We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Goranova, Maria Abouk, Rahi Nystrom, Paul C. and Soofi, Ehsan S. 2017. Corporate governance antecedents to shareholder activism: A zero-inflated process. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 38, Issue. 2, p. 415.
Behrmann, Maximilian and Sassen, Remmer 2016. Anwendung des Say on Pay bei deutschen börsennotierten DAX-Unternehmen – Analyse von Determinanten sowie Unternehmens- und Medienreaktionen. Managementforschung,
Carter, Mary Ellen Li, Lei Marcus, Alan J. and Tehranian, Hassan 2016. Excess pay and deficient performance. Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 30, p. 1.
Chen, Donghua Li, Oliver Zhen and Liang, Shangkun 2016. Perk consumption as a suboptimal outcome under pay regulations. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 23, Issue. 4, p. 373.
COHN, JONATHAN B. GILLAN, STUART L. and HARTZELL, JAY C. 2016. On Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd-) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 71, Issue. 4, p. 1623.
Correa, Ricardo and Lel, Ugur 2016. Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 122, Issue. 3, p. 500.
Cuñat, Vicente Giné, Mireia and Guadalupe, Maria 2016. Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance. Review of Finance, Vol. 20, Issue. 5, p. 1799.
Denes, Matthew R. Karpoff, Jonathan M. and McWilliams, Victoria B. 2016. Thirty years of shareholder activism: A survey of empirical research. Journal of Corporate Finance,
Ferri, Fabrizio and Oesch, David 2016. Management Influence on Investors: Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay. Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 33, Issue. 4, p. 1337.
Gan, Huiqi and Park, Myung Seok 2016. Are more able CEOs getting more compensated? Evidence from the pay-for-performance sensitivity of equity-based incentives. Advances in Accounting, Vol. 34, p. 64.
Kaplan, Steven E. and Zamora, Valentina L. 2016. The Effects of Current Income Attributes on Nonprofessional Investors’ Say-on-Pay Judgments: Does Fairness Still Matter?. Journal of Business Ethics,
Kent, Pamela Kercher, Kim Routledge, James and Smith, Tom 2016. Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link. Accounting & Finance,
Kimbro, Marinilka B. and Xu, Danielle 2016. Shareholders have a say in executive compensation: Evidence from say-on-pay in the United States. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 35, Issue. 1, p. 19.
Malenko, Nadya and Shen, Yao 2016. The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design. Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 29, Issue. 12, p. 3394.
Park, Heejin 2016. Company Stock in Defined Contribution Plans: Evidence from Proxy Voting. Financial Management,
Sauerwald, Steve Van Oosterhout, J. Hans and Van Essen, Marc 2016. Expressive Shareholder Democracy: A Multilevel Study of Shareholder Dissent in 15 Western European Countries. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 53, Issue. 4, p. 520.
Souha, Siala Bouaziz Anis, Jarboui and McMillan, David 2016. Corporate governance and firm characteristics as explanatory factors of shareholder activism: Validation through the French context. Cogent Economics & Finance, Vol. 4, Issue. 1,
Stathopoulos, Konstantinos and Voulgaris, Georgios 2016. The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say-on-Pay. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 24, Issue. 3, p. 359.
Stathopoulos, Konstantinos and Voulgaris, Georgios 2016. The Impact of Investor Horizon on Say-on-Pay Voting. British Journal of Management, Vol. 27, Issue. 4, p. 796.
Vizcaíno-González, Marcos Pineiro-Chousa, Juan and Sáinz-González, Jorge 2016. Selecting explanatory factors of voting decisions by means of fsQCA and ANN. Quality & Quantity,
Congress and activists recently proposed giving shareholders a say (vote) on executive pay. We find that when the House passed the Say-on-Pay Bill, the market reaction was significantly positive for firms with high abnormal chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, with low pay-for-performance sensitivity, and responsive to shareholder pressure. However, activist-sponsored say-on-pay proposals target large firms, not those with excessive CEO pay, poor governance, or poor performance. The market reacts negatively to labor-sponsored proposal announcements and positively when these proposals are defeated. Our findings suggest that say-on-pay creates value for companies with inefficient compensation but can destroy value for others.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.
Loading metrics...
Loading metrics...
* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 29th May 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.
