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Identifying Large Problem/Failed Banks: The Case of Franklin National Bank of New York

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 October 2009

Joseph F. Sinkey Jr.
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Extract

If the “smart money” was out of Franklin before its financial difficulties became public knowledge, just what elements of Franklin's balance sheet were the sagacious analysts reading and why weren't the banking authorities aware of this information? The purpose of this paper is to determine what balance-sheet and income-statement figures, if any, could have been arrayed in an ex post early-warning system to spotlight Franklin's developing problems.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 12 , Issue 5 , December 1977 , pp. 779 - 800
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1977

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