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Just Don’t Call it a Tax! Framing in an Experiment on Voting and Redistribution

  • Jan Lorenz (a1), Fabian Paetzel (a2) and Markus Tepe (a3)


Utilizing a simplified version of the Meltzer–Richard redistribution mechanism, we designed a laboratory experiment to test whether it matters if voters were asked to decide on a tax rate or a minimum income, leaving the redistribution mechanism itself unchanged. Framing the vote about redistribution as a decision about a minimal income increases the individually and ideally preferred level of redistribution. This effect outlives the groups’ deliberation processes and leads to the implementation of a higher level of redistribution.



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Just Don’t Call it a Tax! Framing in an Experiment on Voting and Redistribution

  • Jan Lorenz (a1), Fabian Paetzel (a2) and Markus Tepe (a3)


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