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  • Cited by 3
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Mause, Karsten 2014. Self-serving legislators? An analysis of the salary-setting institutions of 27 EU parliaments. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 25, Issue. 2, p. 154.

    Carson, Jamie L. and Jenkins, Jeffery A. 2011. Examining the Electoral Connection Across Time. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 14, Issue. 1, p. 25.

    CARSON, JAMIE L. ENGSTROM, ERIK J. and ROBERTS, JASON M. 2007. Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress. American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, Issue. 02,


Who Should Govern Congress? Access to Power and the Salary Grab of 1873

  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 September 2006

We examine the politics of the “Salary Grab” of 1873, legislation that increased congressional salaries retroactively by 50 percent. A group of New England and Midwestern elites opposed the Salary Grab, along with congressional franking and patronage-based civil service appointments, as part of a reform effort to reshape “who should govern Congress.” Our analyses of congressional voting confirm the existence of this nonparty elite coalition. Although these elites lost many legislative battles in the short run, their efforts kept reform on the legislative agenda throughout the late nineteenth century and ultimately set the stage for the Progressive movement in the early twentieth century.

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The Journal of Economic History
  • ISSN: 0022-0507
  • EISSN: 1471-6372
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-economic-history
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