Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Political institutions and financial cooperative development

  • AMR KHAFAGY (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

This paper analyses the influence of political institutions on the development of financial cooperatives. It proposes a political economy theory where autocratic regimes deliberately oppose the development of a well-functioning financial cooperative sector to maintain their political influence, and prevent the formation of strong pressure groups that can threaten the current political status quo and reduce the governing elites’ economic benefits from underdeveloped and exclusive financial sector. Using panel data from 65 developing countries from 1995–2014, the results show that democracy, political rights and civil liberties promote financial cooperative development. These results are robust in controlling for endogeneity as well as other economic and institutional factors.

Copyright
Corresponding author
*Email: amfkhafagy@gmail.com
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson (2005), Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 4863.

G. S. Becker (1983), ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3): 371400.

S. Claessens and L. Laeven (2003), ‘Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth’, The Journal of Finance, 58(6): 24012436.

V. Nienhaus (1993), ‘The Political Economy of Development Finance’, Managerial Finance, 19(7): 820.

R. G. Rajan and L. Zingales (2003), ‘The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century’, Journal of Financial Economics, 69(1): 550.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Journal of Institutional Economics
  • ISSN: 1744-1374
  • EISSN: 1744-1382
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 4
Total number of PDF views: 37 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 237 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between 2nd November 2016 - 24th March 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.