Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-9pm4c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-28T19:18:11.967Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Ethnicity and Altruism After Violence: The Contact Hypothesis in Kosovo

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2015

Vera Mironova
Affiliation:
Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, 3140 Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20740, USA; e-mail: vmironov@umd.edu
Sam Whitt
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, High Point University, 833 Montlieu Ave, High Point, NC 27262, USA; e-mail: swhitt@highpoint.edu

Abstract

An enduring question for the social sciences is whether increasing contact and exposure between in-groups and out-groups enhances prospects for social tolerance and cooperation. Using dictator experiments with ethnic Serbs in post-war Kosovo, our research explores how norms of altruism are impacted by proximity to former rivals. In the aftermath of violence, proximity appears to amplify solidarity with the in-group but also increases empathy toward former adversaries. Based on a March 2011 study of 158 ethnic Serbs from regions across Kosovo with varying degrees of contact and separation from ethnic Albanians, we find that both out-group bridging and in-group bonding norms increase with exposure to the out-group. The inclusion of extended controls and matching for displacement by violence and other forms of victimization helps alleviate concerns about sorting and selection driving our results.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alexander, M., and Christia, F.. 2011. “Context Modularity of Human Altruism.” Science 334 (6061): 1392–4.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Allport, G. W. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, UK: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
Altonji, J. G., Elder, T. E., and Taber, C. R.. 2005. “Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools.” Journal of Political Economy 113 (1): 151–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blalock, H. M. 1967. Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New York, NY: Wiley.Google Scholar
Bobo, L., and Hutchings, V. L.. 1996. “Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context.” American Sociological Review 61 (6): 951–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowles, S. 2008. “Conflict: Altruism's Midwife.” Nature 456 (7220): 326–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Choi, J.-K., and Bowles, S.. 2007. “The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War.” Science 318 (5850): 636–40.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Engel, C. 2011. “Dictator Games: A Meta Study.” Experimental Economics 14 (4): 583610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Etzioni, A. 1992–93. “The Evils of Self-Determination.” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter): 2135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U.. 2003. “The Nature of Human Altruism.” Nature 425 (6960): 785–91.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gilligan, M. J., Pasquale, B. J., and Samii, C.. 2013. “Civil War and Social Cohesion: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Nepal.” American Journal of Political Science 58 (3): 604–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Habyarima, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., and Weinstein, J. M.. 2008. “Is Ethnic Conflict Inevitable?Foreign Affairs 87 (4): 138–41.Google Scholar
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., and McElreath, R.. 2001. “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies.” The American Economic Review 91 (2): 73–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horowitz, D. L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Judah, T. 2002. Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Kaufmann, C. D. 1996. “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars.” International Security 20 (4, Spring): 136–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaufmann, C. D. 1998. “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century.” International Security 23 (2): 120–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, I., and Mason, W.. 2006. Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Kumar, R. 1997. “The Troubled History of Partition.” Foreign Affairs 76 (January–February): 2234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kuperman, A. J. 2004. “Is Partition Really the Only Hope? Reconciling Contradictory Findings About Ethnic Civil Wars.” Security Studies 13 (Summer): 314–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
LeVine, R., and Campbell, D.. 1972. Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior. New York, NY: Wiley.Google Scholar
Mearsheimer, J. J., and Pape, R. A.. 1993. “The Answer.” The New Republic 203: 22–7.Google Scholar
Mironova, V., and Whitt, S. 2013. “International Peacekeeping and Micro-Foundations for Positive Peace: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Kosovo.” (Social Science Research Network at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243770), accessed October 24, 2014.Google Scholar
Neyman, J. 1923. “On the Application of Probability Theory to Agricultural Experiments. Essay on Principles. Section 9.” Statistical Science 5 (1923 [1990]): 465–72.Google Scholar
Petersen, R. D. 2011. Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pettigrew, T. F., and Tropp, L. R.. 2006. “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90 (5): 751.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pettigrew, T. F., and Tropp, L. R.. 2008. “How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-Analytic Tests of Three Mediators.” European Journal of Social Psychology 38 (6): 922–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Posen, B. R. 1993. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” Survival 35 (1): 2747.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., and Gaertner, S. L.. 2006. “Intergroup Threat and Outgroup Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10 (4): 336–53.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rubin, D. B. 1974. “Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies.” Journal of Educational Psychology 66: 688701.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sambanis, N. 2000. “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War.” World Politics 52 (4): 437–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sambanis, N., and Schulhofer-Wohl, J.. 2009. “What's in a Line? Is Partition a Solution to Civil War?International Security 34 (2): 82118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. C.. 1979. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” In The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, eds. Austin, W. G. and Worchel, S.. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 3347.Google Scholar
Toft, M. D. 2012. “Self-Determination, Secession, and Civil War.” Terrorism and Political Violence 24 (4): 581600.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Voors, M. J., Nillesen, E. E. M., Verwimp, P., Bulte, E. H., Lensink, R., and Van Soest, D. P.. 2012. “Violent Conflict and Behavior: A Field Experiment in Burundi.” American Economic Review 102 (2): 941–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Whitt, S. 2014. “Social Norms in the Aftermath of Ethnic Violence Ethnicity and Fairness in Non-Costly Decision-Making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (1): 93119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Whitt, S., and Wilson, R.. 2007. “The Dictator Game, Fairness and Ethnicity in Postwar Bosnia.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (3): 655–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, R. M. Jr., 1947. “The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research on Problems of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Group Relations.” Social Science Research Council Bulletin 57: 153.Google Scholar
Zizzo, D. J. 2010. “Experimenter Demand Effects in Economic Experiments.” Experimental Economics 13 (1): 7598.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Mironova and Whitt supplementary material

Appendix

Download Mironova and Whitt supplementary material(File)
File 614.4 KB
Supplementary material: File

Mironova and Whitt supplementary material

Appendix tables and figures

Download Mironova and Whitt supplementary material(File)
File 30.5 KB