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Information Barriers in Global Markets: Evidence from International Subcontracting Relationships

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2019

Massimo Massa
Affiliation:
Massa, massimo.massa@insead.edu, INSEAD
David Schumacher*
Affiliation:
Schumacher, david.schumacher@mcgill.ca, McGill University Desautels Faculty of Management
*
Schumacher (corresponding author), david.schumacher@mcgill.ca

Abstract

We study the link between information barriers in global markets and the organizational form of asset management. Fund families outsource funds in which they are at an informational disadvantage to generate performance. Using a structural model of self-selection, we endogenize the outsourcing decision and estimate positive gains from outsourcing of 4–14 basis points per month, thereby reconciling underperformance of outsourced funds with performance maximization by fund families. The gains from outsourcing provide a novel proxy for the information barriers that segment global financial markets: The more segmented the underlying markets where the funds invest, the larger the gains from outsourcing.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2019

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