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How (Not) to measure institutions

  • STEFAN VOIGT (a1)
Abstract
Abstract:

The statement ‘institutions matter’ has become commonplace. A precondition for it to be supported by empirical evidence is, however, that institutions are measurable. Some of the difficulties in measuring institutions are described and some ways of measuring them are proposed.

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Corresponding author
*Email: stefan.voigt@uni-hamburg.de
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Journal of Institutional Economics
  • ISSN: 1744-1374
  • EISSN: 1744-1382
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics
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