As in most presidential election years, Latin America is not significant in the campaign issues presently under discussion, nor is it likely to become so before November 1992. This article focuses, therefore, not so much upon which issues might, or even should, be emphasized by the Democratic Party during the campaign, as upon what might be the design of a Latin American policy by a new Democratic administration in January 1993. Start, then, by assuming a Democratic victory in November.

It would be reasonable to predict that Latin America will get more attention, of a different nature and on a more consistent basis, than it has during the Reagan-Bush years. The Democrats have had the affiliation of the greater number of this country's Latin Americanists, and their weight will be felt. They will want, demand, and probably get, some serious input.

The Purpose of this essay is to outline, at least in part, the Latin America agenda of the Republican Party for the 1990s as it appears to me. The subject is both timely and important. However, I can claim no special insight in this regard and, given the nature of the two parties, no one has, or really could, authorize my effort. Such an endeavor probably requires roughly equal measures of analysis, and speculation with respect to the future course of events here in the United States, within the region and around the globe. Given these caveats, I am pleased to try to lay out the Hemispheric policy agenda which I believe that the Republican Party should, and will, follow during the decade to come. Although my partisan sympathies will undoubtedly shine through, I can only hope that my viewpoints will not diverge too greatly from those of my esteemed friend and colleague, Ambassador Ambler H. Moss.

The Moment of Truth has come for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The US Congress will have to stop talking and vote to accept or reject the agreement negotiated among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The disagreement on NAFTA in the United States is about free trade with Mexico, not with Canada. A US-Canada free trade agreement (FTA) already exists.

This controversy over NAFTA has been fierce in the United States, much more so than in Mexico. This comparison speaks volumes about changing attitudes. It was almost unthinkable a decade ago that Mexico would so drastically alter its traditional position of maintaining economic and political distance from the United States. This change would not have been possible but for la decena trágica, the years of the 1980s. Beyond that, Mexico has more at stake in a free trade agreement. It has the smaller economy (about 1/27th that of the United States) so that changes, for better or worse, are magnified.

This Article addresses some of the key issues involved in understanding current trade negotiations between Mexico and the United States, as well as their significance for the process of economic integration in North America. These issues derive from the new setting produced by (a) Mexico's trade and investment liberalization in the 1980s, (b) the incentives which underlie the drive towards integration, as well as (c) those factors which will condition the final content of the current negotiating process.

A free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States could be seen as the logical conclusion of the process of trade and investment liberalization carried out by the Mexican government ever since the mid-1980s. At the same time, it also represents a shift in Mexico's initial trade strategy, from multilateralism to bilateralism, or from globalization to regionalization, as a consequence of the global trend, toward the end of the 20th century, to create large regional economic blocs.

This Study will explore the extent to which state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were responsible for creating the Latin American debt problem and, more importantly, the extent to which the present privatization of those enterprises may help to resolve that problem. In some quarters, privatization has been viewed as an essential reform needed to restore creditworthiness and growth in the region after the “lost decade” of the 1980s. Other quarters have been more skeptical, viewing it more as the latest fad to strike the region. The conclusion that will be expressed here falls somewhere in between: privatization can indeed play a part in solving the debt crisis and restoring growth, but, like all solutions, it may also create unintended problems down the road if not used carefully.

The Process of the transition from authoritarianism to more representative forms of government has become a major subject of the scholarship on Latin American politics today (O'Donnell, et al, 1986; Malloy and Seligson, 1987; Stepan, 1989; Diamond et al, 1988-1990; Lowenthal, 1991). Given this interest, as expressed by the growing literature in this area, little attention has been paid to the transition process now going on in Paraguay, which is now emerging from one of Latin America's most long-standing authoritarian regimes.

A number of studies testify to the authoritarian nature of Paraguay's government and society. Johnson indicates that Paraguay ranked either 18th or 19th—out of 20 Latin American nations ... in 9 successive surveys of democratic development, carried out at 5-year intervals from 1945 to 1985 (Jonnson> 1988). A longitudinal study of press freedom found that Paraguay was invariably placed in the category of “poor,” or even “none,” between 1945-1975 (Hill and Hurley, 1980). When Palmer applied his 5 indicators of authoritarianism (nonelective rule, coups, primacy of the military, military rule, executive predominance) to the countries of Latin America, Paraguay consistently ranked first in its degree of authoritarianism (Palmer, 1977).