¹ See, e.g., Mandelbaum, Maurice, “Historical Explanation: The Problem of ‘Covering Laws,’” History and Theory, Studies in the Philosophy of History, I (1961), 229–242.Google Scholar

² Berlin, Isaiah, Historical Inevitability (London, 1954), p. 70Google Scholar; Ritter, Gerhard, “Scientific History, Contemporary History and Political Science,” History and Theory, I (1961), 266–267.Google Scholar

³ Hara Kei (Takashi) believed that this was the result of the limited franchise and public apathy. Hara Kei nikki [Diaries of Hara Kei], ed. Hara Keikhirō I (Tokyo, 1950–1951), 489Google Scholar. For contemporary accounts in English of the first election see Wigmore, John, “Starting a Parliament in Japan,” Scribner's Magazine, X (07–12 1891), 33–51Google Scholar; Moore, H. M., “The First General Election in Japan,” The New Review, III (07, 1890), 67–75Google Scholar; Griffis, William E., “The Constitution of Japan,” The Chautauquan, XII (02, 1891), 591–596Google Scholar. For a comprehensive account of the results of the election, see Kenchō, Suematsu, “Nijūsan nen no sō senkyo” (“The General Election of 1890”), Kokka gakkai zasshi, IV (1890), No. 44, 555–571Google Scholar and No. 45, 618–635. Shigetaka, Fukuchi's “Kensei shoki no daigishi no seikaku” (“Characteristics of the Representatives of the First Phase of Constitutional Government”), Nihon rekishi, No. 79 (12 1954), 28–33Google Scholar is in the main a refutation of some of the findings in Suematsu's articles.

⁴ Ōtsu Junichirō, the author of the classic, Dai Nihon kensei shi [Japanese Constitutional History], was elected from Ibaraki prefecture. He divides the “quasi-government party” votes as follows: Taiseikai, 79 and Kokumin Jiyūtō, 5. There were 45 Independents. Ōtsu, Dai Nikon kensei shi, III (Tokyo, 1927–1928), 542Google Scholar. An extremely helpful source for determining party affiliations is the “Dai ikkai Teikoku Gikai yori dai kyūjunikai Teikoku Gikai ni itaru shūgiin tōseki roku” (“A Record of the Party Affiliations of Members of the House of Representatives from the First to the Ninety-second Diets”), compiled by the Shūgiin Jimukyoku (Tokyo, 1957).

⁵ See the unpubl. diss. (Harvard, 1954) by Hackett, Roger F., “Yamagata Aritomo: A Political Biography,” p. 209.Google Scholar

⁶ Confusion may arise from two different dates which may be given as the beginning of the Diet session. Clement's “Table of Sessions of the Diet,” in Ernest W. Clement and Etsujirō Uyehara, M. P., “Fifty Sessions of the Japanese Imperial Diet,” TASJ 2nd Ser., II (Tokyo, 1925)Google Scholar, gives the date as November 29, 1890. See also, Yanaga, Chitoshi, Japan Since Perry (New York, 1949), p. 216Google Scholar. Uyehara Etsujirō's “Chronology” in his The Political Development of Japan, 1867–1909 (London 1910)Google Scholar, cites November 25. See also Scalapino, Robert A., Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan, The Failure of the First Attempt (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954), p. 154Google Scholar. Uyehara arrives at the earlier date by dating the beginning from the time the Diet is convoked [shōshū], while Clement considers the session begins when the formal opening ceremony with the Emperor in attendance is held [kaiin shiki], Uyehara's practice in his “Chronology” is recommended since important Diet business, such as the election of officers, is conducted immediately after the convoking of the Diet. See, e.g., Dai Nikon Teikoku Gikai shi [The Records of the Imperial Diet], I (Tokyo, 1926) 417–429Google Scholar; cf. “Gikai shichijūnen no ayumi” (“The Diet's Seventy Years”), Asahi, 12 20, 1960.Google Scholar

⁷ Taruhito shinnō nikki [Diaries of Prince (Arisugawa) Taruhito], V (Tokyo, 1935–1936), 408Google Scholar. Wigmore, , “Starting a Parliament,” p. 107Google Scholar. Wigmore's article is valuable, not only because he was an eye witness, but because he was a reporter with a strong sense of history and the dramatic.

⁸ Yoshitake, Oka, “Teikoku Gikai no kaisetsu” (“Inauguration of the Imperial Diet”), Kokka gakkai zasshi, LVIII (01 1944), 46Google Scholar; Oka cites one good reason for equating the budget question with the first session: only six other bills were passed during this session. Oka, Gikai, pp. 74–76Google Scholar. See also, Iichirō, Tokutomi, Kōshaku Matsukata Masayoshi den [Biography of Prince Matsukata Masayoshi], II (Tokyo, 1935), 353Google Scholar; and Yukio, Ozaki, “Yosan iinkai no ryaku rekishi” (“A Short History of the Budget Committee”), in Dai ikki kokkai shimatsu [The First Session of the Diet] (Tokyo, 1891), p. 23Google Scholar. This thin volume is one of the richest sources on the first session, with articles by Kaishintō members who participated in it.

⁹ Oka, Gikai, pp. 46–49Google Scholar; Tokutomi, , Matsukata, II, 355Google Scholar. See also, Kikuo, Nakamura, “Shoki gikai to Hoshi Tōru” (Hoshi Tōru and the Early Sessions of the Diet”), Hōgaku kenkyū, XXVII (02 1954), 13–14Google Scholar. A series of three, Nakamura's articles present a readable background of the first through the fifth sessions of the Diet.

¹⁰ Gikai shi, I, 645Google Scholar; Oka, Gikai, p. 51.Google Scholar

¹¹ Quoted in Quigley, Harold S. and Turner, John E., The New Japan: Government and Politics (Minneapolis, 1956)Google Scholar, Appendix II, “The Old Constitution of the Empire of Japan,” p. 420.Google Scholar

¹² Oka, Gikai, p. 50Google Scholar. See also, “Dai ichi gikai ni kansuru jakkan no kōsatsu” (“Some Reflections on the First Diet”), Kokka gakkai zasshi, LX (01 1946) 63–78Google Scholar, by the same author for a discussion of this constitutional problem.

¹³ Matsukata had, in the meantime, spoken again on February 5. Dai ikki Taikoku Gikai yōroku [A Record of Essential Matters in the First Imperial Diet], ed. Emori, Ueki (Tokyo, 1891), p. 280Google Scholar—a useful work which classifies events of the first session by subject matter. See also, Gikai shi, I, 835Google Scholar; Oka, Gikai, pp. 52–53Google Scholar. On January 20, the Diet building burned to the ground. The cause was apparently defective wiring. On January 29, the House of Peers began to meet at the Imperial Hotel and the House of Representatives at the former Engineering College [Kōbu daigakkō]. Oka, Gikai, p. 52Google Scholar; Kentarō, Kaneko, Itō Hirobumi den [Biography of Itō Hirobumi] II (Tokyo, 1943), 737Google Scholar; Wigmore, John H., “Parliamentary Days in Japan. With Illustrations,” Scribner's Magazine, X (08 1891), 244.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Gikai shi, I, 879–881Google Scholar; Oka, Gikai, p. 54.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Itō was at this time president of the House of Peers. He was clearly unwilling to serve as the president. See Kaneko, , Itō, II, 702–732Google Scholar. Itō's attitude underscores the growing antagonism between Itō and Yamagata. In a letter written to Nakai Hiroshi at the time of his acceptance, Itō complained: “Although I greatly deplore stepping forward as president, we have exhausted all possibilities for a compromise solution and the only (other) alternative is to open a major (political) fight. I would like to have you look with sympathy upon the unavoidable situation mentioned above.” Quoted in Kaneko, , itō, II, 731.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Brilliant, dynamic, highly controversial, and certainly one of the handsomest men in Meiji public life, Itō Miyoji served Itō long and well. Like Inoue Kowashi, Itō Miyoji eventually drifted away from Itō, but at this time, was one of Itō's closest confidants. Itō Miyoji is discussed in a series of nine articles in Chūō kōron, XXXII (07, 1917)Google Scholar, under the general title, “Seikai no hyōmen ni noridashite kita Itō Miyoji shi” (“Count Itō Miyoji's ‘Reappearance’ on the Political Scene”).

¹⁷ Letter from Itō Miyoji to Itō, dated February 13, 1891, in Itō Hirobumi, compiler, Hisho ruisan: Takoku Gikai shiryō [Classified Collection of Private Papers: Materials on the Imperial Diet], I (Tokyo, 1934), 180Google Scholar. In this letter, Itō Miyoji is repeating back to Itō what he reported to Yamagata as Itō's original outburst. Hara Kei supports Itō's views. “Of late, the government's attitude toward the Diet has been extremely confused and its policy pronouncements have always been ill-timed. There is much room for concern about the future. Mutsu [Munemitsu] got up from his sick bed to visit Yamagata to discuss problems, but he still doesn't know what the government's policies are.” Hara, Nikki, I 522.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Gikai shi, I, 927–928Google Scholar; Oka, Gikai, pp. 55–56Google Scholar; Ōtsu, Kensci shi, III, 583–587Google Scholar. In an extremely long footnote, Oka discusses Yamagata's speech. Oka says that the speech was based on a draft written by Itō Miyoji, and that it must have been written early in February because Yamagata showed the draft to Inoue Kowashi on February 4. In the meantime, Yamagata had made his February 10th speech. On February 11th and 12th Itō saw Itō Miyoji and the former had some harsh words to say about Yamagata. Said Itō: “Recently, I advised the prime minister that to prevent [the nation's] headlong plunge into danger, he should unequivocally set forth the government's fixed and unchanging national policies for the past twenty years. I did so, believing that this would have a most salutary effect. The prime minister did not avail himself of the golden opportunity. Rather, when he did speak, he gave a short, meaningless, valueless, ineffectual speech. He does not make use of the proper medicine at the right time as prescribed by the doctor. The first stage of the illness has passed, and the second stage is rapidly passing, and still he hesitates and doubts the orders of the doctor…. When opportunity is lost, wrong methods are used, and the patient is on the verge of death, it is then too late.” Oka, Gikai, pp. 57–62Google Scholar; Itō, Teikoku Gikai shiryō, I, 181–182.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Gikai shi, 1, 928.Google Scholar

²⁰ Ito, Teikoku Gikai shiryō, I, 180–181Google Scholar; Oka, Gikai, p. 63Google Scholar; Iichirō, Tokutomi, Kōshaku Yamagata Aritomi den [Biography of Prince Yamagata Aritomo] III (Tokyo, 1933), 13Google Scholar; Tomomoto, Asahina, Rōkisha no omoide [Reminiscences of a Veteran Newspaperman] (Tokyo, 1938), p. 27.Google Scholar

²¹ Kaneko, , Itō, II, 270Google Scholar; Oka, Gikai, pp. 65–66.Google Scholar

²² Oka, Gikai, pp. 64–77Google Scholar; Nagauma, Ikeda, Kensei to Tosa [Tosa and Constitutional Government] (Kochi, 1941), pp. 30–31Google Scholar; Yoshisuke, Nakayama, Kōno Banshū den [Biography of Konō Banshū (Hironaka)], II, (Tokyo, 1926) 139–42; 151.Google Scholar

²³ Quoted in Shimbun shūsei Meiji hennen shi [A Meiji Chronological History Compiled from Newspapers], ed. Nakayama Yasumasa, VIII (Tokyo, 1934–1936), 35.Google Scholar

²⁴ Oka, Gikai, pp. 67–68Google Scholar; Ōtsu, Kensei shi, III, 589–590Google Scholar; Itō, Tekoku Gikai shiryō, I, 121–123Google Scholar; Gikai shi, I, 972–976.Google Scholar

²⁵ See, e.g., Tokumi, Kojima, “Meiji Taishō seitō hattatsushi” (“A Discourse on the Development of Political Parties in the Meiji and Taishō Eras”), Taiyō, XXXIII (03 1927), 86Google Scholar; Ōtsu, Kensei shi, III, 597Google Scholar; Takeshige, Kudō, Meiji kensei shi [Meiji Constitutional History], I (Tokyo, 1922) 355–356Google Scholar; Scalapino, , Democracy and the Party Movement, 157Google Scholar and footnote 23.

²⁶ Oka, Gikai, p. 68Google Scholar. See also, Hakuai, Saiga, Ōe Tenya denki [Biography of Ōe Tenya] (Tokyo, 1926), pp. 572–576Google Scholar. There seems to be one piece of indirect evidence that bribery may have been used sometime during the first session. In a letter to Itō, dated December 12, probably in 1891, Mutsu speaks of “the customary method of corruption” with which the government hopes to inveigle the Diet members, and Mutsu expressed fears that this method would prove effective “in this session.” Quoted in Itō ke monjo [The Itō Papers] unpubl. LII, 190a.

²⁷ Sec letter from Mutsu to Matsukata, dated February 24, 1891, quoted in Tokutomi, Matsukata, II, 370Google Scholar; Seizaburō, Shlnobu, Mutsu Munemitsu (Tokyo, 1938), p. 195Google Scholar. See also, Ōtsu, Kensei shi, III, 596.Google Scholar

²⁸ Gikai shi, I, 1027Google Scholar; Oka, Gikai, p. 73Google Scholar; Tokutomi, , Yamagata, III, 17–18.Google Scholar

²⁹ Linebarger, Paul, Djang, Chu, Burks, Ardath W., Far Eastern Governments and Politics, China and Japan (New York, 1954), p. 407.Google Scholar

³⁰ Article LXIV, quoted in Quigley and Turner, The New Japan, p. 420.Google Scholar

³¹ Itō appears to have contradicted himself when he ordered the consecutive dissolutions of the 5th and the 6th sessions of the Diet. These dissolutions were only indirectly related to contitutional questions. Japan at this time was on the verge of realizing treaty revision. The opposition was making matters uncomfortable for the government by attacking it for “weakness” in the face of foreign governments. Itō, therefore, had to show the foreign governments dramatically that he was master in his own house.

³² Letter dated December 14, 1890, quoted in Hackett, , “Yamagata,” pp. 220–221.Google Scholar

³³ “Mainly as a result of the Sino-Japanese War and the growing armament and colonial enterprises which followed in its wake, the expenditures of the national government tripled from 1893 to 1903.” Lockwood, William W., The Economic Development of Japan, Growth and Structural Change 1868–1938 (Princeton, 1954), p. 35Google Scholar. Cf. the problem of the Tokugawa rulers as described by John W. Hall with the budget problem faced by the Meiji oligarchs. Hall, Tanuma Okitsugu: Forerunner of Modern Japan (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), pp. 5–6Google Scholar. Even without an expanding budget, the government would suffer if a budget was not passed by the Diet and the previous year's budget had to be used. This argument was made by Miura Katsundo, another participant in the first session. His reasoning was: The Finance Law strictly stipulates that the respective ministries cannot spend money for any other purpose than for that which the money was specifically appropriated. The aims and structure of each year's budget differ from year to year, and that which is considered important one year may not be in another year. Hence the government, when it chooses or is forced to use the previous year's budget, will often find that it will have money to spare for activities it considers not vital while it faces fiscal starvation for critical projects. See his “Zennendo no yosan wo shikkō suru rigai” (“The Pros and Cons of Carrying Over the Previous Year's Budget”), in Dai ikki kokkai shimatsu, pp. 89–98.Google Scholar

³⁴ See, e.g., views of McLaren, Walter W., A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era, 1867–1912 (London, 1916), p. 212Google Scholar; Reischauer, Robert K., Japan, Government-Politics (New York, 1939), p. 112Google Scholar; Kametarō, Hayashida, Ninon seitō shi [A History of Japanese Political Parties], I (Tokyo, 1927), 383.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ike, Nobutaka, The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan (Baltimore, 1950), p. 188Google Scholar. Scalapino tends toward this point of view, though less positively. For example, he cites Suzuki Anzō's view that the nine years between the announcement that a Constitution would be granted and the actual promulgation gave the government nine vital years “to mold die interpretation of the document so as to freeze the status quo.” Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement, pp. 86–87Google Scholar, footnote 129. See also his comments, pp. 86–87, 149–151. Cf. Scalapino, Robert A. and Masumi, Junnosuke, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), p. 13.Google Scholar

³⁶ Japan Weekly Mail, 04 20, 1889, p. 380Google Scholar. Fukuzawa Yukichi also was of the opinion diat party cabinets were inevitable, particularly after “second generation” statesmen who could not boast of meritorious services to their country took over from the oligarchs. See, Zoku Fukuzawa zenshū [Collected Works of Fukuzawa, Second Series], ed. Shigeo, Iwanami, II (Tokyo, 1933), 617–619Google Scholar. See also, Japan Weekly Mail, 06 14, 1890, p. 613Google Scholar; and May 2, 1891, p. 511, quoting articles from the Jiji: Shimpō.

³⁷ Japan Weekly Mail, 01 24, 1891, p. 86Google Scholar, quoting the Hōchi Shimbun.

³⁸ Kalō Seinosuke, describing a period slightly later than the time under consideration, recalled: “Those who belonged to government parties were extremely unpopular. There were incredible stories to the effect that [members of government parties] would wait for dark and cover their heads with hoods when they visited a state minister's residence. Even those who were disinterested felt sorry for the way government party men were rejected by the people.” Quoted in Itō Hirobumi Hiroku [Private Papers of Itō Hirobumi], ed. Atsushi, Hiratsuka, (Tokyo, 1929), p. 122Google Scholar. On June 25, 1892, Hara Kei was asked to join the Kokumin Kyōkai, a quasi-government party. Hara refused on the ground that, “these parties never succeed.” Hara, Nikki, II (a), 45Google Scholar. For other comments on the status of government parties in the eyes of the public, see Ōkuma Shigenobu, “Nihon no seitō” (“Japanese Political Parties”) in Meiji kensei keizai shi ron [Discourses on Meiji Constitutional and Economic History] (Tokyo, 1919), p. 140Google Scholar; Anzō, Suzuki, Jiyū minken undō shi [A History of the Movement for Parliamentary Government] (Tokyo, 1948), p. 90.Google Scholar

³⁸ Quoted in Japan Weekly Mail, 01 23, 1892Google Scholar, p. no. See also editorial in Japan Weekly Mail, 02 4, 1893, p. 136.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Sutton, Joseph L., A Political Biography of Inukai Tsuyoshi, Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1954Google Scholar (Publication 8421).

⁴¹ Sutton, , Inukai, pp. 252–256.Google Scholar

⁴² Sutton, , Inukai, p. 59Google Scholar. Uyehara says that this is the most effective method in Japan because “Japanese are easily moved by sentiment.” Uyehara, Political Development, p. 272.Google Scholar

⁴³ Sutton, , Inukai, pp. 61–62Google Scholar, et passim.

⁴⁴ The eta served as bodyguards, and later, with universal suffrage, as a source of votes, Sutton, Inukai, p. 119.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Sutton, , Inumai, p. 121.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Reading the Gikai shi would bear out this point. One source gives the following figures for those in the first Diet who had previously served in the prefectural assemblies: Of the 300 representatives, 134 were former members; of this number, 28 were presidents, and 12 served as vice-presidents. Wigmore, , “Parliamentary Days,” p. 246Google Scholar. See also Scalapino, and Masumi, , Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan, p. 11.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Hackett, , “Yamagata,” pp. 171–172Google Scholar. See also, McLaren, , Political History, pp. 132 and 147Google Scholar; Linebarger, Djang, Burks, Far Eastern Governments, p. 356.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ McLaren, , Political History, pp. 130–131Google Scholar. Osatake Takeki cites the example of Nagasaki Prefecture, where no one opposed the prefectural governor when he decided that Matsuda Masahisa was to be the president of the Assembly. However, once Matsuda assumed office, the Nagasaki Prefectural Assembly ceased being simply an organ of inquiry, and even the governor was “treated as a child” by Matsuda. Takeki, Osatake, Nikon kensei shi taikō [A General History of Japanese Constitutional Government], II (Tokyo, 1938–1939), 513Google Scholar. See also, A Resident, “The Japanese Constitutional Crisis and the War,” The Contemporary Review, LVIII (10, 1895), p. 460Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Mail, 12 22, 1900, p. 645Google Scholar; and the Tokyo Nicht Nichi, 01 14, 1887.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ “Since this was the first constitutional régime not conducted by the white race, and because this [was destined] to destroy the proud boast that only the white race was capable of carrying out constitutional government, a seriousness [in making the experiment succeed] permeated the entire nation, so as to prevent being laughed at by foreigners.” Takeki, Osatake, Meiji Taishō seiji shi kōtva [Lectures on the Political History of the Meiji and Taishō Eras] (Tokyo, 1943), p. 90.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The Hōchi Shimbun's statement on the subject is representative: “Is not this a circumstance of which we may well be proud before all the countries of the world? … It is memorable … that we have been able to receive the light of constitutional government before every other nation in the Orient. It is memorable … that we have been able to demonstrate that the parliamentary system is not indigeneous (sic) to Europe and America alone, and that it can be introduced without shedding a drop of blood.” Quoted in Japan Weekly Mail, 12 6, 1890, p. 558Google Scholar. See also Itō's speech in the House of Peers, 1891, quoted in Kaneko, Itō, II, 741–742Google Scholar; Itō's speech at Ōtsu, 1898, quoted in Japan Weekly Mail, 05 4, 1898, p. 432.Google Scholar

⁵¹ It should be re-emphasized that the party leaders, as much as the oligarchs, felt that in the national interest constitutional government had to be made workable. See, Jansen, Marius, Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration (Princeton, 1961), p. 368.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵² Kaneko was another of Itō's intimate supporters, and, with Inoue Kowashi and Itō Miyoji, closely connected with the drafting of the Meiji Constitution. He studied law at Harvard from October, 1876 to November, 1878. A promising young bureaucrat, Kaneko was working for Terajima Munenori in the Genrō-in when he first came to Itō's attention. Kaneko had drawn up a long list of questions on specific constitutional problems, probably to embarrass Itō, who was in Europe. The fact that Itō did not let this deter him from appointing talent where he found it is typical of him.

⁵³ Quoted in Uyehara, Political Development, pp. 220–221Google Scholar. Matsukata's February 16th speech, quoted earlier, should be recalled. See also Asahina, , Rōkjsha no omoide, pp. 24–25Google Scholar and Saiga, , Ōe Tenya denki, p. 570Google Scholar. National pride, of course, was also expressed in a more virulent manner. Sir Francis Piggot remembered: “And here is a curious illustration of this nationalist spirit. If this unfortunate translation [into English] of the Constitution is criticized, the ready answer of youthful officials today is … ‘Well, it does not much matter. What has been done for the foreigner is quite sufficient. Japan is for the Japanese.’” “New Japan;” The Fortnightly Review LII (New Series) No. 309, p. 337.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Quoted in Kokka gakkai zasshi XIII (1899) No. 154, p. 6.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Quoted in Takeki, Osatake, Nikon Kensei shi no kenkyū [Studies in Japanese Constitutional History] (Tokyo, 1943), p. 330Google Scholar. Ōkuma Shigenobu agrees. He says, “The impetus for the idea that some day Japan must have a constitutional government can be ultimately traced to foreign policy.” Ōkuma Shigenobu, “Seikai no han-ei” (“On the Political World”), Taiyō, XIII (1907), 161.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ The Kobe Weekly Chronicle, editorializing on the suggestion made later in the decade by Katsura Tarō that the Constitution be suspended, wrote: “Such a course would almost certainly mean the indefinite postponement of Treaty Revision, and in die view of Japanese of all shades of opinion, everything must be subordinated to the consummation of Japan's ambition in this respect.” July 2, 1898, pp. 577–578. See also, Tokio, Kimura, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Meiji kempō kan” (Fukuzawa Yukichi's Views on the Meiji Constitution”), Shikan (06 1953) p. 48Google Scholar; Itō ke monjo, VII, 420a–420b.

⁵⁷ In a letter to Itō, Inoue Kaoru cautioned Itō against carelessly mentioning Yamagata's “weak points” in “light banter with followers and others,” because there was a possibility of misunderstanding when this got back to Yamagata. Letter dated June 13, 1892, in Itō ke monjo, XVI, 388b.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Ozaki Yukio had this to say about the relationship between the two men: “They constantly fought each other, and there was unending friction. Friends on the surface, bitter enemies below the surface … [One day] Yamagata and I were reminiscing. Yamagata was using extremely honorific terminology with a great deal of feeling. I thought that he was speaking about the former Emperor. However, on listening closely, I was surprised to note that Yamagata was talking about a clash with Itō. He must have used honorific language on purpose to convey a sense of ridicule.” Yukio, Ozaki, Minken tōsō shichijūnen [My Seventy-Year Struggle for Democracy] (Tokyo, 1952), pp. 33–34.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Scalapino, , Democracy and the Party Movement, p. 117.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ “The friction within the Meiji government stemmed from the propensity of cabinet members to feudalistically adhere to their own spheres of influence. This was the situation since the Restoration. The aim of the cabinet system created by Itō was to unify and strengthen the cabinet and to eliminate these conflicts. However, because [Itō] merely created it to give the government a modern appearance without infusing it with a democratic foundation, he was unable to root out this deeply entrenched tendency toward factionalism.” Shisō, Hattori and Yoshinaga, Irimajiri, Kindai Nihon jimbutsu seiji shi [A Political History of Modern Japan as Seen Through the Personalities Involved], I (Tokyo, 1955–1956), 180.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Oka states that the fact that Yamagata asked Ito Miyoji to soften the text of the February 16th speech indicates that Yamagata was hopeful for an amicable solution (Oka, Gikai, p. 66Google Scholar). Tokutomi says that Matsukata from the beginning wanted to compromise (Tokutomi, , Matsukata, II, 368Google Scholar). And as stated earlier, Itō encouraged compromise on the budget issue.

⁶² Suzuki, , jiyū minken, pp. 233–235Google Scholar; see also, Taku, Ōe, “Seikai kaiko dan” (“Recollections of the Political World”), Taiyō, XIII (02 1907), 175–176Google Scholar. Mutsu Munemitsu, always close with those in this group, also gave the same rationale for joining the governments—see Renzan, Maeda, Hoshi Tōru den [A Biography of Hoshi Tōru] (Tokyo, 1948), pp. 201–202, 230.Google Scholar

⁶³ Japan Chronicle, 11 4, 1909, p. 805Google Scholar. “Ōkuma always said that Itō was a coward. I do not know whether Itō was a coward, but he was extremely prudent, thorough and conciliatory. He hated to do things by fighting with people.… He tried to accomplish everything with as much harmony as possible.” Watanabe Ikujirō, Meiji shi kenkyū [Studies in Meiji History] (Tokyo, 1944), p. 165.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Hackett, , “Yamagata,” p. 316Google Scholar, also p. 208.

⁶⁵ Japan Weekly Mail, 04 20, 1889, p. 381.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Quoted in Japan Weekly Mail, 12 6, 1890, p. 559.Google Scholar