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Rights of Exit

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2009

Leslie Green
Affiliation:
York University, Toronto

Extract

Social groups claim authority to impose restrictions on their members that the state cannot. Churches, ethnic groups, minority nations, universities, social clubs, and families all regulate belief and behavior in ways that would be obviously unjust in the context of a state and its citizens. All religions impose doctrinal requirements; many also enforce sexist practices and customs. Some universities impose stringent speech and conduct codes on their students and faculty. Parochial schools discriminate in their hiring practices. Those who complain about such internal restrictions on the liberties of members might well be told to “love it or leave it.”

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998

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References

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