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Understanding the economics of limited access orders: incentives, organizations and the chronology of developments

  • BAS VAN BAVEL (a1), ERIK ANSINK (a1) and BRAM VAN BESOUW (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

In ‘Violence and Social Orders’, North, Wallis and Weingast highlight the need of societies to control large-scale violence. In response to this need, a variety of social orders has emerged with differing institutional, political and economic characteristics. One of these social orders is the limited access order that was prevalent in most of history and still is nowadays. Taking the conceptual framework of North et al. as a starting point, we make three advances to their analysis of limited access orders. First, we analyse the incentive structure of actors involved, using a formal model of the main interactions in a limited access order. Second, we decompose organizations into two types and analyse their respective roles. Third, we use insights from historical research to scrutinize the chronology of the rise of organizations. Jointly, this allows us to refine and substantiate the insights gained by North et al., highlight the role of organizations and place the start of relevant developments earlier in time.

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Corresponding author
*Email: b.j.p.vanbavel@uu.nl
**Email: j.h.ansink@uu.nl
***Email: b.vanbesouw@uu.nl
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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

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Journal of Institutional Economics
  • ISSN: 1744-1374
  • EISSN: 1744-1382
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics
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