This article combines a game-theoretic framework and a comparative analysis to study the impact of the Great Depression on private welfare capitalism. Recharacterizing welfare capitalism as an implicit-contract equilibrium, the article documents parallel institutional developments in the United States and Japan in the 1920s and the process of bifurcation thereafter. In the United States, the breach of contract by major employers induced by the depression led to the rise of explicit contracts and legal enforcement institutions. By contrast, the less severe depression in Japan allowed the maintenance of implicit contracts and the formation of complementary labor laws.This article is partly based on my doctoral dissertation. I am deeply indebted to my thesis advisors, Avner Greif, Gavin Wright, Masahiko Aoki, and John Pencavel. I am grateful to Lee Alston, Carliss Baldwin, Samuel Bowles, Adam Brandenburger, Loren Brandt, Amit Bubna, Louis Cain, David Fairris, Joe Ferrie, Price Fishback, Robert Gibbons, Claudia Goldin, Rakesh Kurana, Robert Margo, Jim Minifie, Joel Mokyr, Laura Owen, Ben Polak, Daniel Raff, Paul Rhode, William Tsutsui, Warren Whatley, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.

With passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, the institutional structure necessary to support an American market for bankers' acceptances was created. This article examines the development of the secondary market for bankers' acceptances during its first 20 years. It provides evidence that discount market liquidity increased dramatically during the 1920s and helped the dollar acceptance challenge the sterling bill as an important source of trade finance around the world. The Federal Reserve Banks played a key role by reducing the risk borne by private dealers and propelling the market to a high-liquidity equilibrium.The author thanks Mike Haupert, William Roberds, and Ellis Tallman for their useful comments and suggestions, and Susan Isaac for her excellent editorial assistance. All errors are the responsibility of the author.

This article reconsiders industrial growth in post-Unification Italy in light of a new set of sector-specific production estimates. Though still in part provisional, the new series confirm that the production of durables (and related materials) was dominated by the Kuznets cycle. A similar cycle is documented in the growth rate of the residual, excluding foodstuffs, and extended by reasonable assumption to foodstuffs as well. The new series thus support the traditional view of the 1880s as a period of widespread prosperity and above-trend consumption rather than the opposite, now dominant view.This article presents the first comprehensive results of a long-term research project that owes much to the constant encouragement of Pierluigi Ciocca and Gianni Toniolo, to extended exchanges with Giovanni Federico, to the kindness of the librarians at the Bank of Italy and the Istituto centrale di statistica, and not least, for their financial support, to the Ente per gli studi monetari, bancari e finanziari “Luigi Einaudi,” the National Science Foundation, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca Scientifica e Tecnologica. The usual disclaimer applies.

Following World War II millions of cotton workers, especially African-Americans, left the fields forever, and farmers mechanized the cotton harvest. Prevailing empirical studies argue that high factory wages lured farmhands away. Based on newly reconstructed data, we estimate the causes of the demise of harvest employment in 12 major cotton-producing states from 1949–1964 and find important roles for mechanization, government farm programs, higher nonagricultural wages, and falling cotton prices. On net, our estimates indicate that factors affecting farm labor demand, not labor-supply influences, caused the disappearance of hand-picked cotton—results that reverse the best econometric work to date.For helpful comments, we thank Lee Alston, Larry Neal, Werner Baer, Bill Collins, Lee Craig, Carl Moody, Beverley Peart, Eric Hilt, Michele Knapp, the participants of the workshops at Syracuse University, Northwestern University, the University of Illinois, Colby College, Harvard University, the All-Ohio Economic History Seminar (Ohio State University Economics Department), the Social Science History Association Meeting (2001), and the Allied Social Science Meeting (2002), anonymous referees and the editor, Gavin Wright. The authors assume full responsibility for errors and omissions.

The debasement of the Byzantine gold coin during the reign of Constantine IX Monomachus (1042–1055) marked the end of more than seven centuries of near stability and the beginning of a sharp fall in the coin's gold content. I reject a widely accepted view that the debasement was caused by the increase in the number of transactions in an expanding economy. I explain the debasement as being a measure undertaken to finance the protracted war against the Pechenegs in the latter half of Constantine's reign.I would like to thank Judith Herrin for her help and encouragement and for first suggesting that I look at this problem. I would also like to thank this JOURNAL's editor and three anonymous referees whose comments and recommendations significantly improved this article. Finally, thanks are also due to Richard Brealey, Ian Cooper, Michael Crawford, Julian Franks, Jonathan Goodman, Mervyn King, Michael Metcalf, Robert Mundell, Anthony Neuberger, and Gabriel Stein.

This article uses a new panel dataset to investigate the relationship between financial fragility and real activity on U.S. railroads during 1929–1940. Leverage had a negative effect on maintenance, within small firms only. Bankruptcy had a positive effect on maintenance and employment, within large firms only. Both leverage and bankruptcy effects were significantly larger during the worst depression years. Had all railroads been bankrupt during 1930–1933, GDP would have increased by 0.2 percent annually, and employment by 0.125 percent annually. Loans by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had no impact on maintenance or employment.

We provide 16 purchasing-power-parity-adjusted estimates of U.K. and U.S. income per capita and output per worker between 1872 and 1990 based on new estimates of their price levels. Our income benchmarks depart from current estimates in four crucial respects. The United States, not the United Kingdom, led in income per capita in the 1870s. The United Kingdom kept pace with the United States through the late Victorian era. Most of the United Kingdom's relative decline occurred between 1905 and 1950. Finally, the post-1950 performance of the U.K. economy was stronger than is now estimated.We thank Michael Edelstein for getting us interested in the topic. We are also indebted to two referees for comments on the first draft. Susan Carter, Greg Clark, C. Knick Harley, Alan Heston, Peter Lindert, Robert Lipsey, Luis Locay, Bryan Roberts, Christina Romer, Richard Sylla, Jeffrey Williamson, and the participants in a seminar at the University of California, Riverside gave helpful suggestions. Finally we are especially grateful to Deirdre McCloskey for advice at an early stage.

There are currently two ways of estimating relative levels of per capita income back to the nineteenth century. The most commonly adopted approach, popularized in particular by Angus Maddison and labeled “long-span” estimates by Marianne Ward and John Devereux, is to use time-series projection from a recent benchmark.Maddison, Monitoring; and Ward and Devereux, “Measuring British Decline.” The alternative procedure, labeled “direct estimates” by Ward and Devereux, is to use direct benchmark estimates for earlier years. Ward and Devereux provide some new “direct estimates” which they claim over-turn the conventional chronology of U.K./U.S. relative per capita income levels for the period 1870–1990, derived using “long-span” projections. One important purpose of this note is to dispute the new estimates, and hence to reassert the conventional chronology. Along the way, however, I wish also to make a more general methodological point about the use of time series projections and direct benchmark estimates of relative per capita income levels. In my view, it is unsatisfactory for researchers to note a large discrepancy and simply claim the superiority of one type of evidence over the other. Rather, a satisfactory account of the evolution of relative per capita incomes over a long period should be able to encompass both sorts of evidence.I am grateful to Nick Crafts, Douglas Puffert, Mark Harrison, Douglas Irwin, Angus Maddison, and Mary O'Mahony for comments on an earlier version and to Knick Harley for editorial advice. Any remaining errors are my responsibility.

Charles P. Kindleberger (1910–2003), noted economic historian, died of a stroke on Monday, 7 July.This piece largely duplicates the author's entry for Kindleberger in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History (edited by Joel Mokyr, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Used by permission.

Kindleberger was born in New York City in 1910. He received his B.A. at the University of Pennsylvania in 1932 and his Ph.D. at Columbia University in 1937. He came to economic history after distinguished careers in public service (including the Federal Reserve and the Office of Strategic Services during the Second World War) and teaching international trade at M.I.T. He made his entry into the field with a book on Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1851–1950 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964). Kindleberger surveyed the extensive literature on these two countries and concluded that there was no single convincing explanation for the differences between these two countries. He ended the book with the following famous words: “Economic history, like all history, is absorbing, beguiling, great fun. But, for scientific problems, can it be taken seriously?”