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The Electoral Sweet Spot in the Lab

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2016

Simon Labbé St-Vincent ,
André Blais  and
Jean-Benoit Pilet
Simon Labbé St-Vincent
Affiliation:
Département de science politique, Université de Montréal, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; e-mail: simon.labbe.st-vincent@umontreal.ca
André Blais
Affiliation:
Département de science politique, Université de Montréal, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; e-mail: Andre.blais@umontreal.ca
Jean-Benoit Pilet
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Brussels, Belgium; e-mail: jpilet@ulb.ac.be
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Abstract

Carey and Hix (2011) propose that a proportional electoral system with a moderate number of seats per district offers the best compromise between (1) accurate representation and (2) strong accountability. The argument is that there is a district magnitude (DM) level where the trade-off between proportionality and fragmentation of parties is optimal. This DM is called the sweet spot. We explore this proposition through lab experiments conducted in Brussels and Montreal. We find that the probability of achieving a “good” outcome on both proportionality and the number of parties is slightly higher at moderate DMs. We note, however, that this probability remains low.

Keywords

Electoral systemproportional representationaccountabilitydistrict magnitude (DM)lab experiment
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , Spring 2016 , pp. 75 - 83
Copyright
Copyright © The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2016 

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