¹ See e.g. Keith, The Karma-Mīmāmsā 37ff., London, 1921. This handy little volume is the most convenient source of information on the system; but it deals almost entirely with its speculative side, whereas in most of the original texts the practical side bulks very much larger. Of this Keith tells us little, and what he tells is not always correct.

² For instance, the Mīmāṅsā Nyāya Prakāśa of Āpadeva never once refers to the doctrine of the eternality of the word. Yet this is the most widely-known and popular introductory text-book on the Mīmāṅsā. My translation of it, with text, introduction, and glossary, will shortly be issued by the Yale University Press. This article is based entirely on it.

³ The fact doubtless is that the particular rūḍhi in question, in this instance, grew up after the date of the Vedic text quoted. Historic change in the meaning of words is not recognized by the Mīmāṅsā. But tho the example may not be entirely a happy one, the principle is none the less sound and valuable.

⁴ An accessory, guṇa, is a subordinate element in a rite, as e.g. the material offered in sacrifice. An accessory-injunction, guṇa-vidhi, is one which merely enjoins a particular accessory for a rite which has been enjoined in another injunction; as, dadhnā juhoti, ‘he shall make oblation with sour-milk’, referring to the agnihotra oblation already enjoined by the injunction agnihotram juhoti. In these accessory-injunctions, the rite itself (exprest by the verbal-base, as hu-, homa, oblation) is the object of the efficient-force; 'with sour-milk he shall effect the oblation (which has been enjoined previously).' But unless the oblation has been already enjoined, it is clear that this interpretation would leave us without proper motivation for the instigating force. Why perform the oblation at all—with or without sour-milk? Despite the insistence on Vedic authority—nay, rather because of the repeated Vedic appeals to human self-interest—it is felt that a 'fruit' must be found; otherwise man will not perform the rites. This fruit (which is exprest by an ‘injunction of qualification’, adhikāra-vidhi) is then regarded as the end of the efficient-force in primary or originative injunctions.

⁵ Hence the general-verbal efficient-force is dependent on the injunctive one; the latter is the principal of principals.

⁶ This, I think, is needlessly exaggerated in its depreciation of the speculative side of the system. Thibaut was presumably thinking of the work he was dealing with, the Arthasaṁgraha, which like the Mimāṅsā Nyāya Prakäśa (see note 2) does not deal with that side.