Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa

What approach to property rights?


In his rich contribution, Arruñada (2017) debates what institutions are needed to enforce complex ‘sequential’ transactions embedded in interdependent private contracts, and more specifically discusses the conditions of their efficiency when it comes to transferring property. Beyond acknowledging the importance of this issue and the very stimulating and often counterintuitive ideas developed in the paper, this short note challenges some of the positions adopted by Arruñada, particularly regarding the relevance of ‘The problem of social cost’ (Coase, 1960) for dealing with this issue. It also raises questions about the institutional, hybrid arrangement advocated as the solution for dealing with sequential transactions.

Corresponding author
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

D. W. Allen (2015) ‘The Coase Theorem: coherent, logical, and not disproved’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 11 (2): 379–90.

C. Ménard (2014), ‘Embedding Organizational Arrangements: Towards a General Model’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 10 (4): 567–89.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Journal of Institutional Economics
  • ISSN: 1744-1374
  • EISSN: 1744-1382
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *


Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 1
Total number of PDF views: 19 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 102 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between 9th April 2017 - 23rd September 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.