Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-ndmmz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-24T07:01:36.663Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

RULES, RIGHTS, OPTIONS, AND TIME

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 May 2001

Larry Alexander
Affiliation:
University of San Diego

Abstract

I. INTRODUCTION

Do we have constitutional rights that certain states of affairs exist (for example, that I burn an American flag and am not punished); or do we instead have constitutional rights that certain rules not exist (for example, that there be no rule forbidding the burning of American flags on pain of punishment)? I believe that as a positive account of at least most of our constitutional law, our constitutional rights are best conceived as rights against rules. However, the question remains, Why should the Constitution concern itself with rules rather than with states of affairs, with rule-differentiated act-types rather than rule-independent act-tokens? Must not its concern for the former be based on its concern for the latter?

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)