INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 between the government of Sudan (GRS) and the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) ended the country's second civil war and left the new state of South Sudan with an interim constitution (GRS & SPLM/A 2005). At the time of South Sudan's independence in July 2011, its interim constitution was replaced by the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (TCSS). As it was mandated by the TCSS, the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) established in 2011 a National Constitutional Review Commission whose task was to draft a permanent constitution within a year of its formation (RSS 2011: Chapter II). Six years later, however, South Sudan still has no permanent constitution, while its transitional document has thus far been too easily circumvented. The ongoing constitutional crisis in South Sudan has generated many debates around the importance of a permanent guiding document and the seriousness of the state about realising it. Few policy changes underscore the gravity of the lack of constitution more than the decision of President Salva Kiir to increase the number of states through presidential decree from the 10 recognised states at the time of independence. The first order came in October 2015 and created 28 states (RSS 2015); the second order was decreed in January 2017 and further increased the number of states to 32 (Sudan Tribune 2017).
Besides the constitutional uncertainty, the Establishment Orders came at a sensitive time. Since 2013 South Sudan has been engaged in civil war, pitting Kiir's Sudan People's Liberation Movement In Government (SPLM-IG) against the party's counterpart In Opposition (SPLM-IO) along with other opposition movements which have proliferated since the outbreak of violence. Peace has been elusive; many agreements have been signed, but all were violated by the various parties involved. In this vein, the first Establishment Order undermined yet another peace agreement put in place to address the ongoing conflict. To the surprise of many, the decision came on the heels of a peace agreement mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and signed two months prior: the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). Signed between SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO, the 2015 agreement was based on 10 states which made up South Sudan (IGAD 2015).
Furthermore, the first Establishment Order was decreed at a time when the TCSS itself was supposed to undergo review. As South Sudan is in a period of transition and uncertainty on multiple levels, the redrawing of internal borders seems to escalate tensions. Indeed, though the warring parties have recently agreed on a Revitalised ARCSS (R-ARCSS) deal in September 2018, the issue of states remains unresolved. R-ARCSS instead tasks IGAD's Executive Secretariat with creating an Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) that would ‘consider the number of states … their boundaries, the composition and restructuring of the Council of States …’ and make recommendations accordingly (IGAD 2018: 22). As the contention of this issue has not receded – indeed, it has only been amplified with the creation of the IBC – the current debate around the new states and the arguments advanced in favour of maintaining and reversing them offer significant insights for the way forward as the Commission and South Sudan manages the issue.
In this regard, this research investigates the arguments advanced by supporting and opposing camps of the Establishment Orders using online South Sudanese media data. It asks the following question: Who are the supporters and opponents of the Establishment Orders and how do they argue for their claim of maintaining and reversing the new states? Unearthing the logic behind the propositions of supporters and opponents reveals divergent and convergent interests of various stakeholders that are, I argue, critical points for better understanding of conflict dynamics in South Sudan and for leveraging this understanding for the IBC and South Sudanese political actors in order to help mitigate conflict that could further stem from the issue of states. The contention around the number of states is indicative of further division, but also of opportunities for depolarisation, making understanding the debates around the states vital to conflict resolution in South Sudan.
Figure 1 Map of South Sudan showing the original 10 states divided into 28 states (Stimson Center 2016).
To this end, this paper applies Fairclough & Fairclough's coupling of argumentation theory and critical discourse analysis (CDA) to study practical reasoning. It evaluates the claim of proponents by investigating its defeasibility on its own merit and through an investigation of the counter-claim. In examining the claim of maintaining the new states, the counter-claim of reversing them, and the premises underlying both, this article unveils the political cleavages and intersections often present in complex and dynamic conflict contexts such as the one in South Sudan. Highlighting the points of divergence in the goals and circumstances of the two camps, this work argues for the compatibility of the values which undergird the two arguments and identifies these values as the critical focal point for addressing the issue of states and potentially others in South Sudan. The first part of this article will provide a brief background on the link between CDA and argumentation theory, while the second part will explain the method of argument analysis and evaluation. The third section will address data collection, followed by the analysis and evaluation of the claim and counter-claim in the fourth section. The fifth section will conclude with the implications of the analysis for South Sudan.
POLITICAL MEDIA DISCOURSE, CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENTATION THEORY
Situated in the recent argumentative turn within CDA, this study focuses on political media discourse concerning the establishment of new states in South Sudan. Van Dijk (Reference Van Dijk1997) defines political discourse as a communicative text (audio, written, etc.) that is produced for a political purpose by politicians. Nonetheless, given the social and institutional networks within which politics and politicians function, Van Dijk (Reference Van Dijk1997) notes the importance of what he calls ‘recipients’ of political discourse. ‘Once we locate politics and its discourses in the public sphere,’ he notes ‘many more participants in political communication appear on the stage’ (Van Dijk Reference Van Dijk1997: 13). These other actors can be the citizenry and the social, cultural and political institutions that contour the context of any given political discourse. More than simply being recipients of political discourse, furthermore, these actors – individuals and institutions alike – are also active producers of political discourse (Wodak & Meyer Reference Wodak and Meyer2001). The viewer, reader or listener of a few decades past may have been absent, invisibly consuming and engaging with the content that the media produces. With the advent and rapid development of digital media in recent years, however, recipients are no longer passive.
The literature shows that digital media has transformed political engagement by equipping the public with production capabilities that further enhance their citizenship and transnational citizenship (Jorba & Bimba Reference Jorba, Bimba, Anduzia, Jensen and Jorba2012). The public no longer engages privately with what they consume; they can produce political content and engage with existing content easily in large public virtual spaces (McLeod Reference McLeod2001; Koc-Michalska et al. Reference Koc-Michalska, Lilleker and Vedel2016). The data collected for this study, for example, includes 11 press releases by South Sudanese communities within and outside South Sudan who are affected positively and negatively by the presidential decree, demonstrating the agency the online platform affords them to engage with issues at home (though, no doubt, one could problematise the concept of accessibility to the media and question the extent to which all South Sudanese individuals or communities have the same opportunity to engage with the media – based on internet access as well as levels of education).
Turning to arguments, the argumentative paradigm within CDA defines political discourse as fundamentally argumentative and thus calls for the incorporation of analytical tools from CDA and argumentation theory (Fairclough & Fairclough Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2012). Though CDA and argumentation theory come from two different epistemologies, they jointly provide powerful tools for the analysis of arguments. A critical approach to knowledge originating in the Critical Theory paradigm, CDA encompasses a wide range of approaches to the study of discourse and is primarily concerned with the study of language and the manifestations of power in its use (Reisigl & Wodak Reference Reisigl and Wodak2001; Blackledge Reference Blackledge2005). Argumentation theory has its origin in logic and philosophy and is concerned with the study of arguments – be they formal or informal in their structure – as the unit of analysis within a larger discourse (Van Rees Reference Van Rees2007). Van Eemeren et al. (Reference Van Eemeren, Garssen, Krabbe, Henkemans, Verheij and Wagemans2014: 6) define argumentation as ‘a communicative and interactional act complex’ that aims to reconcile an arguer's view with that of an addressee who holds a divergent opinion. In defining arguments as communicative, argumentation theorists pay attention to the structure of the arguments advanced, the context in which they are made, and whether they are made explicitly or implicitly (Van Eemeren et al. Reference Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck, Blair, Anthony, Ralph, Krabbe, Plantin, Walton, Willard, Woods and Zarefsky1996; Van Rees Reference Van Rees2007).
Argumentation theory then aims for the description, analysis and evaluation of arguments as put forward by actors engaged in argumentative discourse. The evaluative aspect of argumentation theory allows it to be critical and normative – in line with CDA – because arguments fundamentally are attempts ‘to convince an audience by rational means, inherently [make] an appeal to some normative standard of reasonableness’ (Van Rees Reference Van Rees2007: 1455). Reasonableness in argumentation theory is conceptualised as the ‘acceptability of a standpoint in light of critical questioning’ and through ‘critical discussion’ (Fairclough & Fairclough Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2012: 53). Thus, the critical and normative edge of argumentation theory, coupled with its emphasis on the importance of the context surrounding arguments, provide a useful methodology for argument analysis in the South Sudanese context.
Method of argument analysis and evaluation
Noting that there is a lack within CDA of ‘systematic attempt to identify, reconstruct, analyse, and, on this basis, evaluate any particular argument in texts, or to undertake a principled critical discussion of argumentation …’, Fairclough & Fairclough (Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2011: 244) advance an approach to the study of arguments. Their approach draws from and builds on the methodological and theoretical tools of argumentation theorist Douglass Walton (Reference Walton1990, Reference Walton1995, Reference Walton1996, Reference Walton2007) and his work on practical reasoning. Walton (Reference Walton2007: 11) defines practical reasoning as:
[A] kind of goal-directed knowledge-based reasoning that is directed to choosing a prudent course of action for an agent that is aware of its present circumstances … The conclusion is an imperative that directs the agent to a prudent course of action. The premises describe the agent's goals and knowledge in a given situation, especially practical knowledge of ways and means.
Practical reasoning is thus a process by which one arrives at an action, at what to do (as opposed to theoretical reasoning, oriented at reasoning what is). Walton points out, however, that practical reasoning is presumptive and defeasible; that is, ‘it leads to a conclusion that is only provisionally acceptable, subject to the asking of appropriate critical questions’ that test it (Walton Reference Walton2007: 33). Building on the foundational value of actors as the premise on which practical reasoning stands, Fairclough & Fairclough (Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2012) propose the inclusion of goal and circumstance as premises for analysis. The goal premise for argumentation analysis is warranted because the wants and desires of agents are not comparable due to the internal and external reasons for advocating a given action and the mechanism underlying these reason types may be fundamentally different. Desires and wants are inherently different from formal and informal codes of conduct such as duties and norms that are socially expected, for example. Accordingly, Fairclough & Fairclough (Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2012: 42) define the goal of a given action as the ‘future possible state of affairs’ that an arguer anticipates based on the values which anchor her position.
On the other hand, the need for the circumstantial premise for the analysis of arguments emanates from recognising the importance of deontic modality – expectations and values of the speaker – in articulating political arguments (Fairclough & Fairclough Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2012). More often in making political arguments, particularly in media contexts, arguments for a particular action are made from the perspective of the speaker and not the actor who will carry out the proposed action (‘She ought to do Z’). As such, deontic modality considers the circumstances in which the argument is constructed: the facts, motivations, conditions, perspectives and desires shaping the perspective of the speaker. The circumstantial premise is likewise normative because the manner in which argument makers describe circumstances is determined by the values they espouse. To outline arguments, therefore, Fairclough & Fairclough (Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2012: 45) arrive at the following model:
Claim: Agent should do A.
Circumstances: natural facts, social and institutional facts, agent's value, socially recognised moral values.
Goals: A future state of affairs X in which agent's values are recognised.
Means-Goal: Action A is the means to take the Agent from current circumstances to G in fulfillment of values.
Values: Agent is concerned with realising V or value commitments.
For the evaluation of arguments, Fairclough & Fairclough adopt a dialectical approach. They differentiate between questioning the argument and questioning its conclusion, pointing out that to defeat an argument (showing it to be invalid and unsound) ‘is much less significant than being able to rebut its claim, given that a claim can be true or false independently of the quality of the argument that allegedly supports it’ (Fairclough & Fairclough Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2012: 63). They thus emphasise that it is by considering counter-arguments and counter-claims that one can evaluate an argument. Central to counter-arguments and claims is their ability to highlight negative consequences of proposed courses of action. ‘[If] an action leads to the goal stated in the goal premise (is sufficient) but has negative consequences on other goals that are important to the agent or to other agents it might be wise not to go ahead with the action’ as it is unreasonable (does not withstand critical questioning) (Fairclough & Fairclough Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2012: 66). The negative consequences of proposed actions (that ‘Z should not be done’) in this context, act as a premise that supports the counter-argument. Before applying this method to better understand the debate around the new states in South Sudan, I first explain the data.
DATA COLLECTION
The data used for this study are news articles, analysis pieces and press releases collected from Gurtong and Sudan Tribune, two online media outlets which focus on South Sudanese politics. Gurtong is an independent not-for-profit online newspaper based in South Sudan. Its mission is to remove ‘all ethnic, political or personal obstacles on the way to unity, peace, and mutual respect among South Sudanese’ (Gurtong 2016). Sudan Tribune is a France-based online not-for-profit newspaper that has been reporting on Sudan (and later South Sudan) since 2003 (Sudan Tribune 2016).
While there are other online media outlets focused on South Sudan, I exclude them in large part due to credibility and bias issues. I choose these two sources because of their overall positive reputation for credibility and reliability. Within the threshold of reputability, furthermore, I focus on Gurtong and Sudan Tribune because of their virtual existence as online newspapers. That both of these sources occupy a virtual space allows them to engage not just local communities, but diaspora communities who have greater online presence (Ndangam Reference Ndangam2006), thereby accounting for all stakeholders and their views. Focusing on these two sources, however, is not without limitations. Two sources are constrained in the breadth and depth with which they can collectively cover an issue and showcase the multiple perspectives that make up its dimensions. It is likely that much is missed, for example, by not looking at English newspapers such as Juba Monitor or Arabic newspapers such as Al-Watan – both of which have print presence and may experience wider visibility.
Another limitation that is important to acknowledge is the elite nature of the texts I examine. I am working with texts published online in English, about a place with limited internet access, and low levels of education. The voices that are in a position to articulate opinions and stances on the new states in this medium are therefore necessarily privileged and few – as are those positioned to read them. Notwithstanding this limitation, I argue that having press releases as part of the data allows for a sufficiently wide breadth of positions on the new states to be expressed – namely that of concerned and affected communities that may not otherwise have an avenue through which to voice their perspectives. In some small but positive way, this privileged space perhaps allows communities to voice their concerns to those best positioned to take action, such as South Sudanese political elites (though whether actions follow in response is another matter).
The data were collected from July 2015 to April 2017, encompassing the three months preceding the first Establishment Order and the three months following the second Establishment Order. A total of 167 articles were located and NVivo was used for coding and analysis. The articles were initially categorised into the two main camps of proponents and opponents of the decision to create new states. Then, they were further analysed using the argumentation framework, categorising them into the claim, circumstances surrounding it, goals of the claim, the values undergirding the claim, and the means by which the values are achieved.
The news articles include reporting about various issues concerning the Establishment Orders: communities expressing concern over or contentment with the decision; interviews with the president, members of his cabinet, or members of parliament regarding the decision. The analysis articles are written from a professional perspective and they seek to evaluate the presidential decrees by paying attention to issues of constitutionality, timeliness and the anticipated popularity of the decision. The press releases are a combination of international organisations and governments involved in the peace process condemning the decrees and various ethnic communities expressing their support of or opposition to the presidential decision.
As is evident from Table I, the majority of the data refer to the first Establishment Order decreeing the 28 states. An interesting fact about the data is that, within these two outlets, there is no publication about the presidential decree prior to 2 October 2016, when the first decree was established. There is little, overall, on the second Establishment Order in Gurtong and Sudan Tribune. Though Gurtong and Sudan Tribune do not espouse any political ideologies that make them particularly inclined to support or oppose the South Sudanese government, there is certainly a strong argument to be made for journalistic self-censorship in an oppressive media environment (see Bourgault Reference Bourgault1993; Hutt Reference Hutt2006; Parks & Mukherjee Reference Parks and Mukherjee2017). Recent reports of violence against South Sudanese journalists are particularly significant indicators of the state of the media and press freedom in the state (Reporters without Borders 2016a, 2016b).
Table I Breakdown of articles on the first and second Establishment Order by type and media outlet.
ARGUMENT ANALYSIS
Here I identify, reconstruct, analyse and evaluate the arguments advanced in the data. I first outline the argument in support of the claim that the presidential decree should be maintained. For reasons of space, I provide excerpts from each data type that are representative of the two arguments identified in the collected data.
Claim:
The Establishment Order should be maintained.
News 1:
[S]enior officials loyal to president Kiir have defied the international calls to suspend the decision, claiming the president acted in the interest of the people of South Sudan.
“The decision of the president is constitutional. It does not contravene any provisions in the constitution. The president acted within the law to serve the interest of the people from whom the constitution gets the basis,” said Martin Lomuro, cabinet affairs minister, in a briefing to reporters on Wednesday. “The will of our people is one of the sources of the constitution. The constitution talks about decentralization and the people who have always asked for devolution of powers to the lower level government. This could not be done in time because the government, as you know, was preoccupied with the implementation of the CPA (comprehensive peace agreement) and the referendum and then came this senseless war,” he echoed the previous explanations by president Kiir … The spokesperson for the presidency, Ateny Wek Ateny, said no amount of pressure on the government would compel president Kiir and his government to reverse the directive because it was a popular demand by the people. …
Analysis 1:
As the peace implementation gets underway in South Sudan, there are doomsayers who view the decision to increase the number of states to 28 from 10 as a bad omen for the peace in South Sudan. Some have gone as far as arguing that the order is unconstitutional and tribally-biased. This article argues that The Establishment Order actually increased the likelihood of having a durable peace prevail.
In a masterstroke, President Salva Kiir has killed two birds with one stone: reduce the risks to the peace agreement and satisfied a popular demand for taking government to people. The creation of more states is a very popular move at the grassroots level because it satisfied the long-standing demand by South Sudanese to bring their governments closer to people. A government attuned to the desires of people can identify ways to address the issues and this is the essence of any government. It creates greater accountability and transparency because there is less bureaucracy. …
Press release 1:
Your Excellency, your decision in decentralizing powers in the country is a timely one! With no doubt, it would resolve lots of disparities ranging from lack of basic service to the people [in Twic County], unemployment, unnecessary migration of people to only one developed Capital City [Juba] or overcrowding of a few developed urban areas in the country. …
Mr. President, we are aware of limited resources South Sudan has at the movement to fund creation of 28 states. However, it should not be used as an excuse to thwart a novel idea that would equitably address inequality in the country's development at its root … Like many other areas in South Sudan that hardly get government services, Twic County is a marginalized area despite its huge population that is nearly half a million.
Irrefutably, it should be understood that an establishment of 28 states [is to facilitate] access to services.
Your Excellency … [y]ou have already shown to us and to people of goodwill your commitment to peace by signing IGAD-Plus Agreement despite its shortcomings. Please remain resolute to peace and keep up that spirit of peace and harmony in our country alive! We salute you for your bold decision in signing peace and creating 28 states. …
One of the main groups advocating for maintaining the presidential decree, not surprisingly, are members of Kiir's government (1, 5). As shown in News 1, they defend the president from international attacks and cite the constitutionality of the decision as well as its popularity with the South Sudanese public. A similar line of defence, as stated by a South Sudanese ambassador in a news article, emphasises the administrative nature of the decision to create new states. ‘[The] merits of the creation of 28 States is purely basic services delivery’, states the ambassador, ‘but I want to let our people from both Eastern and Western Lakes States take the division as only administrative’ (news article data).
Another group of supporters identified in the collected data are members of the president's ethnic community (27–30). The above press release, from the Twic-Mayardit community in Canada, is one of multiple congratulatory statements from various Dinka communities thanking the president for having created new states. There is no press release by or reporting on co-ethnics of the president arguing against the new states in the data examined – as is true of the inverse. That ethnic divisions may explain some of the camps where communities place themselves is not to say that the decision to create more states has not received opposition and support across ethnic lines – one which the existing data cannot demonstrate. As exemplified by the excerpts above, proponents of maintaining the new states collectively argue for it by highlighting the constitutionality of the move (3–4), the demand of the people (7–9, 13–14, 21), better service delivery by further decentralising the government (22–24, 28–30), and ensuring peace as brought about by the signing of the 2015 ARCSS (18–19, 40–43). The reconstructed argument in favour of maintaining the new states is thus summarised here.
Claim: The newly created states should not be reversed.
Circumstances: There is a ‘lack of basic services … unemployment, unnecessary migration of people to … [Juba] or overcrowding of a few developed urban areas in the country’.
– The people are demanding a more decentralised system of government; the current peace agreement enables the government to deliver on this demand, especially given the constitutional authority the president has.
Goals: To create a decentralised system which takes the ‘government to people’, allowing ‘greater accountability and transparency …’ and addressing the challenges with service delivery.
Values: Accountability to the people by responding to their demands.
Means-Goals: Maintaining the new states will allow the realisation of a decentralised system.
Now I turn to identifying the counter-claim and to reconstructing it.
Counter-claim:
The new states should be reversed.
News 2:
“This illegal action by President Salva Kiir's government is anti-peace. The unilateral creation of 28 states is a clear violation of the peace agreement. Neither the president nor the national legislature has the power to singlehandedly amend the peace agreement or the constitution,” Machar's spokesman, James Gatdet Dak, told Sudan Tribune when contacted on Thursday.
He said it was clear in the peace agreement that any amendment (…) would first be agreed upon by the parties to the deal, and therefore not only one party to decide and implement.
Dak further said the 28 states are prone to creating another war in the country over their unclear boundaries despite the peace agreement which has ended the 15 December 2013 war over political reforms. “And if you look at the way President Kiir has proposed the 28 states, this will most likely create another war over states or boundaries,” he said. …
Analysis 2:
EO No 36/2015 has spurred some dangerous undertakings (e.g., the Luach Jang of Tonj demanding its own state after the recent violent confrontation with the Rek of Riang Nhom and justifying that they are more in numbers than both Gok and Twic West combined; the Twic Mayardit threatening each other with violence over the relocation of the capital to Mayen Abun; the Fratit of Raja demanding detach from Dinka of Malwal; the Bul Nuer expressing dissatisfaction of their new annexation; the Shilluk rejecting division of their Kingdom between West and East Nile States; the Acholi and Madi demanding a separate state, the Azande of Tumbura rejecting being part of Gbudwe State, and the vicious circle of the opened Pandora Box continues, etc.).
The provisions enshrined in the ARCISS and TCSS are paramount, and should form the ground-level from which some of these convictions/beliefs are justified for higher interest of the country rather than for those few elites who engineered the 28 States for the cover up of parochial interests of their ethnicities. …
Press release 2:
(1) The creation of 28 states poses serious legal and political implications on ground of procedural irregularities, violation of the TCSS, 2011 (amended 2015) read together with the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan … [In] our opinion the timing of this decision is unfortunate and can lead to increased burden on the already over stretched economic status, national revenue and human resource capacity deficit that exists in South Sudan. …
(3) The TCSS, 2011 (amended 2015) does not have express provision for creation of new States…The purported creation of 28 states complicates the agreed power sharing ratios in the recently signed peace agreement on the resolution of conflict in South Sudan … Any attempt by either of the parties to unilaterally create new power sharing formula…will take the parties back to the drawing board … and open up the already signed peace agreement for renegotiation which amounts to violation of the Agreement.
(6) In light of the above authority cited by the Presidential Order No 36/2015 for creation of 28 states, and with exception of Article 101 (f), all the rest of the provisions of the TCSS, 2011 (amended 2015) cited in the order do not grant powers to the President to create new States or alter boundaries of existing states. …
Opponents of the new states tend to be opposition groups in general (50–52), civil society groups (68–71), disadvantaged ethnic community groups (58–66), and members of the international community such as the United Nations, the European Union and Norway. A group of former political detainees – former SPLM leaders – voiced their disagreement with Kiir in a press release citing, among others, the constitution. ‘The last thing that South Sudan needs at this difficult time of its history’, they argue, ‘is the conscious and willful disregard for, and violation of its Constitution by the very people who bear the most responsibility for its protection’ (press release data). Opponents of the new states call for reversal of the decision due to its implication for the peace deal signed based on 10 states (45–48, 78–81), the current fragile condition of the country (53–57, 74–77), the unconstitutionality of the decision (46–48, 85–88), the lack of a participatory political process in reaching the decision to redraw boundaries (46–48, 68–71), and the ethno-political motivations behind the decision and the resulting ethnic violence (58–67). In reconstructing the counter-claim that the new states should be reversed, the position of opposition can be further represented accordingly:
Counter-claim: The newly created states should be reversed.
Circumstances: Timing. The peace agreement was based on 10 states. New states amount to ‘violation of the peace agreement …’
– The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan does not grant the president the right to redraw state boundaries.
Consequences: New states exacerbate ‘national revenue and human resource capacity deficit’.
– The new states are motivating ‘dangerous undertakings’: ‘the Luach Jang of Tonj demanding its own state … [The] Twic Mayardit threatening each other with violence over the relocation of the capital …’
Goals: To ensure that the constitution is respected, public political participation is encouraged and promoted, and that the conflict is resolved by upholding the peace process.
Values: peace, respect for the constitution, inclusion of the public.
Means-Goals: Reversing the new states will ensure the supremacy of the constitution and allow a participatory process in determining states.
As Fairclough & Fairclough note, diagramming arguments shows how the values, goals, and circumstances of these two camps relate to one another and support their claims. In the diagram below, the circumstances of the claim (supporters) are numerically labelled from 1 to 4, while the circumstances of the counter-claim (opponents) are alphabetically labelled from A to D, for ease of aligning these symbols with their respective positions. The two consequences of the counterclaim are accordingly labelled alphabetically (A and B).
ARGUMENT EVALUATION
The arguments in favour and against the new states are both presumptive and defeasible; that is, they are provisionally acceptable until scrutinised through critical questioning. While supporters of the new states envision a future with greater decentralisation, opponents see a future with more respect for political institutions, participatory political process and commitment to peace. Are these values and goals indeed the motivations behind the proposed action that each of these camps advances? It is not until one investigates the circumstances and the anticipated consequences that one finds answers. I therefore focus my in-depth analysis on the circumstance and consequence premises and conclude my analysis with a focus on my main argument: the compatibility of the value premise of both arguments.
Evaluation of circumstances
Taking the circumstance premise of both arguments, one can examine whether it is acceptable, relevant and sufficiently supportive of the claim advocated. According to the first argument simplified in Figure 2, supporters argue (1) that the new states are a popular demand; (2) the lack of infrastructure for service delivery across South Sudan, (3) aided by a change in the government's responsibility of no longer having to implement the CPA, and (4) by the state of peace after the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015, cultivate an environment conducive to the creation of new states. By contrast, those who argue for reversing the new states cite (A) the exclusionary nature of the decision, (B) the limited economic resources to institute new states, (C) the lack of constitutional basis for the presidential action, and (D) the current conflict in South Sudan and the violation of the peace agreement.
Figure 2 Diagram of the claim and counter-claim regarding the new states.
Circumstance 1 argues in favour of maintaining the new states from the perspective of its popularity. Is this decision popular and does its popularity matter? Firstly, it is important to distinguish between the popularity of the concept of decentralisation, and the popularity of the new states. The idea of decentralisation, envisioned as federalism, has been increasingly developing in South Sudanese political thought since the first pan-southern conference in 1954 (Johnson Reference Johnson, Kuol and Logan2019). The SPLM later instituted a system of decentralisation in territories under its control from as early as 1994 (Rolandsen Reference Rolandsen2005). The public's interest in more administrative divisions during Sudan's second civil war, argue Rolandsen (Reference Rolandsen2005) and Leonardi (Reference Leonardi2013), comes from the perception of decentralisation as a solution that would respond to the challenges of service delivery.
There is a fallacy in this position, however, because the fact that an action is popularly supported does not make it the right course of action. There is also the political reality of when decentralisation is advocated in volatile contexts such as South Sudan. As De Waal & Pendle (Reference De Waal, Pendle, Kuol and Logan2019: 173) note, decentralisation is rarely about the will of the people; rather, it is often a strategic move by the central state for the purpose of ‘stabilising and consolidating central power by means of reorganising the provincial political landscape’. Circumstance A, on the other hand, weighs the popularity of creating the new states against whether the decision itself was reached through a participatory process.
No doubt, South Sudan's limited infrastructure, particularly to the periphery of the capital and other large cities, is a challenge that faces the country (Fagotto Reference Fagotto2011; Ranganathan & Briceño-Garmendia Reference Ranganathan and Briceño-Garmendia2011). Ranganathan & Briceño-Garmendia (Reference Ranganathan and Briceño-Garmendia2011) find that infrastructure in South Sudan has been ill-funded despite the country's high oil revenues since 2005. Limited access, by extension, has affected the delivery of services related to nutrition, education and healthcare, more so in rural areas than urban ones (World Bank 2017). One governor highlights in a news article the positive infrastructural changes that the new states will entail, and in so doing, outlines the existing challenges. ‘New States means closer government to the people’, notes the governor, ‘[n]ew State capitals will be established, there will be new roads to connect these newly created States to the national capital, hospitals will be created and more schools will open’. Given these confirmations, Circumstance 2 in support of the new states is an acceptable sub-premise that reflects the situation in South Sudan.
However, that poor infrastructure has been an issue well before independence begs why it is of interest in late 2015 to early 2017. Supporters of maintaining the new states claim that implementing the CPA obliged the government to postpone further decentralisation of South Sudan. Even if it were not for the ‘need to implement’ the 2005 peace agreement, however, the CPA's prioritisation of power-sharing between the North and the South would have made it impossible for then southern Sudan to redraw intra-south borders (GRS & SPLM/A 2005). More importantly, the South would have also jeopardised the referendum principle enshrined in the CPA if it created more states, thereby forfeiting a credible chance at independence. These challenges to Circumstance 3, however, are further amplified by a larger obstacle. The CPA's implementation period was six years, ending in 2011 with the referendum on independence. The government had three years from independence to when the current conflict broke out to act on what it depicts in its argument as an urgent demand by the people, yet it did not. Granted, many predicted a hard road ahead for South Sudan following independence, particularly the potential of conflict; it is thus likely that independence reshuffled political priorities in South Sudan (Sarwar Reference Sarwar2012; Salman Reference Salman2013).
Circumstance 4 suggests, however, that the new states are more likely a political move than a commitment to the will of the people. Supporters of the new states advance that the signing of ARCSS in 2015 makes it appropriate for South Sudan to respond to the popular demand of the people. The claim of peace is rather ironic given that both the government and the SPLM-IO protested the violation of ARCSS by the opponent within a few days of its signing (Sudan Tribune 2015a). In July 2016, three months after South Sudan formed a ‘Government of National Unity’ as stipulated by ARCSS, heavy fighting erupted in Juba, causing the displacement of thousands (Aljazeera 2016) and prompting the United Nations to increase its peacekeeping force for the protection of civilians (Sieff Reference Sieff2016). Indeed, in further demonstration of the lack of peace in South Sudan, the government and opposition leaders signed R-ARCSS in September 2018. The understanding of peace to supporters of maintaining the states, no doubt, precludes examining dimensions of positive peace; that is, going beyond the absence of violence and war to addressing more structural and systemic kinds of violence that South Sudan faces. Given that the premise of peace of Circumstance 4 is rejected, Circumstance D – the current conflict in the country – holds.
Besides arguing from the perspective of the ongoing conflict, those who argue for reversing the new states cite the (A) exclusionary nature of the decision, (B) the limited economic resources to institute new states, and (C) the lack of constitutional basis for the presidential action. Circumstance A emphasises the exclusion of the public as well as Parliament from informing the decision, further emphasising that the (arguable) openness to the idea of greater decentralisation does not denote surprising the public or usurping the power of Parliament. The data collected from July 2015 show that there was no reporting on the potential of new states until the first Establishment Order was announced in early October.
The exclusionary nature of the decision, as Figure 2 shows, has led to the negative consequences of ethnic violence, demands for more states, and contestation over state borders by different communities. This is to be expected, as De Waal & Pendle (Reference De Waal, Pendle, Kuol and Logan2019) illustrate, because decentralisation as a political strategy often nurtures or aggravates territorial and social fault lines, creating in its wake the demand for further decentralisation that cements perceptions of difference and reinforces them. According to the data, the politicisation of South Sudanese communities is reflected in the pattern of support and opposition to the new states. In the data collected, the press releases authored by communities in support of the new states are written from the perspective of co-ethnics of Kiir and they use the popularity of the new states and the benefit of decentralisation for better service delivery as their premise for support. Accordingly, all the community-authored press releases by communities that do not share the president's ethnicity oppose the new states and argue against the move, citing that it is annexation of their land. Already constituting a ‘social capital’ (Deng Reference Deng2010) and ‘powerful bond and a prime marker of identity’ (Frahm Reference Frahm2015: 253), ethnic ties are further politicised and mobilised (Roessler Reference Roessler2016), particularly in such times in South Sudan, for the benefit of political elites. Though as McMichael (Reference McMichael2016) argues, not every land conflict in the South Sudanese context originates in ethnic differences, the compounding of the social links ethnic identities nurture, coupled with the political mobilisation and involvement of those identities, may explain this divide.
Circumstance B reflects the economic dimensions of Circumstance 2, which is the inability of the government to fund new political institutions that call for new political structures. Despite its oil wealth, the South Sudanese state is financially bankrupt, unable to provide food to alleviate its man-made famine in 2017 (Nichols Reference Nichols2017; United Nations News 2017) or pay employee salaries (Oluoch Reference Oluoch2016). While the resource shows itself a curse to the South Sudanese people due to failure in leadership, it remains a blessing for politicians (Riak Reference Riak2013). Many have pointed out the kleptocratic context in which the South Sudanese state came into being, tracing it to a legacy of corruption within the SPLM (De Waal Reference De Waal2014). It is kleptocratic, notes De Waal, ‘in the everyday sense that national leaders use every opportunity to steal public funds, and also in the original social-scientific sense’ (Andreski cited in De Waal Reference De Waal2014: 438), where ‘supply and demand rather than laws and regulations’ determine government functioning (see Andreski Reference Andreski1968). High-ranking politicians are key beneficiaries and gatekeepers of this system. If the current state of the economy is hindering an already less-than-adequate operation of 10 states, it is likely to only worsen with the addition of 18 more. Opponents thus accurately assess the economic limitations to establishing new states when highlighting the limited resources of South Sudan as a further negative consequence of the decision to create new administrative units.
Circumstance D speaks to the legality of the Establishment Orders, highlighting that the constitution of South Sudan does not give the president the right to create new states. Supporters point out that the stipulation in the constitution to ‘promote democratic principles’ and ‘decentralization’ in all levels of government (RSS 2011 Article 36 (1): 18) and to ‘promote’ political participation by local government (Article 166 (6) (a): 76), coupled with the president's right to ‘supervise constitutional and executive institutions’ (Article 101 (b): 46), ‘initiate constitutional amendments and legislation’ (Article 101 (f): 46), and perform other functions as permitted by the law (Article 101 (u): 47), could be used to support creating new states. However, they argue, to ‘promote’ does not denote undertaking a significant act such as establishing new states. Indeed, according to Article 162 (3) of the TCSS (RSS 2011: 73), ‘state boundaries shall not be altered except by a resolution of the Council of States approved by two-thirds of all members’.
Furthermore, the Council of States is the only body with the right to ‘initiate legislation on the decentralized system of government’ and ‘approve changes in state names, capital-towns and boundaries’ (Article 59 (a) & (g): 30–31). There is, accordingly, no support for the argument that Kiir has the constitutional authority to create more states. Having considered the circumstantial premise in support of the new states and its counter-argument, the claim that the new states should be maintained stands on shakier ground. The counter-argument shows the mischaracterisation of the conditions claimed to have warranted the new states: underplaying of the current conflict in South Sudan, ignoring the financial difficulties South Sudan faces, and usurping the power of the Council of States to redraw state borders. However, what implications do these different representations of the reality of South Sudan have on the advanced values of both sides?
Evaluation of values
Examining the value premises on which the arguments fundamentally rest, one sees a camp that values accountability and doing the will of the people, and another that values working towards peace, respect for the constitution, and a participatory political process. While the values are presented as exclusive to each argument, I argue that they are compatible and do not inherently embody contradiction. That is, one could envision these values collectively providing a foundation for one argument. That some values are emphasised by one group and not the other underscores the extent to which the issue is heavily contentious, no doubt. But it is these same values, portrayed as irreconcilable by their respective camps, that provide the foundation of a resolution to the issue of states that would be acceptable to stakeholders.
With regards to the values underlying the decision to maintain the new states, the counter-argument illustrates that the claim undervalues other important values such as participation of the public in decision-making, regard for the constitution, and the peace process, especially when decentralisation and service delivery rely on limited resources (at best). The value premise of supporters of the new states, on the other hand, stresses the ‘will of the people’ to be done at all cost – jeopardising the peace process and undermining the TCSS. The values of the counter-argument, by contrast, do not necessarily preclude doing the will of the people. The concerns of the counter-claim are the lack of a participatory process and the conflict climate in which the decision to increase the number of states was made. Collectively, the values of the counter-argument underscore the imperative of distinguishing between support for the principle of decentralisation in general, and support for 28/32 states and the manner and environment in which they were created. Compounded, the manner and the environment – assuming the state's interest in public participation – make it difficult for individuals to partake in the political process. If the action of creating new states is not motivated by the value of doing the will of the people, it follows that the goal of greater decentralisation may not be the future that some supporters of maintaining the new states envision.
While the data certainly cannot tell us what Kiir's goal or intentions may have been, the political context of this debate allows one to address political motivations. I suggest that government supporters of the new states engage in what Fairclough & Fairclough term manipulation by providing rationalisations to justify, legitimise and popularise a stance that is unreasonable (Fairclough & Fairclough Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2012: 259). The South Sudanese minister, Michael Makuei Lueth, provides an insight into what the politics behind the decision may have been. Commenting on the negative reception of the new states by the SPLM-IO, Lueth argued that the opposition group ‘should have instead appreciated the decision because … [it] will solve the problem’ of accommodating the opposition in government (Sudan Tribune 2015b).
According to Lueth, the creation of the new states is a measure towards greater power-sharing because it creates new positions to be filled by members of the opposition. This reasoning seems plausible as there has been a consistent pattern of central government expansion in the recent peace agreements negotiated. The 2015 round of ARCSS increased the number of parliamentarians from 332 to 400 (IGAD 2015: 14). The recently signed R-ARCSS has further expanded the government by providing for five vice-presidents (previously one), 35 ministries (previously 30) and 550 members of Parliament (IGAD 2018: 13–26). It is plausible that Kiir wanted to create a win-win situation for his camp as well as the opposition. In practice, however, a large central government essentially defeats the purpose of decentralisation and raises the issue of financing a large central government as well as 32 state governments. It is more plausible, I contend, that the idea of decentralisation is a political tool that, far from responding to the demands of the people, ensures Kiir's control of the situation in South Sudan. Accommodation, after all, could have also meant reducing the number of Kiir allies in order to incorporate an appropriate number from the opposition.
CONCLUSION
Applying argumentative discourse analysis to the case of the new states in South Sudan, one delves into the arguments advanced in favour of maintaining and reversing the new states and engages in a critical examination of the assumptions which underlie them. The counter-argument is an essential part of argument analysis. One does not only accept or reject a claim but evaluates it in light of a counter-claim which helps uncover the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the premises on which the claim is based. The better argument – in this case the counter-claim – wins until one is presented further information to suggest the contrary (defeasible argument). This analysis reveals the attitudes of various stakeholders within and around South Sudan towards the new states, contributing to our understanding of the dynamics of this conflict. It demonstrates that there are two vividly opposing sides regarding the issue of states and highlights the ways in which these sides are in opposition and ways in which they are not. In doing so, it argues that the values of both camps do not seem to be mutually exclusive (though they seem to be presented as such). It is in the inclusivity of the values that there may be a way forward with regards to the unresolved issue of states.
The study thus has significant implications for South Sudanese actors and the IBC, especially as the latter works on its recommendations regarding the states. As the IBC deliberates on the issue of states, it should aim to respond to these values and make a case for their compatibility – a compatibility on which the IBC bases its proposal to South Sudanese officials. The analysis shows that the concept of decentralisation is not necessarily what the counter-argument protests. It is rather the process by which decentralisation is sought – excluding voices that are ultimately affected by such significant decisions. In this vein, this analysis pinpoints the sleeping lion, so to speak, in the negative consequences of the new states as highlighted by the counter-argument. Boundaries in such a highly politicised context are ultimately perceived to be about space and place by communities and individuals at the fault lines – which is arguably everywhere in South Sudan at this time.
Issues regarding the number of states, their boundaries, their capitals, and the basis on which such decisions will be made cannot be exclusionary, arbitrary or elite-oriented if South Sudan is to introduce elements that quell violence instead of ones that exacerbate it. The recommendations that the IBC will eventually make should hinge on clear understanding of the arguments that South Sudanese communities, members of civil society and opposition groups make in support and opposition of the 28/32 states and the values that undergird both positions. These values can potentially forge a way to understanding the needs and concerns of various stakeholders at the core of other societal, political and economic conflicts within South Sudan, demonstrating the contribution of CDA and argumentation theory as an effective and useful deconstructive methodology at the nexus of conflict and text.
