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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
This is a study of the role played by Ch'en Ch'eng, who for almost thirty years was Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted and powerful lieutenant, in the relations between Chiang's “Central” government and the so-called tsa-parh or noncentral military forces. The study illustrates both the complexity and importance of Chiang's dealings with the tsa-parh and suggests that Ch'en had the responsibility of coopting them into Chiang's service. This was especially true with respect to militarists from Kwangtung and Kwangsi, who felt that their leadership of the Nationalist movement had been usurped by the Chekiang-Kiangsu group, led by Chiang Kai-shek. Ch'en also emerges as an advocate of fundamental social and economic reform, as well as an important proponent of resisting Japan and, therefore, the united front with the Communists, although, after 1945, he became chief-of-staff to Chiang Kai-shek and, in this capacity, directed Nationalist efforts to destroy the Communists. The article concludes by suggesting that Nationalist efforts to impose a “modern,” meaning a unitary and organically centralized, state on what traditionally had been a politically fragmented society provoked unprecedented antagonism toward the central government on the part of the provinces and prevented Chiang Kai-shek from achieving even that degree of control enjoyed by China's emperors in the past.
1 She-ling wai-shih (Ts'ang Cho), “Paoting chün-kuan hsüeh-hsiao ts'an-sang shih” (“The Convulsive History of the Paoting Military Academy”), no. 2, Ch'un Ch'iu (Spring and Autumn), 03 1, 1960, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar
2 Tsung-huang, Li, Lu-chün szu-hsiano t'ung' hsüch hui (The Alumni Association of the Four Military Schools) (unpublished manuscript in my possession) pp. 1–12Google Scholar. Li Tsung-huang was the principal founder of the Association.
3 Meng-Sui-sheng, , “Teng K'eng pei an-sha te nue-mu” (“The Inside Story of the Assassination of Teng K'eng”), Ta Hua (Great China), no. 23, p. 3Google Scholar. Teng was the man who created the First Division. Also see letter to myself from Ch'en Hsiao-wei, dated 01 2, 1968.Google Scholar
4 P'ing, Hsieh, Ch'en Ch'eng p'ing-chuan (A Popular Biography of Ch'en Ch'eng) (Taipei, 1949) p. 23Google Scholar and Anonymous, Wang-p'ai Ch'en Ch'eng (The “Ace” Ch'en Ch'eng) (an article published in Tsingtao on Feb. 15, 1949 and now in the files of Hsin-sheng Pao, Taipei) p. 2.
5 Hsi-tse, Wu, “Ch'en Tzu-hsiu hsien-sheng chüan-lüeh” (“A Summary Biography of Ch'en Ch'eng”) p. 13Google Scholar, in Ch'en ku fu-tsung-t'ung t'ung chi-nien chi (A Memorial Collection About the Late Vice President Ch'en) (Taipei, 1965)Google Scholar. Also letter from Wu Hsiang-hsiang, 10 1968.Google Scholar
6 See ibid., p. 14 and interview with Wu Hri-tse, Taipei, 12 9, 1966.Google Scholar
7 Anonymous, Wang-p'ai Ch'en Ch'eng, p. 3.Google Scholar
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13 Letter to the author from Wu Hsiang-hsiang, dated 10 15, 1968Google Scholar. Professor Wu has had access to Ch'en Ch'eng's personal archives and was a friend of both Ch'en and Hu Shih. He saw in the archives a copy of a telegram which Ch'en sent to Chiang Kai-shek in 1937 urging Chiang to appoint Hu ambassador to the United States and says this telegram was largely responsible for Hu's appointment to that post.
14 Yün, Hsiao, Nieh Jung-chen ta-chan Sun Lien-chung (Nieh Jung-chen Fights Sun Lien-chung) (Hong Kong, 1948) p. 3Google Scholar and interview widi Kuo Chi, 03 1967Google Scholar, in Taipei, as well as biographies of Ch'en Ch'eng and Hsüeh Yüeh in Biographies of Kuomintang Leaders and interview with Ch'en Ch'eng's confidant Ch'iu Yü, Taipei, 03 1967.Google Scholar
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24 Ch'eng, Ch'en, K'ang-chan chien-kuo yü ch'ingnien tse-jen (The War of Resistance, National Construction and the Responsibilities of Youth) (Wu-ch'ang, 1939) p. 6.Google Scholar
25 See ibid., p. 9.
26 Kuo-fang pu tsung-cheng-chih tsa-chan pu (General Political Warfare Department of the Ministry of National Defense), pub., Ch'en ku fu-tsung-t'ung tzu-hsiu hsien-sheng chü-shih yen-lun hsüan chi (Collected Speeches on Military Affairs of the late Vice President Ch'en Ch'eng) (Taipei, 1965) pp. 72–87Google Scholar (Aug 1935).
27 See ibid., pp. 65, 72, 79, 115, and 134.
28 For an example of Ch'en's views along this line see ibid., p. 131 (Oct. 7, 1937).
29 Snow, Edgar, Random Notes on Red China (Cambridge, 1957) p. 59.Google Scholar
30 Interview with Ho Chung-han, as well as Kuo Chi, and Hsi-tse, Wu, op. cit., p. 15.Google Scholar
31 Interview with Ch'en's former chief-of-staff, Liu Yün-han, in Taipei, 11 7, 1966Google Scholar and interview with Liu Chien-ch'ün, Chiang Kai-shek's chief agent in North China, Taipei, 02 1967.Google Scholar
32 Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, op. cit., p. 11Google Scholar and P'ing, Hsieh, op. cit., p. 19.Google Scholar
33 Ch'eng, Ch'en, Ti-yü wai-wu yü fu-hsing min-tsu (Resist Foreign Insults and Restore the People) (Taipei, 1963) p. 25Google Scholar. This is a speech delivered at Lu-shan in 1935.
34 Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, op. cit., p. 11Google Scholar, P'ing, Hsieh, op. cit., p. 9Google Scholar, and interview with Ho Chung-han.
35 wai-shih, She-ling, “Paoting chün-kuan hsüeh-hsiao ts'an-sang shih,” no. 7, Ch'ün Ch'iu, 05 16, 1960, p. 8Google Scholar; Mowrer, Edgar, The Dragon Wakes (New York, 1939) p. 199Google Scholar; Utley, Freda, China at War (New York, 1939) p. 265Google Scholar; and interview with Hsiung Shih-hui, former governor of Kiangsi and confidant of Chiang Kai-shek, in Taipei, Apr. 1967.
36 Hsi-tse, Wu, op. cit., p. 19Google Scholar and interviews with Wu Hsi-tse, Liu Yün-han, Ho Chung-han, Kuo Chi, and Hsiung Shih-hui, in Taipei, Dec. 1966, Nov. 1966, Feb. 1967, Mar. 1967, and Apr. 1967, respectively, as well as with Kuan Lin-cheng, in Hong-Kong, Apr. 1967 and one of Ch'en's most valued “brain-trusters,” Liu K'e-shu, in Taipei, Feb. 1967.
37 P'ing, Hsieh, op. cit., p. 10Google Scholar and Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, op. cit., p. 13Google Scholar, as well as interviews with Ho Chung-han, Taipei, Feb. 1967 and Hsieh Jan-chih, Taipei, Jan. 1967. Hsieh Jan-chih's career exemplifies Ch'en's skill at coopting even the most menacing kind of tsa-parh. He was a student who joined the Communist Party during its Kiangsi period, only to be captured by Ch'en's armies and subsequendy converted into a lifelong follower of Ch'en. In Taiwan he directed the Hsin-sheng pao before taking over the “Third” or intelligence section of the Kuomintang.
38 As late as May 1940, Ch'en still believed that “the only threat to our Nationalist Revolution is Japanese Imperialism. Other political factions can be dealt with by political actions in the future.” See Ch'en Ch'eng, “The Duties and General Activities of the San-Min-Chu-I Youth Corps,” in Line-barger, Paul MA., ed., The China of Chiang Kai-shek (Boston, 1941) p. 344.Google Scholar
39 wai-shih, She-ling, op. cit., p. 8Google Scholar; White, Theodore, Thunder Out of China (New York, 1946) p. 106Google Scholar; New York Times, 03 28, 1938, 12:5Google Scholar and interviews with Ho Chung-han and Hsieh Jan-chih, Taipei, Feb. 1967 and Jan. 1967, as well as interview with Raymond Huang, a former Nationalist officer, Philadelphia, Apr. 1968. Raymond Huang was a close friend of the son of the Communist poet T'ien Han, who worked under Ch'en at Wuhan and later Chungking. T'ien told Huang that Ch'en entered into close personal relations with the Communists working under him, shared their disgust with the corruption and apathy in the government, and continued to be on good terms with them through 1940.
40 Interview widi Hsieh Jan-chih and interview with Ch'en Hsüeh-p'ing, formerly one of Ch'en Ch'eng's most valued “advisors,” Taipei, Feb. 1967, as well as biography of Lo Cho-ying, virtually Ch'en's alter-ego, in Biographies of Kuomintang Leaders.
41 Ibid. At the time the Corps was set up, Chiang Kai-shek more or less warned the “CC Clique” not to interfere with its affairs. “…the aim of the Kuomintang's leadership of the Corps is to unite all efforts under the same banner,” warned Chiang. “Leading, however, does not mean in the least commanding or ordering. To lead is to help.” See Chiang's speech, cited by Ch'en Ch'eng in Line-barger, op. cit., p. 344. Nevertheless, the “CC” dominated Party continually tried to assert its authority over the Corps, as indicated by the following Party directive, issued to the Youth Corps in Apr. 1939: “The Youth Corps is organized by the Kuomintang, which means that the Party and the Corps are closely related. Yet many Corps members fail to understand this and regard the Party and the Corps as two separate entities, calling the Party die ‘Kuomintang’ in conversation as well as official documents. This is improper. Hereafter, Corps members should call the Kuomintang ‘our Party’ in order to clarify the relationship between the two organizations.” See San Min Chu I Youth Corps Headquarters, pub. Tang yü t'üan ti kuan-hsi (The Relationship Between the Party and the Corps) (Chungking, 05 1940) p. 13Google Scholar. For additional evidence of the continual conflict between the Corps and the “CC” dominated Party see the “editorial” in Hunan Ch'ing-nien (Hunanese Youth), 07 1947, p. 2.Google Scholar
42 Pu-lei, Ch'en, Ch'en Pn-lei hui-i lu (The Memoirs of Ch'en Pu-lei) (Taipei, 1967) p. 130.Google Scholar
43 New York Times, 03 27, 1938, 28:2Google Scholar and Hsin-wen pao, (The News) (Shanghai), 03 29, 1938, p. 6.Google Scholar
44 Interviews of die writer's research assistant, Miss Kwoh Yü-pei, with Miss Julie Lien-ying How, research associate at Columbia University, as well as a former Corps member who prefers to remain anonymous.
45 San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien t'üan chung-yang t'uan-pu (Central headquarters of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps), pub. and ed., San min chu-i ch'ingnien t'uan t'uan-shih tzu-liao ch'u kao (Documentary History of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, First Draft) (Chungking, 1946), vol. I, p. 3Google Scholar. For T'an's role in the reestablishment of the “Third Party” see the biography of Teng Yen-ta in Boorman, Howard, ed., Men and Politics in Modern China, Preliminary Fifty Biographies, I (New York, 1960)Google Scholar. For additional evidence of T'an's importance within the Youth Corps see Kai-shek, Chiang, ed., San-min chit-i ch'ing-nien t'uan lün-wen chi, ti-i chi (Collected Essays on the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, Vol. I”) (Chungking or Wuhan, 1939) p. 19Google Scholar. This features lectures given by Ch'en Ch'eng, his successor as secretary-general of the Corps, Chu Chia-hua, and T'an P'ing-shan, who discusses the duties and responsibilities of Youth Corps members. T'an rejoined the Communist Party after 1946.
46 For a detailed account of these reforms and their background see footnote 51.
47 San min chu-i ch'ing-nien t'uan t'uan-shih tzu-liao ch'u kao, vol. I, p. 103.Google Scholar
48 Ch'en Shao-hsiao (“Major Ch'en”), Hei wan lu (The Story of the Black Net) (Hong Kong, 1966) pp. 317–18.Google Scholar
49 See the article by Wang Ch'ung-hsi in Ch'ing-nien t'ung-hsün (Instructions to Youth) 04 25, 1942.Google Scholar
50 Kai-shek, Chiang, Tuan-chang hsün-shih (Instructions of the Commandant) (Chungking, 1942) pp. 101–109.Google Scholar
51 Interview with Liu K'e-shu, Taipei, Mar. 1967. Although undertaken in part for political reasons, these reforms also were an outgrowth of feelings provoked by Ch'en's poverty during his youth. His father, a village schoolteacher, earned such a meager income that in order to subsist the family had to incultivate with its own hands the small amount of land in its possession. Ch'en Ch'eng's brother has said, “As children, my brother and I knew what it was to work in the fields side by side with the farmers.” (Interview with Ch'en Cheng-hsiu, Tai-pei, 03 1967Google Scholar) Ch'en's subsequent behavior suggests that this experience gave him at least some insight into the plight of China's rural masses, for whom he conceived a certain empathy which generally was not shared by Chinese leaders who came from the urban middle class or the more affluent groups in the countryside. Moreover, because of his family's poverty Ch'en was obliged to withdraw from middle school and attend instead a government-supported normal school, where he obtained an education which he frequently called inadequate. All of this helps explain why Ch'en fell so completely under the influence of Teng Yen-ta and Yen Chung, who were in large part responsible for his lifelong enthusiasm for Dr. Sun's so-called “Third People's Principle” of min-sheng chu-i or “The People's Livelihood.” (Interview with Kuo Chi, Taipei, 02, 1967Google Scholar) His belief in the reincome sirability of social and economic reforms was rein forced by his experiences in Kiangsi, during 1933 and 1934, where he was much impressed by the way in which the Communists used such reforms to win widespread support among the peasants, (Ministry of National Defense, pub., Collected Speeches of Ch'en Ch'eng, p. 71Google Scholar) According to his brother, Ch'en Ch'eng wanted to confirm the land reforms carried out in Kiangsi by the Communists but was unable to do so because he lacked civil authority over Kiangsi. (Interview with Ch'en Cheng-hsiu) He contented himself with publishing and distributing at his own expense Communist documents having to do widi social and economic reform which his troops had captured in Kiangsi. (Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, op. cit., p. 9Google Scholar) Furthermore, while serving as dean of the officer training school at Lu-shan he scheduled as speakers outspoken proponents of radical social and economic reform, such as the controversial economist Ma Yin-ch'u. (ch'ün, Liu Chien, op. cit., p. 220Google Scholars) Perhaps his belief in the desirability of social and economic change also was strengthened by his brief association with the reform-minded Yen Hsi-shan during the Communist invasion of Shansi in 1936. Japan's invasion of China gave Ch'en Ch'eng an opportunity to put into effect, at least on a small scale, many of the reforms which he long had envisioned. In 1938, after becoming civil governor of southwestern Hupeh, as well as commander of the Sixth War Zone, he had his reform-minded friend Yen Chung installed as acting civil governor of Hupeh. Yen proceeded to lay the groundwork for a sweeping program of social and economic reform which began in 1940, when Ch'en resigned his other posts in order to concentrate on the defense and reconstruction of southwestern Hupeh. In spite of intense opposition on die part of landlords, rents, which in the past had averaged between 60 and 70 percent of the crop, (Interview with Ch'en's subordinate and confidant Hsü Nai, Taipei, Nov. 1966) were reduced to no more dian 37 percent of the annual harvest, while, at the same time, the provincial audiorities made earnest, although less successful, efforts to lower interest rates to 20 percent. (Hsi-tse, Wu, op. cit., pp. 25–26Google Scholar). By means of a rigorously enforced program of rationing, barter, and public distribution of commodities prices were more or less stabilized, in contrast to the raging inflation which afflicted much of the rest of Chiang Kaishek's wartime domain. (Ibid.) Administrative reforms and the care with which Ch'en selected his subordinates resulted in a government so honest that throughout the areas ruled by Chiang Ch'en Ch'eng's name became virtually synonymous with incorruptibility, a trait which, later, much commended him to Joseph Stilwell. Furdiermore, in order to meet die educational needs of the youth of southwestern Hupeh, as well as of the diousands of refugee students who had fled there from Japanese-occupied areas, Ch'en erected a large complex of publicly financed middle schools, where all qualified young people could obtain not only a tuition-free education but likewise a cost-of-living allowance which enabled them to devote full time to their studies. (Liu Chen, “Yung-yüan huo tsai jenmin te shin-li” (“He lives Forever in the Hearts of Everyone”), Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh (Biographical Literature) (04 1965, pp. 29–30.)Google Scholar Ch'en recalled that because of his own family's poverty he had been unable to obtain a proper education and said he was determined not to let the same fate befall able but impoverished young people living in southwestern Hupeh. (Ibid.) Consequently, whereas in the past southwestern Hupeh had been an educational backwater, now it began producing an unusually large number of middle school and college graduates. (Interview widi Liu K'e-shu.) The acclaim which Ch'en's achievements in southwestern Hupeh won for him may have been in part responsible for his appointment, in 1949, as governor of Taiwan. A person close to Ch'en says that his policies while in charge of southwestern Hupeh were prototypes of die reforms which he subsequently carried out in Taiwan. (Interview with Kuo Chi, Taipei, Feb. 1967) While commanding Nationalist forces in Shensi and, following Japan's surrender, in Manchuria, Ch'en tried, although without much success, to initiate many of the reforms which he had carried out in southwestern Hupeh. (Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, op. cit., pp. 16–17 and 18–19Google Scholar) In 1945 he had the Ministry of War publish two volumes describing diese reforms, presumably in the hope that odier Chinese leaders would adopt them. (Liu Ch'ien chün, ed. and comp., E-cheng chi-yao) (Annals of the Government of Hupeh), 2 vols., (Chungking, 1945)Google Scholar When his friend and former subordinate Chu Huai-ping accepted a post as district magistrate in central Hupeh, Ch'en urged Chu to put into effect in his district the social and economic reforms which, together, they had enacted in southwestern Hupeh. (Chu Huai-ping's piece on page 225 of Ch'en ku fu-tsung-t'ung chi-nien chi.) In 1948 Ch'en resigned from all his posts, largely for political reasons, but also in order to undergo a serious operation. While recuperating he read books having to do with English socialism and became enthusiastic about many Fabian ideas. (Interview widi Wu Hsi-tse, Jan. 1967.) According to Wu, one of the books was by Fei Hsiao-tung, the famed radical sociologist.) His brodier says that at heart Ch'en always was a socialist. (Interview with Ch'en Cheng-hsiu.) Later, he had published in Taiwan several books dealing with Fabianism, (Chung-yang kai-tsao wei-yüan-hui wen-wu kung-ying she (Material Supply Bureau, Central Reform Committee), pub., Fei-pien she te ching-shen yü fang-fa (The Spirit and Methods of the Fabian Society) (Taipei, 1951)Google Scholar, Ying-kuo kung-tang ho hsin-she-hui (The English Labor Party and the New Society) (Taipei, 1950)Google Scholar and Ying-kuo kung-tang she-hui chu-i yü nung-keng (The English Labor Party, Socialism, and the Peasant) (Taipei, 1952)Google Scholar, which he probably likened to Sun Yat-sen's third principle of min-sheng chu-i. A person who visited him shortly after he became governor of Taiwan found Ch'en utterly preoccupied with realizing in Taiwan Sun's principle of the people's livelihood. (Chien-ch'ün, Liu, op. cit., p. 225.Google Scholar) All of this suggests die complexity of Chiang Kai-shek's regime, which came to command the allegiance of persons subscribing to a wide range of ideologies or having very different views with respect to social, economic, and even political matters. Although tied to Chiang by bonds of personal loyalty, as well as mutual self-interest, men like Ch'en Ch'eng did not abandon their convictions but instead repeatedly urged them upon Chiang, often in the face of bitter opposition on the part of other members of his coterie. By surrounding himself with men who, albeit loyal to him, differed reradically on the issues confronting his regime Chiang Kai-shek left himself free to go in any direction he pleased, since he always could find among his most trusted followers a certain number willing to implement with enthusiasm whatever policies he chose to follow. The result was a government dominated by an uneasy coalition of frequently irreconcilable factions, ranging from conservative and even reactionary groups such as the “CC Clique” to comparatively progressive elements represented by Ch'en Ch'eng, who consistently advocated not only resisting Japan but also land and other reforms which, eventually, he was allowed to put into effect in Taiwan. Moreover, whereas Ch'en Washing was a soldier, many of those opposed to him were civilians. This raises a question concerning the role of the military as an instrument of modernization which I have discussed at length in other publications, such as the last chapter of my book Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911–1950 (Princeton, 1967).Google Scholar
52 Although I arrived at this impression on the basis of my own research, it is shared by the reporter Jack Belden, who felt that Chiang knew little about either the United States or the Soviet Union and “dealt with them like local warlords …” Belden, Jack, China Shakes the World (New York, 1949) pp. 431–32.Google Scholar
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57 Interview with Ch'en Cheng-hsiu, Taipei, 03 1967.Google Scholar
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59 San Min Chu I Youth Corps Headquarters, ed. and pub., San min chu-i ch'ing-nien t'uan ti-i chich chung-yang kan-shih hui kung-tso pao-kao: min-kuo san-shih-erh nien szu-yüeh tao min kuo san-shih-wu nien liu-yüeh (Activity Report of the San Min Chu I Youth Corp's First Elected Central Executive Body: April 1942 to June 1946) (Chungking, 1946) p. 160Google Scholar and Tien-jung, Chin, “Ta-lu hui-i” (“Memories of the Mainland”) T'ien-wen t'ai (“Observatory Review”), 12 8, 1964, p. 3.Google Scholar
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62 San min chu-i ch'ing-nien t'uan ti-i chieh chung-yang kan-shih hui kung-tso pao-kao, pp. 360, 131, and 438Google Scholar, as well as Ta Kung Pao (Impartiality), 08 30, 1946.Google Scholar
63 Ta Kung Pao, 09 5, 1946 and 09 14, 1947.Google Scholar
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65 For example, see the Taiwan sections of Perleberg, Max, ed., Who's Who in Modern China (Hong Kong, 1954)Google Scholar. In 1952, when the Kuomintang held its first party congress in Taiwan five of the twelve members of the new central reform committee, a leading Party organ, had been high ranking members of the “San Min Chu I Youth Corps.”
66 Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, op. cit., pp. 104–106Google Scholar, and interviews with Raymond Huang, who served under Ch'en's “hatchet man” in the Ministry of National Defense and witnessed this reorganization, as well as Ch'iao Chia-ts'ai, formerly an aide to Tai Li, who witnessed quarrels between Tai and Ch'en over Ch'en's actions with respect to reorganizing the armed forces, Taipei, Mar. 1967.
67 Interview with Ho Ying-ch'in, Taipei, 03 1967Google Scholar. Ho detested Ch'en and no doubt is biased against him; however, he swears that Ch'en told Chiang he could beat the Communists in only three months and diere are many other indications of Ch'en's overconfidence, such as Jack Belden, China Shades the World, p. 351Google Scholar, and New York Times, 03 21, 1947, 17:1.Google Scholar
68 Feng-ch'ing, Wan, op. cit., pp. 105–106Google Scholar and interview with Ho Ying-ch'in as well as with Ch'iao Chia-ts'ai.
69 Ch'en Shao-hsiao (“Major Ch'en”), Chin-ling ts'an-chao chi (Sunset for Nanking) (Hong Kong, 1963) pp. 217–60.Google Scholar
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72 Tien-jung, Chin, “Ta-lu hui-i,” Tien-wen t'ai, 12 6, 1965, p. 3Google Scholar and Shao-hsiao, Ch'en, op. cit., pp. 69–70 and 250–62.Google Scholar
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74 Tse-tung, Mao, Selected Works, p. 63.Google Scholar
