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Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana: a Best-Case Example?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Extract

Independent Botswana has developed on three main pillars: rapid and sustained economic growth (over the decade to 1992, for example, at 8.4 per cent a year, third-highest among all developing countries, and far in excess of any other in Africa); multi-party or liberal democracy; and an efficient central state, the main features of which have been identified and praised by observers. With growth, an accompanying build-up of a relatively strong governmental system took place, with activities especially focused on finance and planning. The civil service was maintained at a high level, according to Ravi Gulhati, by avoiding rapid localisation, by providing high compensation for officials, and by keeping well-defined lines of authority and accountability. Able people were placed in key positions and kept there for extended periods. The political elite fairly consistently sought expert advice from leading bureaucrats, and the two groups have displayed a closeness and mutuality of interest built upon their common involvement in cattle and commerce, and the not uncommon tendency for cabinet ministers to arise from the ranks of the senior bureaucracy.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

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31 According to Mogae's ‘Budget Speech, 1991’, P31 million had been provided by the Government in 1988 in order to write off bad debts. Three years later it was revealed that loans to the NDB had been written off twice, in 1985–1986, as well as 1988–1989, with a total value of over P35·5 million. See the Botswana Gazette, 30 March 1994, for the parliamentary statement by the Assistant Minister of Finance, Edison Masisi.Google Scholar

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74 Midweek Sun, 15 September 1993. Patrick Molutsi may rather over-state the actual, rather than the intended, passivity of the people, certainly with regard to students and organised workers in the towns.Google Scholar

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76 Under Section 5 of the existing National Security Act it is a criminal offence to publish any information which the state decides is ‘classified’ – defined as any matter declared to be confidential by the Government. Editorial, Botswana Gazette, 23 February 1994. The penalty under this Act is up to 25 years imprisonment, regardless of public interest. Section 7 of the Immigration Act empowers the President to declare a resident or visitor a prohibited immigrant, and denies such a person the right of appeal to a court of law and to demand information. Bojosi Otlhogile, ‘The President: office, functions and powers’, n.d., pp. 14–15. This power has been used to deport foreign journalists on more than one occasion. Both Acts remained unused during Newslink's operations. It should also be noted that certain offences under the Penal Code, especially that of ‘sedition’, seriously limit access to information.Google Scholar

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78 Midweek Sun and Botswana Gazette, 23 February 1994.

79 Nairn, op. cit. p. 44. However, Sweden, apart from the Bofors case, appears to be different. Corruption in Japan, unlike the endemic form of Italy, is seemingly also of the eélite variety, focused often on the construction industry.

80 Guardian, 28 January 1993.

81 The Chief Magistrate declared: ‘I am satisfied that the accused has been validly accused of influence-peddling within the management of BHC in the award of the Spectra contract, and the onus is placed on him to prove albeit on balance of probabilities that he did not obtain the [so-called] loan corruptly.’ See Mmegi, 6 August 1993, for ‘State v Tshipinare, Judgement’.Google Scholar

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84 The establishment of something like an Economic Crime Unit within the Office of the President was mooted over several months in 1994, and the creation of an Ombudsman has been talked about for more than a decade. But it is very doubtful that such bodies — in the abstract, and in and of themselves worthy reforms — could be capable of confronting the type of élite corruption experienced in Botswana.Google Scholar