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Citizens–experts’ interactions under different institutional arrangements: assessing the role of uncertainty, interests, and values

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2019

Francesco Bogliacino Open the ORCID record for Francesco Bogliacino [Opens in a new window] ,
Cristiano Codagnone  and
Giuseppe Alessandro Veltri
Francesco Bogliacino*
Affiliation:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo, Carrera 30, #45-03, Bogotá, Colombia
Cristiano Codagnone
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Milano; Univeritat Obierta de Catalunya
Giuseppe Alessandro Veltri
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Trento
*
*Corresponding author. Email: fbogliacino@unal.edu.co
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Abstract

In this paper, we develop a framework to analyze the relationship between evidence and policy. Postulating a normative criterion based on cost–benefit analysis and the value of a piece of information, as well as a topology of the policy space defined by three characteristics (epistemic uncertainty, interests, and the degree of value conflicts), we identify the (Nash) equilibria of an interaction between experts and citizens in providing information to a decision maker. In this setup, we study three institutional arrangements (evidence-based policy, deliberative governance, and negotiated conflict) that differ in terms of reliance on experts and citizens for providing information. We show that different degrees of uncertainty, interests, and value-relevance surrounding the issue at stake result in vastly different arrangement performances; hence, to foster efficiency, rules should be contingent.

Keywords

Evidence-based policydeliberative governancenegotiated conflictpolicy evaluation

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 15 , Issue 5 , October 2019 , pp. 861 - 879
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2019 

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