Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 May 2016
South Sudan is in a unique combination of (post)-conflict reconstruction and thebirth of a new state in which old policies are re-activated and new policiesintroduced. By looking at three case-studies of taxation and private sectorregulation reforms, the paper will show how the overlapping and oftencontradictory regulatory frameworks of the state provide the setting forbricolage strategies by different actors. These actors, and particularly stateofficials, rely on a variety of institutional resources to implement, resist orremake certain regulatory measures. Although the breadth of regulatory measureshas increased exponentially, the institutional corridor – the spacein which bricolage is performed and on which various actors can rely– remains narrow. This space is contingent on wartime authoritystructures, and more particularly pre-existing Sudan's PeopleLiberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) power structures, as well as a deep-rootedresistance to centralised control. Importantly, these regulatory practices arenot fixed: intense periods of rearrangement of the social order or‘open moments’ may provide a window of opportunity forregulatory reform.
The authors have contributed equally to writing this article. They wouldlike to thank the following people: Prof. Thea Hilhorst of the SpecialChair for Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction (HAR) WageningenUniversity; the anonymous reviewers; Mollie Gleiberman. The researchdescribed in this article was financially supported by the DutchMinistry of Foreign Affairs under the IS Academy for Human Security inFragile States Grant [Act number 20683, Contract number DEK0111286].