Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vvkck Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T06:45:38.740Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Emergence of Political Parties in Eritrea, 1941–1950*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2009

Lloyd Ellingson
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In May 1941, after the Italians' capitulation, the British immediately took over the administration of Eritrea for the duration of the war and until an international body could decide the former colony's future. From 1941 to 1950, the political direction of Eritrea remained uncertain until the U.N. commission reached its compromise solution. Ultimately, the Ethiopian Government contravened the U.N. agreement and unilaterally annexed Eritrea in 1962, which set in motion the present struggle for independence.

The British Military Administration, acting as an interim government, attempted with moderate success to create an atmosphere in which all people of Eritrea might have the maximum voice in determining their political future. From the end of the war through the arrival of the U.N. commission in February 1950, there was a flurry of political activity. Although initially five political parties were formed, which in time became splintered and re-emerged as other parties, two main groups could be distinguished along geographical boundaries: the lowlands versus the highlands, separatist Muslims versus irredentist Christians. The historical suspicion and aloofness between Orthodox and Muslims continued to divide Eritrean loyalties. Affiliation, however, with one or another political party was not observed strictly on geographical or religious grounds. A small number of educated Orthodox saw no advantage in Eritrea's incorporation into Ethiopia and thus formed a pocket of Christian separatists who would have undoubtedly obtained greater allegiance had not the Orthodox priesthood threatened excommunication for anyone not espousing the Unionist cause. On the other hand a small nucleus of Muslims, mostly chiefs and landed aristocracy, favored union with the government in Addis Ababa, for their feudalistic hold on the large number of Tigrai serfs (numbering three-fifths of all Muslims in Eritrea) would have been retained under Ethiopian rule.

By the end of 1946, there was widespread but unorganized anti-unionist sentiment; elections held in 1947 by the Four Power Commission showed that a small majority of all Eritreans opposed union. The anti-Unionist cause profited from Ethiopia's intimidation and terrorist interference, which was largely counter-productive; moreover, the irredentist argument failed to convince most Muslims and some Orthodox that Eritrea would prosper under the aegis of one of Africa's least developed countries. It seems clear that terrorism and intimidation were largely Unionist tactics and that the anti-Unionist campaign became popular not so much because of Italian contributions (which were far less than those of the Ethiopian Government to its irredentist cause) but rather because of the grass-roots nature of the Muslim movement.

Unfortunately, the future of Eritrea after two commissions and voluminous reports was decided in the international arena which failed to satisfy either side, but rather planted the seeds for future conflict.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of African History , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , April 1977 , pp. 261 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Longrigg, S. H., Chief Ad. from May 1942–Nov. 1944, ‘Some Problems of Administration in Eritrea’ Mar. 1944, 6Google Scholar, para. 29, F.O. 371/46116/748.

2 Longrigg to H.M. Minister, British Legation, Addis Ababa, 7 June 1944, F.O. 371/41499/2344, and United States, National Archives, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Internal Affairs of Ethiopia [hereafter, U.S. Archives], J. K. Caldwell, American Legation, Addis Ababa, to Secretary of State, 28 Nov. 1944, 865D.01/11–2844.

3 Trevaskis, G. K. N., Eritrea: a Colony in Transition (Oxford, 1960), 69Google Scholar. Between 1943 and 1951 Trevaskis held various administrative posts in Assab, Serai and Western Province; he was a member of the British Delegation to the Four Power Commission and acted as British Liaison Officer to the U.N. Commission in Eritrea, 1950. See footnote 90, p. 280.

4 Longrigg to Minister, Addis Ababa, 7 June 1944, para. 4, F.O. 371/41499/2344; Longrigg, S. H., ‘Some Problems of Administration in Eritrea’ Mar. 1944, paras. 31 and 34, F.O. 371/46116/748Google Scholar; Four Power Commission for the Investigation of the Former Italian Colonies: Report on Eritrea, Appendix 101: 4 and 6 (Memo by Eritrean Liberal Progressive Party), Appendix 103: 4–5 (Memo by the Moslem League), unpub. report, London and New York (available in New York at the United Nations Library, and in London in the State Papers Room of the British Library); for a brief discussion of the historical relationships between Eritrea and Ethiopia, see: Nadel, S. F., ‘Eritrea and Her Neighbours’ F.O. 371/35658/4110Google Scholar; Savell, , H.M. Chargé d'Affaires to E. Bevin, M.P., 12 Sept. 1945, British Legation, A.A., F.O. 371/46114/3481Google Scholar; and memo containing the important articles of the Hewitt Treaty (so called), which Ethiopia wrongly advanced as Great Britain's recognition of her claim to Eritrea, F.O. 371/46092/3649; and Perham, M., The Government of Ethiopia (London, 2nd ed., 1969), Appendix G.Google Scholar

5 The commission heard 3,336 representatives from 23 Nov. to 14 Dec. 1947, each of whom was affiliated with a political party (Unionist—1,559 or 48%; Moslem League— 1,033 or 31%; Pro-Italy—358 or 11%; Liberal Progressive—313 or 9%; and the National Party of Massawa—33 or 1%), see F.P.C., Report on Eritrea, 106.Google Scholar

6 Council of Foreign Ministers (Deputies), Former Italian Colonies, Supplementary Views of Other Interested Governments, United Nations, C.F.M./D/L/48/IC/166, 5 Aug. 1948.

7 Four Power Commission Report, Appendices 159–73.

8 F.P.C., summaries, Appendices 159–73.Google Scholar

9 F.P.C., Appendices 137–58Google Scholar; F.P.C., Appendix 121, 4.Google Scholar

10 Longrigg, 6, para. 28. F.O. 371/46116/748.

11 Longrigg, 6, para. 30, F.O. 371/46116/748.

12 Courlander, Harold to President Roosevelt, , 22 Mar. 1943, U.S. Archives, 865D.01/608.Google Scholar

13 See F.P.C., Appendix 20, 1, Financial Organization.

14 Abuna Marcos, the Orthodox Archbishop of Eritrea, was the emperor's chief resident agent for unionist propaganda.

15 Longrigg, 6, para. 27, F.O. 371/46116/748.

16 F.P.C., Appendix 99, 7–9.

17 The Four Power Commission visited Eritrea from 23 Nov. to 14 Dec. 1947, and the U.N. Commission from 24 Feb. to 5 Apr. 1950.

18 F.P.C., Appendix 95, 5.

19 This claimed to have been founded in Apr. 1941, in Asmara, but it was probably not founded until, at the earliest, 1944; in Feb., an organization of a similar name, The Society for the Unification of Ethiopia and Eritrea, was established in Addis Ababa. See Caldwell to Sec. of State, 865 D.01/11–2844. For B.M.A./Unionist Party relations, see F.P.C., Appendices 19, 95: 5, and 97; and Trevaskis, 91–2 and 106 ff.

20 Honorific title of senior dignitaries.

21 F.P.C., Appendix 20, 1; it should be noted that the figure 729,193 is 33% higher than the F.P.C.'s estimate of the party's strength.

22 These were the Tigrai, primarily of the Western Province, who were bound to the Nabtab families and clans of the Beni Amer tribe by monetary and service obligations. In 1944, the B.M.A. estimated their numbers at about 30,000, although several years before, an Italian source had claimed 48,000. There were also an unestimated number of slaves (mostly Tigrai), maybe as many as there were serfs, but no estimates are available.

23 Longrigg observed that the ‘Muslim tribesmen outside the towns, who form half the population of Eritrea, and occupy nine-tenths of its soil, would be generally and probably strongly opposed to such union, although it is never admitted by Irredentist spokesmen’: Longrigg, 6, para. 28, F.O. 371/46116/748.

24 F.P.C., Appendix 20.

25 S. H. Longrigg was very doubtful of the potential self-sufficiency of Eritrea, although owing to the temporary nature of the B.M.A., no long-term economic projects could be planned. Whether its economy could stand alone, therefore, remained a moot question throughout Eritrea's period of political uncertainty.

26 It was unofficially suggested in the early 1940s that the Western Province be annexed to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, but the idea was abandoned owing to widespread disapproval among the inhabitants of the area in question. See F.O. 371/46116/748.

27 F.P.C., Appendix 18.

28 A feudal system by which oppressive land-rent taxes, payable in produce or labour or both, were collected and asymmetrical obligations of goods and services were required. Throughout Ethiopia, it is generally known as the ‘gabbär’ system.

29 Ibid. 2.

30 See Slavery Proclamation 22, passed by Ethiopian Government, 26 Aug. 1942, indicating the presence of domestic slavery; The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society's paper to Eden, Anthony, 21 July 1941, F.O. 371/27537/2777Google Scholar; memo, ‘Slavery in Ethiopia’ By Lugard, Lord, 16 Apr. 1941, F.O. 371/27537/1028Google Scholar; Cook, F. A. G., H.M. Charges D'Affaires to A. Eden, 30 May 1944, para. 5Google Scholar, indicating the presence of child slavery in northeast corner of Wollega Province. F.O. 371/46056/30.

31 Before the British occupation, there were 3,141 Italian and 737 Eritrean officials in the Eritrean Government, while by Jan. 1943, the figure had been reduced to 2,242 Italians and 276 Eritreans. Not only were most of the officials not replaced by British counterparts, but it is also significant that the Eritrean component suffered the greatest relative loss of jobs. See Smith, Talbot, American consul, Asmara, to Secretary of State, 12 Jan. 1943, 7, U.S. Archives, 8650.01/605.Google Scholar

32 Eritrean Daily News, 1947 (12 June: 3; 4 July: 3; 8 July: 3).Google Scholar

33 E.D.N., 1947 (8 July: 3ab and 23 July: 3a and c) and continuing to 1947.Google Scholar

34 F.P.C., Appendix 124, 3.Google Scholar

35 F.P.C., Appendix 142 (Annex).

36 7 Apr. 1943, F.O. 371/35031/1542.

37 Longrigg, S. H., ‘Some Problems of Administration in Eritrea’ Mar. 1944, para. 28, F.O. 371/46116/748Google Scholar; F.P.C., Appendices 104 and 107: 2.

38 Bigelow, D. F. to Secretary of State, 4 Apr. 1949, U.S. Archives, 884.00/4–1149.Google Scholar

39 It is unclear whether there were two separate organizations, both led by Gebremeskal Habtemariam and both established at approximately the same time; however, internal evidence and consistency leads one to conclude that they were one and the same.

40 Longrigg, to Minister, Addis Ababa, 7 June 1944, F.O. 371/41499/2344.Google Scholar

41 Cole, William E. Jr, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, to Secretary of State, 3 Oct. 1945, U.S. Archives, 884.014/10–345.Google Scholar

42 Ibid.

43 F.P.C., Appendix 95, 5.

44 B.M.A., Proclamation 42, Article 6, 1945.

45 F.P.C., Appendix 22.

46 The combined figures for those political parties opposing union (c. 675,000) was approximately 23% greater than those in favour (c. 547,000). See F.P.C., Appendices 159–73.

47 The Unionists may have derived inspiration from the accounts of contemporary Palestinian violence reported in the Eritrean Weekly News. For anti-separatist terrorism, see Trevaskis, , Eritrea, 96 ffGoogle Scholar. It seems clear that, contrary to Trevaskis (ibid., 102), terrorism and intimidation were largely Unionist tactics.

48 F.P.C., Appendices 17 and 18: and Pollera, , Le Popolazioni Indigene dell' Eritrea (Bologna, 1935), chap. 34, 168–90.Google Scholar

49 Muslims of old stock with a kind of ‘droit de cité’ who are primarily merchants and tradesmen residing in Massawa and its environs.

50 Farquhar, H. L. to British Legation, 17 Feb. 1947, U.S. Archives, 884.014/2–2047.Google Scholar

51 F.P.C., Appendix 20, 3.

52 Ibid.

53 An unnamed Italian planter contributed £3,000. See Merrell, George R. to Secretary of State, 29 Aug. 1949, U.S. Archives, 884.00/8–2949.Google Scholar

54 The figure 731,764 is 48% higher than F.P.C.'s estimate of its strength.

55 United Nations: C.F.M./D/L/48/IC/179, 9 Aug. 1948; see also F.O. 371/41510/3693, Minutes.

56 F.P.C., Appendix 103, 4.

57 Ibid.

58 F.P.C., Appendix 107, 2.

59 Ibid.

60 F.P.C., Appendix 124, 2.

61 See representative strength of political parties in F.P.C., Appendices 159–73.

62 F.P.C., Appendix 20, 10.

63 F.P.C., Appendix 116.

64 F.P.C., Appendix 134.

65 These tribes had been divided by the convention of Mar. 1890.

66 F.P.C., Appendix 20, 7.

67 Taxation had been light under both the Italian and British administrations, although it should be noted that daring the Italian administration (which had abolished the Nabtab tithe system), the Tigrai were forced to contribute both the annual tribute (payable by the Beni Amer tribe to the Italian administration) and the tithes.

68 Trevaskis, , Eritrea, 96.Google Scholar

69 Merrell, to Sec. of State, 29 Aug. 1949, U.S. Archives, 884.00/8–2949.Google Scholar

70 Trevaskis, , Eritrea, 79.Google Scholar

71 F.P.C., Appendix 136.

72 Ibid.

73 'Na'ib, or agent, is a Turkish title given to the family in Massawa who administered the Samhar and, later, only Massawa.

74 F.P.C., Appendix 20, 9.

75 As regards Eritrea, the proposals stated ‘that Eritrea, except for the Western Province, be incorporated into Ethiopia and that the Western Province be incorporated into the Sudan’. G.A.O.R., 3rd session, pt. 2, 1st Committee Annexes A/c. 1/466.

76 Merrell, to Secretary of State, 29 Aug. 1949, U.S. Archives, 884.00/8–2949.Google Scholar

77 Trevaskis, , Eritrea, 95.Google Scholar

78 In Aug. 1948, more than 300 Ethiopian flags were displayed in the largely Muslim Western Province to celebrate the emperor's birthday; a year later only 13 flags were counted. See Merrell, to Sec. of State, 29 Aug. 1949, U.S. Archives, 884.00/8–2949.Google Scholar

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Trevaskis, , Eritrea, 91.Google Scholar

82 Report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea, G.A.O.R., 5th Session, Supplement No. 8 (A/1285), 29.

83 Ibid.

84 G.A.O.R., 5th Session, Supplement 8, 17–21.

85 Trevaskis, , Eritrea, 98.Google Scholar

86 Since the border had been finalized between Sudan and Eritrea as of 18 Feb. 1903, there had been periodic raids across the border mainly for cattle. When the British occupied Eritrea in 1941, the Hadendowa in the Sudan assumed that grazing lands in the Baraka lowlands, which they used annually, would soon become theirs. Early in 1942, a tribal war was set off by a Beni Amer raiding party, in reprisal for a camel theft by the Hadendowa. Fighting continued off and on for more than three years until in Dec. 1945 a peace settlement was reached. As a result of this long-standing feud, the Western Province, led by the Beni Amer chiefs, opposed partition. See Trevaskis, , Eritrea, 70–1.Google Scholar

87 This, today, has been considered by some a viable solution to the Eritrean question: some members of the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Forces have suggested that union with Ethiopia may be possible but only after independence has been achieved.

88 Final Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea, G.A.O.R., 7th Session, Supplement 15 (A/2188), 1952, 75–6.Google Scholar

89 The following day, the emperor unilaterally, without consulting the U.N., proclaimed (Order No. 27) the termination of Eritrea's federal status. ‘Unanimity’ in the Eritrean Assembly was obtained through intimidation by Ethiopian Government troops parading outside the parliament building. See interview with Bairu, Tedla, Dagens Nyheter, 14 July 1967: 4aGoogle Scholar. In the proclamation, such provisions as Article 5 that ‘All rights, powers, duties and obligations of the former Administration of Eritrea become,… the rights, powers, duties and obligations of the Imperial Ethiopian Government’ stood in direct opposition to the fundamental precept of the Ethiopian Constitution that all power ultimately emanated from the emperor. See Ethiopia Observer, vi, 4 (1963), 310–12.Google Scholar

90 In preparing this article, I unfortunately did not have an opportunity to consult the Trevaskis papers in the Library of Rhodes House, Oxford (Mss. Br. Emp. s. 367).