Between 1844 and 1848 the Scottish pig iron trade occupied a particularly important place not only in British but also in world economy. In 1830 Scotland produced only 37,000 tons of pig iron, or about 5 per cent of the total British output. By the mid-1840's it produced over 300,000 tons annually, or about 25 per cent of die British output. Of this increased output only one third was used in Scotland, while no less than one quarter left the United Kingdom for abroad. Such a rapid progress rested on peculiarly favorable geological and technical conditions.

Financial relationships between the federal government and the states were a critical matter in the founding and early operations of the federal government under the Constitution, with the settlement of the Revolutionary War debt the object of chief concern. When the debt was ultimately secured, other matters arose to keep funds passing from one level of government to another. Some of these were of major political importance, while others involving substantial sums made little political impact, being less controversial.

During the last four years before the outbreak of war in 1914 the people of England experienced an unprecedented combination of political strife and labor unrest. The struggle over the budget of 1909 had led to a constitutional crisis over the powers of the House of Lords in 1910–1911; suffragettes were resorting to obstructive and exasperating tactics to win the vote for women; the question of home rule almost resulted in civil war in North Ireland and brought what amounted to a threat of dereliction of duty by high military officers, who could not contemplate the use of force against the opponents of home rule; while the restlessness of labor brought a series of massive strikes in which the rank and file of workers often broke from the discipline of their leaders.

We economic historians can sympathize fully with Professor Gerhard in his search for criteria that will help to cut political history into meaningful periods. Like him, we are fully aware that periodizing seems an artificial intellectual trick in face of the fact that life continues even in the midst of destruction. We would add, “So do human wants and the efforts that have to be made for their satisfaction.”

It would not seem to be stretching matters unduly to assert that widespread agreement could be found on the following related propositions: (1) that the social crises and upheavals in Europe between the two World Wars, and the wars themselves, were not aberrations but are, rather, susceptible of a systematic, coherent explanation; (2) that such an explanation, though it would rest on a myriad of social relationships and processes, would place economic affairs at or near the center of Europe's troubles; and (3) that an understanding of European economic difficulties in the period might be efficiently achieved through an analysis of the factors stimulating and retarding the rate of economic growth of interwar Europe—or, that any thorough explanation would have to include such an analysis.

The economic historian's concern with the changing institutions and processes of economic activity currently takes on added relevance in connection with world-wide interest in economic growth. Plans and programs for rapid industrialization abound, especially in economically underdeveloped areas. In this context, the example of Soviet industrialization, mysterious in its contours and awesome in its results, has attracted increasing scholarly attention.

J. van der Poel has just published The History of Netherlands' Revenue Stamps, 1624–1954. Mr. van der Poel is the director of the Netherlands Administration of Direct Taxes, Fees, and Excise and the Director of Netherlands' Tax Academy (Rijksbelastingsacademie) in Rotterdam, a civil service university for the highest grades of the Dutch fiscal service.