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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 October 2013
By the last quarter of the fifth century it was generally agreed that there were three basic forms of government: monarchy, democracy and oligarchy, and this basic division continued to the end of the classical period. For the Athenians, this choice was for practical purposes reduced to one between democracy and oligarchy: kings might appear on the tragic stage, but in contemporary Athens sole rule was synonymous with tyranny, a form of government which had been beyond the pale since the expulsion of the Peisistratids. Indeed, in the late fifth century it was the object of a public hysteria which affords Aristophanes much scope for satire, particularly in Bdelycleon's speech in Vesp. 488 f.
1 First in Pi. P.2.86–8, dated between 475 and 468; cf. Hdt. iii 80–2, Pi. R. 338d8, Plt. 291cd, 301c, Isoc. xii 132, D. xxiii 66 (n.b. τύραννος), Aeschin. i 4, Arist. Pol. 1279a25. The parallel degenerate forms do not appear until the early fourth century (X. Mem. iv 6.12, Pl. Plt. 291d–2a, R. 543 f.), perhaps inspired by the successive downfalls of the radical democracy and a close oligarchy at the end of the preceding century.
2 N.B. the assimilation of ξυνωμόται (implying oligarchy) to tyranny in Ar. Vesp. (345, 483, 488, 507 f. cf. 417). If Thesmophoriazusae belongs to the Dionysia of 411 (for which see HCT v 187–93) the references to tyranny (338, 1143–4) on the eve of an oligarchic revolution are particularly striking.
3 Of the Thirty: Lys. ii 61–2, 64, xii 39, 73, 92, 94, 97, xiii 17, xiv 34, xviii 5, 24, 27, xxviii 13, xxxi 26, 31, 32, Isoc. xvi 37. Of the Four Hundred: Lys. xii 67. Of both revolutions: Lys. xii 78, Isoc. xx 10. For the usage cf. Hell. Oxy. 15.2. Oligarchs naturally tried to assimilate themselves to the constitutional forms of government: in Thuc. iii 62.3 the Thebans implicitly align themselves with democracy against δυναστεία, which is ἑγγυτάτω … τυράννου.
4 The failure of right-wing sources such as ps.-X. and Andocides to mention oligarchy as such is not surprising, but it is noteworthy that ὁλιγαρχία and its cognates do not appear in Aristophanes.
5 The author of [And.] iv remarks that the Athenians think a lot about the word ‘tyrant’ while ignoring the thing itself (iv 27). As an index of the shift of political debate to a constitutional level one might note that ὁλιγαρχία and its cognates are found 5 times in Hdt., 26 times in Thuc., and δημοκρατἱα and cognates 3 times in Hdt. and 22 times in Thuc.
6 Conspiracy might be equated with tyranny (above n. 2), but it might equally be left undefined, as part of the standard vocabulary of political abuse (e.g. Ar. Eq. 236, 257, 452, 476, 628, 862, Vesp. 953). If anything, ξυνωμὁται were associated with manipulation of the democratic system (Ar. Lys. 577–8, Thuc. viii 54.4) and it was perhaps not appreciated that they might alter their objectives. The vagueness of the expression κατἁλυσις τοῦ δήμου also helped, focussing as it did on the victim, not the aggressor: in Thuc. vi 27.3, for example, ξυνωμοσίᾳ implies oligarchy, but the focus on Alcibiades suggests tyranny (vi 28.2 cf. 15.4; Seager Historia xvi [1967] 6–18).
7 μὴ τὀν αὐτὀν τρόπον δημοκρατουμένοις (Thuc. viii 53.1). There are hints of a similar process at Megara in 424 (Thuc. iv 74) inasmuch as the future oligarchs got themselves elected under a democratic system, though the element of military force also suggests resemblances to the techniques of the Thirty (n.b. HCT ad loc.).
8 YCS xxiv (1975) 37Google Scholar f. For naval strength and the empire see [X.] Ath. 1.2, 19–20, 2.2–6; 1.15–7. There are references to the sea, democratic interference and the link between the demos and πονηρἰα in PHeid. 182, which may be of similar date (frr. a3, b2–3, a5; for a text and full discussion see Gigante Maia ix [1957] 68 f.). It is uncertain whether this papyrus is part of a political treatise or a fragment of comedy (it is fr. 362 dub. in Austin, C.Comicorum graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta [Berlin 1973])Google Scholar.
9 For an extreme statement, see the ‘moderate’ views of Theramenes (X. HG ii 3.48).
10 Although the archon for 411 was retained in office, in other ways the restored democracy made a clean break with the past (Rhodes, JHS xcii [1972] 126;Google Scholarτούτους in Ath. Pol. 34.1 refers to the government of the Five Thousand, who are thus distinguished from the restored democracy, ὀ δῆμος). Rhodes brings out well the relativity of slogans in this case (ibid. 122–3, 125). regardless of the technical definition of the government of the Five Thousand, which continues to be debated.
11 The authorship of this speech is attributed to Critias by Wade-Gery, (CQ xxxix [1945] 19CrossRefGoogle Scholar f. = Essays in Greek history 271 f.), who argues that the political sentiments are his, though he will not have been the speaker. For the association below of Theramenes' comments with the Larissaean constitution see 24–6. Debate continues about the date and attribution of this speech, but I find Wade-Gery's arguments persuasive.
12 The fact that the government of the Five Thousand (and, nominally, of the Four Hundred) also contained elements of a hoplite franchise (below, 162–3) shows how vague, emotional and open to misrepresentation constitutional labels were.
13 Sparta's constitution caused a different kind of confusion. In the fifth century historians contented themselves with references to its excellence and enduring stability (Hdt. i 65.2, Thuc. i 18.1), but her victory in the Peloponnesian War made her a natural model for imitation (X. Mem. iii 5.14 f.) and stimulated investigation into the basis of her success, thus throwing into prominence her puzzling constitution (Pl. Lg. 712de), which might be variously described as monarchy (X. Lac. 15), oligarchy (D. xx 108) or, more tendentiously, democracy (Isoc. vii 60–1, xii 178: n.b. Andrewes, A.Ancient society and institutions, studies V. Ehrenberg [Oxford 1966] 14–7)Google Scholar, a problem finally resolved by the concept of the mixed constitution (e.g. Arist. Pol. 1265b33 f., 1270b7 f, 1293b1 f., 1294b13 f. cf. Plb. vi 3.8, 10.6–12).
14 In the context the name seems significant: many of Athenagoras' attitudes and preoccupations are those of contemporary Athenian democrats (see HCT iv 301 for echoes of Cleon). For another possible case n.b. Euphemus at vi 75.4; both names are, of course, well attested elsewhere and it is the context which makes them significant, particularly since the individuals are otherwise unknown.
15 For the continuing importance of equality in doctrinaire democratic ideology cf. E. Supp. 353, 408, 432, 434, 441; it is reflected also in the group of significant Ισο names in the late fifth and early fourth century: Ἰσαρχος PA no. 7685, Ἰσόδημος PA 7710–1, Ἰσοδίκη. PA 7712, Ἰσόνομος PA 7719–20, Ἰσοτιμίδης PA 7721 (cf. Ἀριστοκρἁτης PA 1892–6).
16 For age as a characteristic, at least de facto, of participation in oligarchies, n.b. Whibley, L.Greek oligarchies: their character and organisation (London 1896) 148–9;Google ScholarCary, JHS xlviii (1928) 229 and n. 50Google Scholar.
17 Ath. Pol. 29.2, 30.2, 31.1 with Rhodes, A commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford 1981)Google Scholarad locc. If age limits were imposed on the Three Thousand, they have left no trace in the sources, but hand-picking of reliable individuals probably obviated the need for other types of limitation.
18 Whibley (n. 16) 126–32. Even this criterion was not absolutely reliable: Phormisius, as one of the returning exiles, presumably saw his proposal to limit the franchise as moderate democracy (D. H. Lys. 32), though to Lysias (xxxiv) it is a proposal to subvert the constitution and a prelude to oligarchy.
19 This system reflects the similarly elaborate constitution of contemporary oligarchic Boeotia (Hell. Oxy. 16.2–4, Thuc. v 38.2), which may have been its model. In both the constitutions of Ath. Pol. 30–1 the prevalent numerical specificity and procedural elaboration are presumably largely for propaganda purposes.
20 Thuc. viii 67.3; this was presumably the simplest and safest way of expanding from an inner group to the magic figure of 400, but finds a curious echo in Xenophon's account of the elder Cyrus' selection of his Persian expeditionary force (Cyr. i 5.5). Plato's interest in numerical systems probably owes more to Pythagoreanism (Lg. 737–8), but n.b. Whibley (n. 16) 136 n. 17.
21 Whibley (n. 16) 134–6.
22 N.B. Whibley (n. 16) 157–61. Oligarchic councils were commonly appointed for life, but the suggestion that the Four Hundred be selected from the Five Thousand in rotation (Thuc. viii 93.2) resembles the Boeotian system (above n. 19), its closeness to democratic practice making it a suitable concession in a crisis. Under the Thirty there was both a boule, for a veneer of legality, and a gerousia in the Thirty themselves.
23 See Rhodes 1981 (n. 17) ad loc. for δυνατός as an oligarchic slogan, and cf. the remark in [Herodes] 31: ὃτῳ δὲ μήθ᾿ ὁπλα μηδ᾿ ἅλλη δύναμίς ἐστι τὰ κοινὰ πράσσειν, οὐχ ὐπὸ Λακεδιμονίων ἀλλ᾿ ὑπὸ τῆς τὑχης ἀπεστερήθη τῶν πραγμάτων.
24 N.B. the suggestion of Cary (n. 16) 225 that the constitution of the Ten Thousand at Cyrene, which was based on a single property qualification, was equivalent to a hoplite franchise. Plato's Laws also presents a hoplite franchise (753bc), though the light-armed get a say in military elections (755e).
25 Thuc. viii 93.1. The possible identification of the assembly at Colonus with the Five Thousand needs treating with scepticism in view of the composition of that assembly, and is in any case problematic (n.b. Rhodes 1981 [n. 17] ad loc., also HCT v 203f. on Lys. xx). On the leading role of the hoplites in the formation of the government of the Five Thousand n.b. HCT v 326.
26 See HCT v 329 for a brief discussion of the numbers question.
27 The very gap between the theoretical figure and Polystratus' demonstrates its artificiality, perhaps arrived at by multiplying the boule by ten; the tribal organisation would have suited ideas of a hoplite franchise. A certain degree of fudging in the early stages is also suggested by Pesiander's ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον (Thuc. viii 53.3); μᾶλλον looks like a cautious afterthought.
28 That there was some debate about the effectiveness of numerical limits is also suggested by an intriguing fragment of an early fourth century dialogue in the Socratic manner, in which it is argued that the number of participants can no more be used to differentiate between constitutions than it can be used to define flute-playing. The text is edited by Merkelbach, in Aegyptus xxix (1949) 56–8;Google Scholar his deletion of δημοκρατία and ὀλιγαρχἱα in the last sentence seems essential to make sense of the passage.
29 E.g. Ar. Vesp. 662, Ath. Pol. 24.3; Plu. Arist. 7, And. i. 87, D. xxiv 45–6, lix 89. For this sort of measure of political activity cf. Thuc. viii 72.1. Of course, it is a fallacy to identify the peak count with the total number of individuals involved.
30 Hdt. v 97.2; for the figure see Gallo, Pisa, Scuole Normale Superiori, Annali ix 2 (1979) 505Google Scholar f., Meiggs, CR n.s. xiv (1964) 2–3Google Scholar.
31 For the Spartiate population in the late fifth century see Forrest, W. G.A history of Sparta (London 1968) 132–5,Google ScholarDe Ste. Croix, G. E. M.The origins of the Peloponnesian War (London 1972) 331–2,Google Scholar Andrewes (n. 13) 7. However, an exact correspondence to historical reality is less important than the point that this would be a reasonable estimate for a laconising Athenian to make, since Sparta's recent success made her contemporary form, rather than any Spartan ideal figure, the model for imitation (above, n. 13). The particular round figure might then be influenced by the importance of the number 3 in Sparta's constitutional arrangements: there were 3 tribes and 30 members of the gerousia, including the kings, and Plutarch's figures for the Lycurgan distribution of land are also all divisible by 3, including the total of 9000 Spartiates (Lyc. 8); n.b. Forrest op. cit. 42–6.
32 This theory is developed in detail by Whitehead, AncSoc xiii/xiv (1982/1983) 105–30Google Scholar and Krentz, P.The Thirty at Athens (Ithaca N.Y. 1982) 64–8Google Scholar. Among other measures, they note the ephors who preceded the Thirty (Lys. xii 43–4), the 300 lash-bearers (Ath. Pol. 35.1 cf. X. Lac. 4.3, HC iii 3.9), the reduction to perioecic status of those not included in the Three Thousand, and the overtones of ξνηλασία in the attacks on metics.
33 Though it may be worth observing that a third of the population of 10,000 in the ideal city of Hippodamas of Miletus were to be soldiers (Arist. Pol. i267b30–3).
34 The dispute over the membership of the boule in 411 was conducted in terms of numbers (Thuc. viii 86.6), but this concealed a wider issue: 400 represented a return to alleged Solonian practice (Ath. Pol 31.1 with Rhodes 1981 (n. 17) ad loc., HCT v 227) while 500, the Cleisthenic figure, represented democratic practice, despite earlier attempts to steal the democrats' clothes (Ath. Pol 29.3 with Rhodes op. cit.; HCT v 215; Fuks, A.The ancestral constitution [London 1953]Google Scholar ch. 1).
35 I would like to thank Peter Derow, George Forrest, Steve Tracy and the J.H.S. editor and referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this note.
