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  • Cited by 5
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Carlsen, Paul D. and Heckelman, Jac C. 2016. State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference?. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 82, Issue. 3, p. 781.

    Eguia, Jon X. 2013. The Origin of Parties: The United States Congress in 1789-1797 as a Test Case. Economics & Politics, p. n/a.

    Dougherty, Keith Heckelman, Jac Carlsen, Paul and Gelman, David 2012. A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on All Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 45, Issue. 3, p. 135.

    Heckelman, Jac C. and Dougherty, Keith L. 2010. Personalty interests at the Constitutional Convention: new tests of the Beard thesis. Cliometrica, Vol. 4, Issue. 2, p. 207.

    Dougherty, Keith L. and Heckelman, Jac C. 2008. Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention. Public Choice, Vol. 136, Issue. 3-4, p. 293.


An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited

  • Jac C. Heckelman (a1) and Keith L. Dougherty (a2)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 December 2007

Empirical studies of delegate voting at the Constitutional Convention have relied on the same 16 roll call votes. This article re-examines various assumptions used in the collection of these data. We first create a baseline regression. We then consider the effect of dropping delegates not in attendance, re-inferring the votes from primary sources, examining various subsamples of the roll calls, and reconstructing constituency variables to include state districts. Our findings suggest that personal interests were indeed important for decision making at the Constitutional Convention, but constituent interests were less important than previously claimed.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Robert E Brown . Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of “An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.” New York: W. W. Norton, 1956.

Calvin Jillson . Constitution-Making: Alignment and Realignment in the Federal Convention of 1787. American Political Science Review 75, no. 3 (1981): 598612.

Calvin Jillson , and Cecil L. Eubanks . The Political Structure of Constitution Making: The Federal Convention of 1787. American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 3 (1984): 435–58.

Robert A McGuire . Constitution Making: A Rational Choice Model of the Federal Convention of 1787. American Journal of Political Science 32, no. 2 (1988): 483522.

Jonathan Riley . Constitutional Democracy in a Two-Stage Game. In Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule, edited by John Ferejohn , Jack N. Rakove , and Jonathan Riley , 147–69. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Adam Slez , and John Martin . Political Action and Party Formation in the United States Constitutional Convention. American Sociological Review 72 (February 2007): 4267.

Sidney S Ulmer . Sub-group Formation in the Constitutional Convention. Midwest Journal of Political Science 10, no. 3 (1966): 288303.

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The Journal of Economic History
  • ISSN: 0022-0507
  • EISSN: 1471-6372
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-economic-history
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