Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 December 2013
Thucydides' brief account of the events which have come to be known as the First Peloponnesian War has left considerable doubts about Sparta's precise role. Her first clearly attested expedition is that to help Doris in 458 or 457, but fighting had been going on for some two or three years before this and several members of the Peloponnesian League were involved in it. The question is whether Sparta and her League as a whole were also involved, and if so, from what date. Scholars have taken differing views on this problem and one of the most recent, and important, treatments of it firmly advocates an early commitment to war by Sparta and her League. It is the purpose of this paper to suggest a different interpretation of the evidence and to claim that it is one which fits better into the context of Spartan behaviour throughout the whole period c. 460–445 B.C.
1 I am grateful to Mr W. G. Forrest for some helpful suggestions regarding this paper. He should not, of course, be held compromised thereby.
2 de Ste. Croix, G. E. M.The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (1972) 187–8Google Scholar. He thinks that the departure of Megara from the Peloponnesian League and her alliance with Athens were the crucial cause and occasion.
Of earlier scholars, Busolt (Gr. Gesch. III, 1 302 and 209) attributes the war to the pressure put on Sparta by this alliance, but he is thinking in terms of power politics rather than the legal aspect. He hedges on the actual date of the formal beginning of the war by observing that the creation of this alliance was bound to bring Sparta in ‘sooner or later.’ He carefully preserves Thucydides' own ambiguous terminology for the opponents of Athens in the fighting of the early years and thus leaves open the question whether Sparta and the League were involved. But he interprets the expedition to Doris as evidence that Sparta had come to realise the need for action if her League was to survive. So he may have thought that this was Sparta's first intervention in the war, but he may also have thought that war was declared earlier.
Gomme (Hist. Comm. I 305) thought that Corinth put great pressure on Sparta, as in 431, and succeeded in getting her to declare war. He seems to have thought that the placing of a garrison in Aegina was the first act of the League, as he says of this ‘the first Peloponnesian War has begun.’
On the other hand Kahrstedt, (Gr. Staatsrecht I 92)Google Scholar thought that Corinth and her allies were fighting alone until 458, as they did again before 431. Bengston, (Gr. Gesch. 1290–10)Google Scholar holds that the breach between Sparta and Athens only came with the Battle of Tanagra, as does Wickert, K., Der peloponnesische Bund (Diss. Erlangen 1961)Google Scholar.
3 As does Jeffery, L. H.BSA lx (1965) 52Google Scholar.
4 Thuc. i 103.3 
is relevant if it precedes the outbreak of the war.
5 De Ste. Croix op. cit. 183–4 draws attention to the strong language in which Aeschylus alludes to the alliance.
6 The recent attempt by Cole, John R., GRBS 15 (1974) 369–85Google Scholar, to discredit Thucydides' account of this episode is not very convincing. It does not seem likely that the Spartans would have been willing to allow the Messenians to escape merely because they wanted Cimon to have a chance to oppose Ephialtes' reforms (if, indeed, this chronology is conceded). Would they have put such a remote problem before their own urgent and immediate one? Moreover, if Cimon did return so opportunely his enemies would surely have suspected and denounced such a transparent connivance, and it is difficult to believe that such charges would not have been remembered in Athens; in which case Thucydides could hardly have got away with his version, even if we are willing to credit that he might have wished to.
That the Spartans became genuinely frightened by the possible reactions of the Athenian soldiers is by no means improbable. Ordinary Athenians did not normally see the Spartan system in its home and one should not make the mistake of thinking that as hoplites they would be more sympathetic to it than thetes. The vast majority of Athenian hoplites were as enthusiastic for democracy as the thetes and they proved this by leading the overthrow of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. The oligarchs' attempt to create a rift between hoplites and thetes was a failure.
7 See n. 42 for discussion of this point.
8 This in itself was an anomalous position in so far as members of the Peloponnesian League were sworn to have the same friends and enemies as Sparta, but Sparta did not enforce this clause so strictly as Athens with her League. It is difficult to see how Sparta's tolerance of internal wars between League members can be formally reconciled with the principle of having the same friends and enemies as Sparta, even though it was made easier through the giving of oaths separately by each member to Sparta alone. As in the case of revolts and secessions, such as that of Megara in c. 460, Sparta sometimes found it convenient to disregard them for a time, even though they must have involved a breach of the oaths. Sparta's inaction must have been based on pragmatic rather than legal grounds. Cf. de Ste. Croix, op. cit. 114 § 5(d).
9 Op. cit. 16 ff.
10 Thuc. i 53.1. Cf. the Athenian reply in the same chapter and the correct conduct of the Athenian captains in i 49.4, though in i 49.7 tempers began to rise on both sides. But even such an open clash is still not taken as a breach of the Peace, any more than the Battle of Mantineia was in 418. Thuc. ii 7.1, talking of the Theban attack on Plataea, speaks of 
11 Cf. Thuc. vii 18.2 where the Spartans recognise the Theban attack on Plataea and their own refusal of arbitration as placing responsibility for the breach of the Peace on their own side. Yet, strictly speaking, even the Theban attack on an ally of Athens, though a breach of the Peace, need not in itself have automatically involved Sparta. This involvement arose because Thebes was too powerful an ally to leave in the lurch, especially at a time when Sparta and the League had already declared war.
12 Thuc. v 48.1. In mid fourth-century Athens again had alliances with Sparta and her enemies at the same time (Dem. xvi).
13 Thuc. v 56.1–2.
14 Thuc. v 54.1 and v 55.3.
15 Thuc. v 54.4. I agree with de Ste. Croix that they were not under an obligation to help by virtue of their membership of the League (op. cit. 114).
16 When the Argive embassy to Athens denounced the Spartan garrison in Epidaurus as πολέμιοι and blamed the Athenians for letting ‘enemies’ pass by sea, the Athenians remained inactive and contented themselves with adding a footnote to the stele of the Peace with Sparta to the effect that the Spartans had broken their oaths (Thuc. v 56.3). They did not throw down the stele as if the Peace had been broken. Cf. A. Andrewes in Gomme Hist. Comm. ad. loc.
17 Thuc. v 61–3.
18 Thuc. v 18.4.
19 Thuc. v 64–5. Sparta no doubt could justify her action on the grounds that Mantineia had illegally seceded from her League.
20 Thuc. v 77.9.
21 Thuc vi 105.1–2. Cf. Gomme op. cit. iv 78 (A. Andrewes) and 377 (K. J. Dover).
22 Op. cit. Appendix XIII.
23 Wickert op. cit. 61 argues that Sparta took no part in Corinth's war, and that this was because Corinth had been the aggressor against Megara and had no right to be helped, and also because Aegina was not a member of the Peloponnesian League. The arguments on the latter point are not conclusive and it is not a safe basis from which to make deductions. As for the former, Sparta had her own interests in Megara which should have led her to action (see note 29). Wickert thinks the expedition to Doris is not to be linked with Corinth's war.
24 A bronze greave dedicated at Olympia has been found with an inscription saying that the Sicyonians dedicated Athenian spoil from Halieis. (ἙΣΤΙΑ May 8, 1971). This occasions no surprise as the Sicyonians help Corinth subsequently (Thuc. i 114.1 ). I am grateful to the Editor for drawing my attention to this piece of evidence.
25 e.g. Thuc. ii 85.1, iii. 261; cf. also de Ste. Croix, op. cit. 112 at (e).
26 Cf. de Ste. Croix op. cit. 108 and 112 at (e).
27 If Aegina was a member of the Peloponnesian League as de Ste. Croix believes (op. cit. Appendix XVII B) then the failure of Sparta to give help to Aegina is staggering. Even if she was not, as argued by Wickert (op. cit. 23–6, 62, 64) it remains very surprising. The case of Megara is different in that she had defected.
It is true that Sparta was not under a legal obligation to help her allies when they got involved in wars, even if they were blatantly the objects of aggression. But failure to help would weaken the League if the ally succumbed and whether she succumbed or not Sparta's credibility as hegemon would suffer very badly. Cf. de Ste. Croix op. cit. 106, 113. He suggests that where the attack on a member of the League was blatant Sparta might not even need to summon a meeting of the League Congress but could call out her allies automatically. He cites Thuc. v 57.1 for the summoning of troops to help Epidaurus against Argos.
28 Thuc. i 105.3 τὰ δὲ ἄκρα τῆς Γερανείας κατέλαβον καὶ ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα κατέβησαν. It may be that after the fall of Aegina the Athenian capacity to defend the Megarid became stronger and therefore more deterrent, but when Corinth invaded no regular field force was available, only the young and the old. Why did Sparta miss this golden opportunity?
29 The big difference is that Sparta had no interests of her own in Corcyra whereas she did in Megara, who had seceded illegally from the Peloponnesian League and made Spartan activity north of the Isthmus more difficult.
30 On that occasion Corinth gained wider support, especially from the Western regions, Megara, Pale (in Cephallonia) Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, Leukas, Ambracia, Elis, Phlius and Thebes (i 27.2) and, later, Megara, Elis, Leukas, Ambracia and Anactorium (i 46.1). Smart, J. D.JHS xcii (1972) 139Google Scholar perhaps overstates Sparta's opposition to Corinth at this time, but she was clearly following a very different line from Corinth.
31 Cf. de Ste. Croix op. cit. 209.
32 Fowler, B. H. in Phoenix xi (1957) 164 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. uses three special issues of Tanagran coins as evidence to suggest that Tanagra had been claiming leadership of the Boeotian federation during the years preceding 458/7 and that she had probably been encouraged in Athens. She suggests that Thebes asked for Spartan help to deal with Tanagra and re-establish Theban hegemony. This would certainly explain the presence of the Spartan army at Tanagra, which is not on the direct route home, and also account for the quickness of Athenian reaction. But there is no ground for supposing a formal alliance between Athens and Tanagra and we need not suppose that Tanagra had really achieved the position of hegemon in practice.
33 Hampl, F.Die Gr. Staatsverträge 72Google Scholar has argued that Thucydides' account is contrary to this interpretation. The Boeotian episode, he suggests, like the Athenian oligarchs' embassy, seems to arise out of the circumstances of the imposed delay and was the concern of the Spartan commander on the spot, rather than the Spartan state.
34 Sparta's interest in Doris, as her reputed motherland, is in itself perfectly adequate as an explanation of her action, but it may well be true, as is argued by Zeilhofer, G. in Sparta Delphoi und die Amphiktyonen im 5 Jahrhundert (Diss. Erlangen 1959) 41 ffGoogle Scholar. on the strength of Plut., Cimon 17.3Google Scholar, that the Phocians had also seized Delphi which Sparta wished to liberate, as in 449. Zeilhofer also suggests that Sparta's concern for Doris was not purely sentimental since her only ability to partake in the deliberations of the Amphictyony came through Doris' single vote. These deliberations were normally dominated by Thessaly and her satellites and did not often affect Greek affairs very seriously, but they no doubt enjoyed prestige (as does a voice at UNO today) and there was always a possibility that it might enable Sparta to sponsor a motion to increase her own representation and diminish that of her enemies, as in her proposal to expel the Medizers after the Persian War. It might also improve her chances of protecting Delphi and its priests, about whose independence Sparta showed continual concern. It was stipulated in the forefront of the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. v 18.2) and was only abandoned during the Third Sacred War when the alternatives to Phocian control seemed even less acceptable.
35 De Ste. Croix op. cit. 197, following Busolt, suggests that the revolts must surely have been concerted with the Spartans but there is nothing in the evidence to support this. Gomme in commenting on i 114.1 speculates about local grievances in Euboea and notes the presence of Euboeans in Boeotia. No doubt there was co-operation between these groups as between Corinth and Megara. But no Spartan force was at hand to help the Megarians, only the local allies who had been involved in the affairs of Megara 460–57. Co-ordination from Sparta is a guess which depends on the prior assumption that Sparta was belligerent, which is precisely the point at issue.
36 Op. cit. 198.
37 The same is true of her acceptance of Athens' rearrangement of the affairs of Boeotia after Oenophyta.
38 De Ste. Croix op. cit. 191 says ‘And the very fact that no Peloponnesian army attempted again to cross the Megarid in either direction, as far as we know, whereas immediately Megara returned to her Spartan allegiance in 446 the Peloponnesians invaded Attica through the Isthmus, is very strong circumstantial evidence that the Megarid could be held firmly enough to make a Peloponnesian expedition through it too hazardous.’ But this argument of course involves a petitio principii. The conclusion only follows if we assume a Spartan desire to invade Attica.
39 Andrewes, A. in The Ancient Historian and his Materials ed. Levick, B. (1975) 9 ffGoogle Scholar. The exploit of the distinguished Spartiate Aneristos who took Halieis with a well-manned merchant ship may represent a response to an appeal from a pro-Spartan group in the city when threatened by Athens early in the war, but hardly shows official Spartan initiative (Hdt. vii 137).
40 A word is perhaps required about the background of this truce. The willingness of the Spartans to participate in it is not surprising if their attitude is correctly depicted in this paper. The Athenian attitude is presumably due to the revival of interest in the Persian War which accompanied the return of Cimon from ostracism. (Thuc. i 112.1–4, Plut., Cimon 18.1–5)Google Scholar. If Cimon had lived he would no doubt have hoped to turn the truce in due course into a peace, and the Spartans would have shared this hope. The peace which Argos made with Sparta at this time was no doubt due to disappointment at the poor results of their alliance with Athens. They had been dragged into Athens' enterprise in Boeotia but had received little help in their own ambitions. Oenoe was at the best a small-scale affair and Thyreatis remained in Spartan hands.
41 There could hardly be any way of ‘overlooking’ this. Athens had no right to be in this part of Boeotia, only in the territory of Plataea. This presumably remains true even if Athens had been secretly encouraging anti-Theban pretensions in Tanagra (see n. 25) if there was no formal alliance. If Athens had had an epimachia with Tanagra her action might not have forced Sparta to regard herself as at war. In any case, the attack on the Laconian shipyards by Tolmides (Thuc. i 108.5) would have produced this effect shortly afterwards. Such an overt act of aggression could hardly have been treated as were the raids from Pylos after the Peace of Nicias.
42 It is here conceded that the promises of help to the Thasians and Potidaeans were in fact resolutions of the Spartan assembly (although the former is said by Thucydides (i 101.2) to have been kept secret from the Athenians), and that the convening of the congress of allies by Sparta over Samos at least shows that she was willing to consider war. Some scholars have thought that the promises may have only been made by Spartan officials who may have genuinely thought that they could get them honoured, and convinced the Thasians and Potidaeans of this. Thucydides might well have got his information about the promises from sources in Thasos and Potidaea, where they would have been eagerly credited (cf. καὶ ἔμєλλον in Thucydides loc. cit.). But no such explanation will meet the case of Samos. Unless the Corinthian story of the congress is totally rejected it must be agreed that at least this one case of a sudden switch in the Spartan attitude is established, and therefore the other two may be credited, though they are by no means certain, and no explanation is provided of the failure to help Potidaea promptly.
43 Plut., Cimon 16Google Scholar. 4–7. Diodorus xi 63.5–7.
44 Op. cit. 143.
45 It might be suggested that Sparta could have been capable of an isolated big effort but not of a sustained one. The reply could be that one would have expected the isolated big effort to have come over Aegina before the Doris issue arose. More seriously, the question is merely whether Sparta possessed enough troops (as she clearly did). Her expeditions cost her nothing economically and could be repeated without difficulty, as they were in the Archidamian War.
46 i 95·7.
47 xi.50.
48 Plut. Cimon 16.8.
