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A time to throw stones, a time to reap: how long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2021

Pierre-Guillaume Méon  and
Khalid Sekkat
Pierre-Guillaume Méon*
Affiliation:
Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Centre Emile Bernheim and Dulbéa, CP-114/03, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 50, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium
Khalid Sekkat
Affiliation:
Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and ERF, Centre Emile Bernheim, CP-114/03, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 50, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium
*
*Corresponding author. Email: p-guillaume.meon@ulb.be
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Abstract

We study the impact of democratic transitions on institutional outcomes. Using an event study method and a sample of 135 countries over the period 1984–2016, we observe that democratic transitions improve institutional outcomes. The effect appears within 3 years after the transition year. The results are robust to alternative definitions of transitions, alternative codings of pre- and post-transition years, and changing the set of control variables. We also find that both full and partial democratizations improve institutional outcomes. Transitions out of military regimes or communist autocracies do not. The effect of democratization depends on GDP per capita, education, and the regularity of the transition. Finally, the evidence suggests that the effect is particularly clear on the corruption, law and order, and military in politics dimensions of the index.

Keywords

Democratic transitionsdemocratizationgovernanceinstitutionspolitical riskH11
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 18 , Issue 3 , June 2022 , pp. 429 - 443
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Millennium Economics Ltd.

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