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An analysis of trust in anonymity networks in the presence of adaptive attackers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 November 2014

SARDAOUNA HAMADOU ,
VLADIMIRO SASSONE  and
MU YANG
SARDAOUNA HAMADOU
Affiliation:
INRIA, LIX, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, France Email: sardaouna.hamadou@gmail.com
VLADIMIRO SASSONE
Affiliation:
Cybersecurity Centre, University of Southampton, Southampton, U.K. Email: vs@ecs.soton.ac.uk
MU YANG
Affiliation:
ECS, University of Southampton, Southampton, U.K. Email: my1g09@ecs.soton.ac.uk
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Abstract

Anonymity is a security property of paramount importance, as we move steadily towards a wired, online community. Its import touches upon subjects as different as eGovernance, eBusiness and eLeisure, as well as personal freedom of speech in authoritarian societies. Trust metrics are used in anonymity networks to support and enhance reliability in the absence of verifiable identities, and a variety of security attacks currently focus on degrading a user's trustworthiness in the eyes of the other users.

Information

Type
Special Issue: Quantitative Information Flow
Information
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science , Volume 25 , Issue 2: Quantitative Information Flow , February 2015 , pp. 429 - 456
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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