Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 April 2026
In the recently published third volume of his Indogermanische Grammatik Professor H. Hirt, in his strikingly original and suggestive way, has unfolded a panorama of the history of the formation of IE nouns which differs so radically from the conception of the majority of scholars both in many details and in his general point of view, that it will be of the utmost importance to examine the credibility of his theories and the reliability of his methods. This is true all the more because his presentation, as elsewhere, through its clarity, through the interest which it arouses, and through the confidence with which it is presented, is apt to fascinate the minds of those who have not yet formed an opinion of their own, but are seeking orientation in the problems of IE linguistics for the first time.
1 To the speaker of the language *ĝhim-o-s was the correct analysis, i.e. he did not think of the m as being a suffix because there was no associated word without m with which to compare. For the probable earlier history of the word cf. Brugmann, Gr. 2. 12. 135. Of course it is equally true that words which were very clearly derivatives to the most superficial analysis would also often or usually be felt as a unity. These considerations show how illogical it is to accept misdivision' as a process which rearranges the length of the various formative elements, but to reject the same occurrence when it clips off something from the supposedly sacred and inviolable root. To the mind of the speaker it did not make a particle of difference whether the part clipped came from a root or another formative, since he did not and could not know what the original form of the root might have been, and the whole process was unintentional anyway.
2 Cf. Wundt, Sprachpsychologie3 1. 584 ff.
3 The assumption that determinatives, i.e. particles, were promiscuously added to nouns is also a blemish on Hirt's otherwise admirable suggestions on the origin of nominal inflections (VI). That inflectional endings, as far as not adapted, may have originated as pronouns or prepositions, we may well believe. That there were any particles among them, except when a pronominal ending was transferred to nouns secondarily, is highly improbable. That there were as many as Hirt assumes, is outside of the realms of possibility. The difference between the endings of nouns and pronouns resolves itself just exactly into this: All distinctively pronominal endings, of the origin of which there is any clue, are particles, while of the nominal case endings just the reverse is true. In the light of the above paragraph that is what we are bound to expect.
4 A peculiarly whimsical example of Hirt's, bearing on inflection rather than word formation, is his assumption that e.g. *і̯ug-om nom. acc. neut. is the correct analysis rather than *і̯ugo-m. From the fact that only the neuters of the o declension have the m, and that therefore no -m occurs alongside of -om in other neuters, Hirt draws the astonishing conclusion (88) that the -om of the neuter was not subject to the workings of the accent, and must therefore be a late addition, particle of course. He is sure it must be separated from the accusative masc. fem. in -o-m, as well as from all the o cases of the neuters themselves (all except nom. acc. pl.), but that it does belong to the ending of pronouns as Skt. ah-ám ‘ego,‘ and of adverbs like Gr. ϵ́μβαδν.
5 It is true that alongside of φ∈ιδωλή we find φ∈ιδώ in the same sense, but it would be rash to maintain that when one abstract suffix is added to another the later one is meaningless. Surely one diminutive suffix preceded by another is not called meaningless, but is considered to have been added for emphasis. Cf. Brugmann, op. cit. 674. To the apperception of the Greek speaker -ωλŋ apparently was felt as a single suffix, as is shown by the analogical ϵύχ-ωλή: ∈ύχoμαι and τ∈ρπ-ωλή: τϵ́ρπω, for which Hirt assumes abstracts *ϵύχώ and *τ∈ρπώ, as primitives. That in this combination the λ had any less to do with the sense than the ω, there is nothing to prove.
6 So Fay, Am. J. of Phil. 34. 15.
7 It is a specious argument used by Hirt and others that part of the examples of of a suffix in such cases must have had a different origin from the rest, and that it is not permissible to want to bring everything under one category. As a general principle this certainly cannot meet with any objection: it is its application that is not convincing. If άγριos could be interpreted in no other way, or if the origin from i ‘go’ were self-evident and did not bear the stamp of artificiality, we could readily subscribe to its etymology. But άγριos is much more convincingly taken as ‘belonging to the field’, and thus is exactly like the great number of denominative i(i̯)o adjectives. Where both form and meaning coincide with the normal, it puts an exceedingly onerous burden of proof on him who would separate in origin.
8 The theory of Bloomfield, Am. J. of Phil. 4. 66 ff., that root determinatives arose by word contamination, is infinitely more capable of explaining these elusive elements in their large majority, than their identification by Hirt with ‘determinatives’ or particles which he has found in noun formation. The objection raised by Persson, Beiträge 523 ff., that the identity of suffixes and root-determinatives disproved Bloomfield's theory, is met by the answer that suffixes arose in the same way—an idea which to Persson seemed inconceivable.