standard system rests not in the complexity of the norms, but by whom and when changes are made. In a rule—decisions are made before the fact, and in a standard—decisions are made after the fact. This Article then evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of this move from rules to standards, and offers observations and future avenues of research.

The Article explores relationships between contemporary international human rights and democracy. In what respects are they two sides of the same coin, in what respects are they different coins? Do they depend on and complete each other? Can the two be in contradiction? The Article looks at these questions from several perspectives, including their historical connections, the changing definitions and understandings of each, their functional links, their determinacy, and their character as universal phenomena. It also indicates ways in which courts, which have long interpreted and applied human rights, now also reach decisions about constitutional issues by drawing on their conception of democracy.

The debate surrounding the legal status of Gaza after Israel's disengagement in September 2005 exemplifies some of the chronic limits and deficiencies that international humanitarian law in general and the law of occupation in particular suffer from: (a) binary application—the law operates within clear-cut dichotomies and struggles with recognizing ambiguous situations; (b) varying realities—prevalent tensions between “legal reality” and the actual conditions “on the ground” cause the characterization of conflicts to be based upon different law-based and fact-based perceptions of reality: (c) inconsistent legal and policy approaches—parties to a conflict attempt to simultaneously advance different legal and political goals, which leads to a state of affairs that encourages the application of IHL in a selective and inconsistent manner; (d) chronic gaps between law as it is and law as it should be—lex lata may bring about unsatisfactory outcomes—hence, parties and commentators often attempt to modify existing laws through radical reinterpretations. Focusing on the recent debate over the status of Gaza, this Article illustrates how these four fundamental tensions hamper the application of the law of occupation in factually complicated situations.

The Article discusses the difficulties of establishing a hierarchy of norms in international law, particularly with regard to human rights norms. A number of arguments have been put forward but none of them has proven to be conclusive: be it the distinction between treaty-based norms and norms of customary law, be it the non-restrictability or non-derogability of some treaty rights, be it their erga omnes character or the inadmissibility to make reservations. The best way to address the issue of hierarchy seems to be the concept of jus cogens. However, the consequences of some rights being “superior” to others are by no means clear. The fact that certain rights are addressed in court decisions as being “most fundamental” or representing a “supreme value” does not necessarily mean that these rights prevail over other, seemingly “inferior” rights in a given case. This is so because it is difficult to decide in abstracto and in advance possible conflicts of human rights positions of different human beings. The Article therefore recommends a very reluctant use of a terminology pointing at a hierarchy between human rights.

Various political realities influence the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and, more generally, the vitality of the international law of occupation. The law of occupation—though ill-suited to modern international relations and ill-equipped for prolonged occupation—has been almost universally invoked as applicable to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). At the same time, international human rights law is increasingly viewed as applicable to occupation. This creates a dilemma for Israel because international humanitarian law and international human rights law contain conflicting prescriptions and policy goals with respect to the administration of occupied territory. In many instances, occupants seek United Nations Security Council action in order to reconcile this tension and to secure legal and political cover for their actions. By acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter; the Security Council can create a select legal patchwork applicable to a particular occupation. This use of Chapter VII resolutions by the Security Council to create international law by fiat is an important trend in modern occupation. Yet geopolitics determines access to—and the content of—such resolutions, and the sensitive political context of the OPT currently makes this avenue unavailable to Israel. For the same reason, opponents of the Israeli occupation are unable to secure Security Council action to clarify and enforce Israeli legal obligations in the OPT. This Article considers these issues from the perspectives of both Israel and Palestinians in order to examine why the relative gain and loss in each case is not immediately clear. This Article also discusses how the legality of Israeli conduct in the OPT may be gauged in light of the conflicting international legal obligations imposed by human rights law and the law of occupation. A broader exploration of the impact of these phenomena reveals that these political realities serve to increase the influence of the Security Council while further undercutting the utility and relevance of the international law of occupation.

Only five years after the end of the Second World War terminating the complete disregard for human rights in one of the important European countries and in the occupied territories, the governments of European countries agreed on a European Bill of Rights and took the first steps toward collective enforcement of certain rights of the Universal Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. Evidently the Convention was a response to the totalitarian ideologies prevailing in national socialism but also to the communist ideology and practice governing the Soviet Union and the European countries behind the iron wall. Was the Convention intended to be more than a response and clarification of the fundamental principles which were well recognized in the constitutional structure of the free European states? If this is the case it should have had an impact on the legal system of member states.

How far that impact would go was certainly not foreseen in 1950 or 1953 when the Convention came into force. By hindsight we may say that the establishment of the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights as judicial organs to enforce the Convention had something that is called “List der Vernunft” in German, a certain rule of reason, not fully understood by the drafters.

Notwithstanding of the considerable body international law dealing with occupation, identification of the normative standards against which law and order is maintained continues to challenge the international community. That challenge is centered on the existence of an unclear and often awkward interface between international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

Policing represents the normal means by which order is maintained in society. In occupied territory the preference should be for maintaining order by means of properly trained police forces seeking to apply international human rights law standards. However, the security threat is often not limited to criminal activity with there being striking similarities between attempting to maintain order in occupied territoty and battling insurgencies in internal armed confits. This then points to the application of international humanitarian law to govern the use of force.

Despite ongoing disagreement about which paradigm should be applied the question remains whether the proponents of the two frameworks can break free of their normative chains to craft a realistic approach to maintaining law and order. Suggested approaches include the situation based approach of applying the appropriate body of law to specific fact situations and the blended approach of borrowing from each normative regime to address the unique situations confronting security forces. Which ever approach is adopted the emphasis must remain on the right to life to ensure true respect for the rule of law is maintained.

This Essay considers the 2006 Sri Lankan Supreme Court case, Singarasa v. Attorney General, which declared unconstitutional the state's eight-year-old accession to the Protocol permitting the Human Rights Committee to examine complaints of violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It places the decision in the context of the Committee's earlier findings of Covenant violations by Sri Lanka resulting from actions by the Court. This forms the basis of a discussion of problems of identifying questionable judicial conduct and the relevance of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.

The policies of the U.S.—developed in response to the threat of terroism have been criticized. This is of importance, not only because of the harm it does to the United States own reputation, but because of the influence such measures have on other countries with less commitment to the protection of human rights than the United States has historically had. It is, however, a crucial issue because of the impact that such policies can have on the political will of the international community to respect and promote half a century of endeavor to build an international human rights culture, and on attitudes and behavior in countries affected by such measures. The exception becomes the rule; the temporary becomes permanent; and fairness and due process cease to have the meaning they once had. This Article's remarks are directed to the right to a fair hearing which must be seen, however, in a broader context as a concern about a discourse which, whilst retaining the label, seeks to change the content of established principles of human rights.

This Article explores the grounds and consequences of illegal occupation. It proposes that an occupation may be considered illegal if it is involves the violation of a peremptory norm of international law that operates erga omnes, and is related to territorial status. Accordingly, illegal occupations are primarily those achieved through violation of the prohibition on the use of force and of the right to self-determination, or maintained in violation of the right to self-determination. This examination forms the basis for a systematic analysis of specific occupations that have been declared illegal by U.N. organs. The second part of the Article addresses the consequences of an occupation's illegality, in view of the political and legal objectives of determining such illegality. It considers the international responsibility for an illegal occupation; the obligation of non-recognition and the law applicable to an illegal occupation; and the right to self-defense. The Article concludes by commenting on the role of “illegal occupation” as a category under international law.

This is a preliminary inquiry into the application to occupation law of the distinction between jus in bello (or IHL) and jus ad bellum. Under current doctrine, the two are mutually exclusive: the former applies irrespective of the “nature or origin of the armed conflict or the causes espoused by the Parties.” I argue that occupation law, although generally considered part of IHL, is intrinsically less susceptible to a strict application of the distinction.

Exploring its pedigree, meaning, and rationale, the paper notes the distinction's scant, soft Conventional expression and brief history, but also its fundamental character and the broad scope attributed to it under contemporary IHL. Although the distinction sometimes fulfill important humanitarian functions in occupied territories, occupation law—in regulating governance of territory—differs from ordinary IHL norms; this and other differences render the strict application of the distinction to occupation law, whose key norms often depend on jus ad bellum references to the “nature, origin and causes” of armed conflict, impossible.

The last part of the Paper calls for a more nuanced approach to the application of the distinction to occupation law and identifies some of its contours. Such an approach can enhance the efficacy of occupation law and facilitate fulfillment of the two different functions of occupation law: protection of individuals and the maintenance of international peace and security. The Paper concludes with preliminary observations on the roles and powers, under both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, of the Security Council with regard to occupied territories.

In times of crisis there is an unmistakable tendency to augment and extend the powers of the executive branch. This centralizing tendency has been exhibited in numerous legal systems and through varied kinds of crisis. More recently, similar trends have been much in evidence in the United States, and a corresponding academic discourse defending and extolling the virtues of such augmentation has emerged. This Article is skeptical of the virtues of such advice and its ultimate policy benefits. We assert that there are substantial dangers to the centralization of crisis powers in times of emergency. These tendencies hold particular perils for the democratic state. Moreover, the rush to create or cement decision and review making hierarchies can be antithetical to the project of utilizing the strengths of rule of law based societies to respond to the challenges posed by violent actors. The purported benefits of excluding, or at best sidelining, the courts from review of executive actions of crisis regulation are particularly ill-conceived. Such proposals consistently fail to engage with the importance of across-the-board institutional legal engagement with state action in times of crisis. The success and value of such engagement cannot be measured from the crisis vantage point. Rather it requires an assessment beyond the moment of exception, factoring in a return to normalcy and the impact on law and legal institutions in the post-crisis phase. We assert that scholars advocating for exclusive executive supremacy in times of crisis fail to measure the harms that may be caused by inept or illegal state action, not only as experienced by individual victims but to the broader project of discouraging and dissuading the resort to group based violence.

In December 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in its latest Guantánamo Bay cases, Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States. Interestingly, the argumentation offered in this litigation was almost exclusively domestic—international human rights law did not feature in spite of its capacity to add significantly to the weight and persuasiveness of the arguments petitioners' In respect of both the geographic scope and the content of constitutional standards, international human rights law has a well-developed body of jurisprudence that, this Article argues, ought to have been advanced by counsel for the petitioners. This Article both exposes the potentially significant international human rights law arguments that could have been advanced, and explores some possible reasons for the marginalization of this body of law. The Article concludes that this strategic decision on the part of counsel for the petitioners robbed the U.S. Supreme Court of an opportunity to assert the relevance of human rights law to the “War on Terrorism,” and to expand on the relationship between international and domestic constitutional standards and, for those reasons, is to be lamented.

This Paper argues that the traditional international legal discourse on occupation fails to reflect the condition of international relations, and their governability by international law, at the turn of the 21st century. This Paper suggests re-conceptualizing the concept of occupation by linking it to the discourse of failed and fragile states and the responsibility to protect.

A contemporaneous understanding of occupation needs to reflect its transforming relationship to sovereignty. Occupation represents a state of interference with the external aspect of sovereignty, which ultimately infringes also on the state of internal sovereignty. In contemporary world politics, occupation arises also from a chain of successive situations interfering with sovereignty wherein internal sovereignty becomes “vitiated” (“failed and fragile state”), and creates a condition conducive to interference with external sovereignty. The outcome of this order of impingements on sovereignty represents a state wherein sovereignty was suspended.

The condition of suspended sovereignty triggers the new norm of the responsibility to protect. This Paper submits that re-vitalization of the concepts of leasehold and trusteeship offers an elegant, perhaps face-saving outlet, hence potentially constructive approach to empower the failed and fragile state in re-establishing its sovereign plenary control over its territory and ending an occupation-like situation.

The analysis of the Lebanese situation is an example of the arguments raised in this Paper and does not fit the traditional post World War II (WWII) occupation legal mould for neither belligerent nor non-belligerent occupation. The complex inter-state relationship linking Lebanon-Syria-Iran-Israel, and which is intricately interlaced in a state-to-non-state actor (NSA) web as played out in the relationship between Israel-South Lebanon Army on the one hand, and between Iran, Syria and Lebanon-Hezbollah on the other hand, serve to illustrate the new 21st century conditions. These conditions press for an updating of the traditional understanding of occupation.

The legal regime of human rights entitles individuals and groups to legal protection against the hegemony of the political majority, of the religious establishment and of other powerful social actors. This Article examines the way in which this protection is implemented at the constitutional and international levels. Within states, it is at the constitutional level that the supremacy of human rights is translated into a normative paradigm. However, within states there may be opposition to the human rights regime—pragmatic or ideological—from powerful lobbies: majoritarian or sectoral. This opposition may result in lack of political will to apply or enforce human rights through constitutional mechanisms. The author shows that, in contrast, the formulation of the human rights vision at the international level consistently underwrites the human rights of individuals and groups as against the power of traditionalist religious or cultural norms. She suggests that the future of human rights as a universal paradigm depends on the effectiveness with which international norms can be translated to the constitutional level thus suggesting a reversal of the previously observed process of translating from the constitutional to the regional.

A review of the different occupation situations evidences that these situations are characterized by a poor record of compliance with the law of occupation. The international humanitarian law (IHL) conventional enforcement mechanisms have not been activated and compliance with the law has almost exclusively relied upon judicial processes. However, since enforcement of IHL through adjudication operates mainly under the principles of criminal individual responsibility, this course of action has been of little relevance for occupation law insofar as the latter contains only few provisions the violations of which amount to graves breaches of IHL or other serious violations thereof. Disrespect for occupation law barely gives rise to criminal proceedings and therefore excessive focus on the latter procedures constitutes an impediment to the effective enforcement of this corpus juris. In addition, actual IHL mechanisms designed to induce compliance with occupation law do not allow for the appropriate control of the administrative and legislative acts of the occupant. In light of the contemporay forms of occupation and the tendency to broadly interpret the powers conferred on the occupant by IHL, administrative and legislative acts of the occupant should not be left without legal review. The present Article investigates the role and legal entitlement of different domestic courts in this respect after having previously examined the obstacles to exercise of jurisdiction by domestic courts with regard to the measures undertaken by the occupant within the framework of Article 43 of The Hague Regulations of 1907. The author argues that, despite their usefulness, domestic courts do not actually provide an appropriate course of action for legal review of the administrative and legislative measures promulgated by the occupying power.